new

Get trending papers in your email inbox!

Subscribe

Daily Papers

byAK and the research community

Nov 16

Runtime Authorization for Resources Acquired by AI Agents

By acquiring compute, credentials, accounts, services, and other agents, autonomous AI agents can introduce new authority into a task. Payment, budget, OAuth, mandate, and fulfillment checks can validate transaction conditions without deciding whether a returned resource may become usable authority. This post-fulfillment activation gap spans tool-mediated creation, inter-agent delegation, and agentic commerce. We present a provenance-bounded runtime authorization architecture. It quarantines acquired outputs, resolves their actual capabilities from authenticated provider evidence through a versioned resolver, and activates them only through a current activation transaction that checks the resolved manifest, provenance, epochs, and a downward-closed relational envelope over a typed resource-capability hypergraph. The envelope preserves correlated identity, effect, data, delegation, and graph-wide limits. Single-use effect permits are revalidated and consumed at effect linearization. Under explicit assumptions, we prove eight safety properties covering quarantine, backing, non-amplification, split non-evasion, crash/retry, refunds, epochs, and effect confinement. Across five resource classes, reference semantics accepted 20/20 benign traces and rejected 40/40 registered unsafe traces over 810 events; an independent checker agreed on 60 base and 40 refinement traces and rejected 89/89 tamper tests. Frozen Codex and Gemini Model Context Protocol (MCP) client components completed 54/54 deterministic local stdio calls. In a registered 18-case staged MCP-to-Docker composition, both benign paths completed, and none of the 16 unsafe paths added an unauthorized Docker start request. A five-source audit classified 1,248 field pairs across 32 units; no unit alone supplied a complete activation profile.

  • 2 authors
·
Sep 17

AutoDev: Automated AI-Driven Development

The landscape of software development has witnessed a paradigm shift with the advent of AI-powered assistants, exemplified by GitHub Copilot. However, existing solutions are not leveraging all the potential capabilities available in an IDE such as building, testing, executing code, git operations, etc. Therefore, they are constrained by their limited capabilities, primarily focusing on suggesting code snippets and file manipulation within a chat-based interface. To fill this gap, we present AutoDev, a fully automated AI-driven software development framework, designed for autonomous planning and execution of intricate software engineering tasks. AutoDev enables users to define complex software engineering objectives, which are assigned to AutoDev's autonomous AI Agents to achieve. These AI agents can perform diverse operations on a codebase, including file editing, retrieval, build processes, execution, testing, and git operations. They also have access to files, compiler output, build and testing logs, static analysis tools, and more. This enables the AI Agents to execute tasks in a fully automated manner with a comprehensive understanding of the contextual information required. Furthermore, AutoDev establishes a secure development environment by confining all operations within Docker containers. This framework incorporates guardrails to ensure user privacy and file security, allowing users to define specific permitted or restricted commands and operations within AutoDev. In our evaluation, we tested AutoDev on the HumanEval dataset, obtaining promising results with 91.5% and 87.8% of Pass@1 for code generation and test generation respectively, demonstrating its effectiveness in automating software engineering tasks while maintaining a secure and user-controlled development environment.

  • 5 authors
·
Mar 13, 2024 2

RedCode: Risky Code Execution and Generation Benchmark for Code Agents

With the rapidly increasing capabilities and adoption of code agents for AI-assisted coding, safety concerns, such as generating or executing risky code, have become significant barriers to the real-world deployment of these agents. To provide comprehensive and practical evaluations on the safety of code agents, we propose RedCode, a benchmark for risky code execution and generation: (1) RedCode-Exec provides challenging prompts that could lead to risky code execution, aiming to evaluate code agents' ability to recognize and handle unsafe code. We provide a total of 4,050 risky test cases in Python and Bash tasks with diverse input formats including code snippets and natural text. They covers 25 types of critical vulnerabilities spanning 8 domains (e.g., websites, file systems). We provide Docker environments and design corresponding evaluation metrics to assess their execution results. (2) RedCode-Gen provides 160 prompts with function signatures and docstrings as input to assess whether code agents will follow instructions to generate harmful code or software. Our empirical findings, derived from evaluating three agent frameworks based on 19 LLMs, provide insights into code agents' vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations on RedCode-Exec show that agents are more likely to reject executing risky operations on the operating system, but are less likely to reject executing technically buggy code, indicating high risks. Risky operations described in natural text lead to a lower rejection rate than those in code format. Additionally, evaluations on RedCode-Gen show that more capable base models and agents with stronger overall coding abilities, such as GPT4, tend to produce more sophisticated and effective harmful software. Our findings highlight the need for stringent safety evaluations for diverse code agents. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/AI-secure/RedCode.

  • 8 authors
·
Nov 12, 2024 1