Daily Papers

Multi-targeted adversarial attacks aim to mislead classifiers toward specific target classes using a single perturbation generator with a conditional input specifying the desired target class. Existing methods face two key limitations: (1) a single generator supports only a limited number of predefined target classes, and (2) it requires access to the victim model's training data to learn target class semantics. This dependency raises data leakage concerns in practical black-box scenarios where the training data is typically private. To address these limitations, we propose a novel Cross-Domain Multi-Targeted Attack (CD-MTA) that can generate perturbations toward arbitrary target classes, even those that do not exist in the attacker's training data. CD-MTA is trained on a single public dataset but can perform targeted attacks on black-box models trained on different datasets with disjoint and unknown class sets. Our method requires only a single example image that visually represents the desired target class, without relying its label, class distribution or pretrained embeddings. We achieve this through a Feature Injection Module (FIM) and class-agnostic objectives which guide the generator to extract transferable, fine-grained features from the target image without inferring class semantics. Experiments on ImageNet and seven additional datasets show that CD-MTA outperforms existing multi-targeted attack methods on unseen target classes in black-box and cross-domain scenarios. The code is available at https://github.com/tgoncalv/CD-MTA.

With the rapid development of diffusion models, style transfer has made remarkable progress. However, flexible and localized style editing for scene text remains an unsolved challenge. Although existing scene text editing methods have achieved text region editing, they are typically limited to content replacement and simple styles, which lack the ability of free-style transfer. In this paper, we introduce SceneTextStylizer, a novel training-free diffusion-based framework for flexible and high-fidelity style transfer of text in scene images. Unlike prior approaches that either perform global style transfer or focus solely on textual content modification, our method enables prompt-guided style transformation specifically for text regions, while preserving both text readability and stylistic consistency. To achieve this, we design a feature injection module that leverages diffusion model inversion and self-attention to transfer style features effectively. Additionally, a region control mechanism is introduced by applying a distance-based changing mask at each denoising step, enabling precise spatial control. To further enhance visual quality, we incorporate a style enhancement module based on the Fourier transform to reinforce stylistic richness. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves superior performance in scene text style transformation, outperforming existing state-of-the-art methods in both visual fidelity and text preservation.

Recent feature matching methods have achieved remarkable performance but lack efficiency consideration. In this paper, we revisit the mainstream detector-free matching pipeline and improve all its stages considering both accuracy and efficiency. We propose an Efficient Deep feature Matching network, EDM. We first adopt a deeper CNN with fewer dimensions to extract multi-level features. Then we present a Correlation Injection Module that conducts feature transformation on high-level deep features, and progressively injects feature correlations from global to local for efficient multi-scale feature aggregation, improving both speed and performance. In the refinement stage, a novel lightweight bidirectional axis-based regression head is designed to directly predict subpixel-level correspondences from latent features, avoiding the significant computational cost of explicitly locating keypoints on high-resolution local feature heatmaps. Moreover, effective selection strategies are introduced to enhance matching accuracy. Extensive experiments show that our EDM achieves competitive matching accuracy on various benchmarks and exhibits excellent efficiency, offering valuable best practices for real-world applications. The code is available at https://github.com/chicleee/EDM.

Semantic ultra high resolution image (UHR) segmentation is essential in remote sensing applications such as aerial mapping and environmental monitoring. Transformer-based models struggle in this setting because memory grows quadratically with token count, constraining either the contextual scope or the spatial resolution. We introduce CASWiT (Context-Aware Stage-Wise Transformer), a dual-branch, Swin-based architecture that injects global cues into fine-grained UHR features. A context encoder processes a downsampled neighborhood to capture long-range dependencies, while a high resolution encoder extracts detailed features from UHR patches. A cross-scale fusion module, combining cross-attention and gated feature injection, enriches high-resolution tokens with context. Beyond architecture, we propose a SimMIM-style pretraining. We mask 75% of the high-resolution image tokens and the low-resolution center region that spatially corresponds to the UHR patch, then train the shared dual-encoder with small decoder to reconstruct the UHR initial image. Extensive experiments on the large-scale IGN FLAIR-HUB aerial dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of CASWiT. Our method achieves 65.83% mIoU, outperforming RGB baselines by 1.78 points. On URUR, CASWiT achieves 49.1% mIoU, surpassing the current SoTA by +0.9% under the official evaluation protocol. All codes are provided on: https://huggingface.co/collections/heig-vd-geo/caswit.

We propose an efficient framework, called Simple Swap (SimSwap), aiming for generalized and high fidelity face swapping. In contrast to previous approaches that either lack the ability to generalize to arbitrary identity or fail to preserve attributes like facial expression and gaze direction, our framework is capable of transferring the identity of an arbitrary source face into an arbitrary target face while preserving the attributes of the target face. We overcome the above defects in the following two ways. First, we present the ID Injection Module (IIM) which transfers the identity information of the source face into the target face at feature level. By using this module, we extend the architecture of an identity-specific face swapping algorithm to a framework for arbitrary face swapping. Second, we propose the Weak Feature Matching Loss which efficiently helps our framework to preserve the facial attributes in an implicit way. Extensive experiments on wild faces demonstrate that our SimSwap is able to achieve competitive identity performance while preserving attributes better than previous state-of-the-art methods. The code is already available on github: https://github.com/neuralchen/SimSwap.

Facial parts swapping aims to selectively transfer regions of interest from the source image onto the target image while maintaining the rest of the target image unchanged. Most studies on face swapping designed specifically for full-face swapping, are either unable or significantly limited when it comes to swapping individual facial parts, which hinders fine-grained and customized character designs. However, designing such an approach specifically for facial parts swapping is challenged by a reasonable multiple reference feature fusion, which needs to be both efficient and effective. To overcome this challenge, FuseAnyPart is proposed to facilitate the seamless "fuse-any-part" customization of the face. In FuseAnyPart, facial parts from different people are assembled into a complete face in latent space within the Mask-based Fusion Module. Subsequently, the consolidated feature is dispatched to the Addition-based Injection Module for fusion within the UNet of the diffusion model to create novel characters. Extensive experiments qualitatively and quantitatively validate the superiority and robustness of FuseAnyPart. Source codes are available at https://github.com/Thomas-wyh/FuseAnyPart.

Customized generation has achieved significant progress in image synthesis, yet personalized video generation remains challenging due to temporal inconsistencies and quality degradation. In this paper, we introduce CustomVideoX, an innovative framework leveraging the video diffusion transformer for personalized video generation from a reference image. CustomVideoX capitalizes on pre-trained video networks by exclusively training the LoRA parameters to extract reference features, ensuring both efficiency and adaptability. To facilitate seamless interaction between the reference image and video content, we propose 3D Reference Attention, which enables direct and simultaneous engagement of reference image features with all video frames across spatial and temporal dimensions. To mitigate the excessive influence of reference image features and textual guidance on generated video content during inference, we implement the Time-Aware Reference Attention Bias (TAB) strategy, dynamically modulating reference bias over different time steps. Additionally, we introduce the Entity Region-Aware Enhancement (ERAE) module, aligning highly activated regions of key entity tokens with reference feature injection by adjusting attention bias. To thoroughly evaluate personalized video generation, we establish a new benchmark, VideoBench, comprising over 50 objects and 100 prompts for extensive assessment. Experimental results show that CustomVideoX significantly outperforms existing methods in terms of video consistency and quality.

Customized video generation aims to produce videos featuring specific subjects under flexible user-defined conditions, yet existing methods often struggle with identity consistency and limited input modalities. In this paper, we propose HunyuanCustom, a multi-modal customized video generation framework that emphasizes subject consistency while supporting image, audio, video, and text conditions. Built upon HunyuanVideo, our model first addresses the image-text conditioned generation task by introducing a text-image fusion module based on LLaVA for enhanced multi-modal understanding, along with an image ID enhancement module that leverages temporal concatenation to reinforce identity features across frames. To enable audio- and video-conditioned generation, we further propose modality-specific condition injection mechanisms: an AudioNet module that achieves hierarchical alignment via spatial cross-attention, and a video-driven injection module that integrates latent-compressed conditional video through a patchify-based feature-alignment network. Extensive experiments on single- and multi-subject scenarios demonstrate that HunyuanCustom significantly outperforms state-of-the-art open- and closed-source methods in terms of ID consistency, realism, and text-video alignment. Moreover, we validate its robustness across downstream tasks, including audio and video-driven customized video generation. Our results highlight the effectiveness of multi-modal conditioning and identity-preserving strategies in advancing controllable video generation. All the code and models are available at https://hunyuancustom.github.io.

Creating 3D assets that follow the texture and geometry style of existing ones is often desirable or even inevitable in practical applications like video gaming and virtual reality. While impressive progress has been made in generating 3D objects from text or images, creating style-controllable 3D assets remains a complex and challenging problem. In this work, we propose StyleSculptor, a novel training-free approach for generating style-guided 3D assets from a content image and one or more style images. Unlike previous works, StyleSculptor achieves style-guided 3D generation in a zero-shot manner, enabling fine-grained 3D style control that captures the texture, geometry, or both styles of user-provided style images. At the core of StyleSculptor is a novel Style Disentangled Attention (SD-Attn) module, which establishes a dynamic interaction between the input content image and style image for style-guided 3D asset generation via a cross-3D attention mechanism, enabling stable feature fusion and effective style-guided generation. To alleviate semantic content leakage, we also introduce a style-disentangled feature selection strategy within the SD-Attn module, which leverages the variance of 3D feature patches to disentangle style- and content-significant channels, allowing selective feature injection within the attention framework. With SD-Attn, the network can dynamically compute texture-, geometry-, or both-guided features to steer the 3D generation process. Built upon this, we further propose the Style Guided Control (SGC) mechanism, which enables exclusive geometry- or texture-only stylization, as well as adjustable style intensity control. Extensive experiments demonstrate that StyleSculptor outperforms existing baseline methods in producing high-fidelity 3D assets.

Instruction-based image editing through natural language has emerged as a powerful paradigm for intuitive visual manipulation. While recent models achieve impressive results on single edits, they suffer from severe quality degradation under multi-turn editing. Through systematic analysis, we identify progressive loss of high-frequency information as the primary cause of this quality degradation. We present FreqEdit, a training-free framework that enables stable editing across 10+ consecutive iterations. Our approach comprises three synergistic components: (1) high-frequency feature injection from reference velocity fields to preserve fine-grained details, (2) an adaptive injection strategy that spatially modulates injection strength for precise region-specific control, and (3) a path compensation mechanism that periodically recalibrates the editing trajectory to prevent over-constraint. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FreqEdit achieves superior performance in both identity preservation and instruction following compared to seven state-of-the-art baselines.

The next Point-of-Interest (POI) recommendation task aims to predict users' next destinations based on their historical movement data and plays a key role in location-based services and personalized applications. Accurate next POI recommendation depends on effectively modeling geographic information and POI transition relations, which are crucial for capturing spatial dependencies and user movement patterns. While Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit strong capabilities in semantic understanding and contextual reasoning, applying them to spatial tasks like next POI recommendation remains challenging. First, the infrequent nature of specific GPS coordinates makes it difficult for LLMs to model precise spatial contexts. Second, the lack of knowledge about POI transitions limits their ability to capture potential POI-POI relationships. To address these issues, we propose GA-LLM (Geography-Aware Large Language Model), a novel framework that enhances LLMs with two specialized components. The Geographic Coordinate Injection Module (GCIM) transforms GPS coordinates into spatial representations using hierarchical and Fourier-based positional encoding, enabling the model to understand geographic features from multiple perspectives. The POI Alignment Module (PAM) incorporates POI transition relations into the LLM's semantic space, allowing it to infer global POI relationships and generalize to unseen POIs. Experiments on three real-world datasets demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of GA-LLM.

Despite recent advances in video generation, existing models still lack fine-grained controllability, especially for multi-subject customization with consistent identity and interaction. In this paper, we propose PolyVivid, a multi-subject video customization framework that enables flexible and identity-consistent generation. To establish accurate correspondences between subject images and textual entities, we design a VLLM-based text-image fusion module that embeds visual identities into the textual space for precise grounding. To further enhance identity preservation and subject interaction, we propose a 3D-RoPE-based enhancement module that enables structured bidirectional fusion between text and image embeddings. Moreover, we develop an attention-inherited identity injection module to effectively inject fused identity features into the video generation process, mitigating identity drift. Finally, we construct an MLLM-based data pipeline that combines MLLM-based grounding, segmentation, and a clique-based subject consolidation strategy to produce high-quality multi-subject data, effectively enhancing subject distinction and reducing ambiguity in downstream video generation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that PolyVivid achieves superior performance in identity fidelity, video realism, and subject alignment, outperforming existing open-source and commercial baselines.

Cover songs constitute a vital aspect of musical culture, preserving the core melody of an original composition while reinterpreting it to infuse novel emotional depth and thematic emphasis. Although prior research has explored the reinterpretation of instrumental music through melody-conditioned text-to-music models, the task of cover song generation remains largely unaddressed. In this work, we reformulate our cover song generation as a conditional generation, which simultaneously generates new vocals and accompaniment conditioned on the original vocal melody and text prompts. To this end, we present SongEcho, which leverages Instance-Adaptive Element-wise Linear Modulation (IA-EiLM), a framework that incorporates controllable generation by improving both conditioning injection mechanism and conditional representation. To enhance the conditioning injection mechanism, we extend Feature-wise Linear Modulation (FiLM) to an Element-wise Linear Modulation (EiLM), to facilitate precise temporal alignment in melody control. For conditional representations, we propose Instance-Adaptive Condition Refinement (IACR), which refines conditioning features by interacting with the hidden states of the generative model, yielding instance-adaptive conditioning. Additionally, to address the scarcity of large-scale, open-source full-song datasets, we construct Suno70k, a high-quality AI song dataset enriched with comprehensive annotations. Experimental results across multiple datasets demonstrate that our approach generates superior cover songs compared to existing methods, while requiring fewer than 30% of the trainable parameters. The code, dataset, and demos are available at https://github.com/lsfhuihuiff/SongEcho_ICLR2026.

Inversion-based image editing in flow matching models has emerged as a powerful paradigm for training-free, text-guided image manipulation. A central challenge in this paradigm is the injection dilemma: injecting source features during denoising preserves the background of the original image but simultaneously suppresses the model's ability to synthesize edited content. Existing methods address this with fixed injection strategies -- binary on/off temporal schedules, uniform spatial mixing ratios, and channel-agnostic latent perturbation -- that ignore the inherently heterogeneous nature of injection demand across both the temporal and channel dimensions. In this paper, we present AdaEdit, a training-free adaptive editing framework that resolves this dilemma through two complementary innovations. First, we propose a Progressive Injection Schedule that replaces hard binary cutoffs with continuous decay functions (sigmoid, cosine, or linear), enabling a smooth transition from source-feature preservation to target-feature generation and eliminating feature discontinuity artifacts. Second, we introduce Channel-Selective Latent Perturbation, which estimates per-channel importance based on the distributional gap between the inverted and random latents and applies differentiated perturbation strengths accordingly -- strongly perturbing edit-relevant channels while preserving structure-encoding channels. Extensive experiments on the PIE-Bench benchmark (700 images, 10 editing types) demonstrate that AdaEdit achieves an 8.7% reduction in LPIPS, a 2.6% improvement in SSIM, and a 2.3% improvement in PSNR over strong baselines, while maintaining competitive CLIP similarity. AdaEdit is fully plug-and-play and compatible with multiple ODE solvers including Euler, RF-Solver, and FireFlow. Code is available at https://github.com/leeguandong/AdaEdit

Vision language models (VLMs) extend the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) to cross-modal settings, yet remain highly vulnerable to multimodal jailbreak attacks. Existing defenses predominantly rely on safety fine-tuning or aggressive token manipulations, incurring substantial training costs or significantly degrading utility. Recent research shows that LLMs inherently recognize unsafe content in text, and the incorporation of visual inputs in VLMs frequently dilutes risk-related signals. Motivated by this, we propose Risk Awareness Injection (RAI), a lightweight and training-free framework for safety calibration that restores LLM-like risk recognition by amplifying unsafe signals in VLMs. Specifically, RAI constructs an Unsafe Prototype Subspace from language embeddings and performs targeted modulation on selected high-risk visual tokens, explicitly activating safety-critical signals within the cross-modal feature space. This modulation restores the model's LLM-like ability to detect unsafe content from visual inputs, while preserving the semantic integrity of original tokens for cross-modal reasoning. Extensive experiments across multiple jailbreak and utility benchmarks demonstrate that RAI substantially reduces attack success rate without compromising task performance.

Large language models store substantial factual knowledge in their parameters, yet this knowledge is difficult to control, update, and reliably elicit at inference time. Existing memory-augmented approaches typically rely on a single auxiliary mechanism, such as retrieval, parameter updates, or neural memory, and therefore apply the same form of correction to tokens with very different knowledge demands. We propose Mixture-of-Memories (MoM), a memory-augmented language modeling framework that separates routed neural memory from writable factual memory. MoM combines a frozen base LM with two neural memory experts: a latent memory that provides low-latency hidden-state corrections and a lexical memory that provides a token-space knowledge pathway. A lightweight Budget Router sets per-token mixture weights from uncertainty and disagreement features, replacing the fixed interpolation of prior memory modules. For post-hoc updates, an external explicit memory stays outside the router, because a router trained before facts are written learns to down-weight it; new facts are appended without retraining any component and used only when an answer-level gate accepts the retrieved fact. Experiments across language modeling, factual QA, update analysis, and efficiency show that MoM improves both predictive accuracy and updateability while retaining low inference overhead.

Researchers have shown a growing interest in Audio-driven Talking Head Generation. The primary challenge in talking head generation is achieving audio-visual coherence between the lips and the audio, known as lip synchronization. This paper proposes a generic method, LPIPS-AttnWav2Lip, for reconstructing face images of any speaker based on audio. We used the U-Net architecture based on residual CBAM to better encode and fuse audio and visual modal information. Additionally, the semantic alignment module extends the receptive field of the generator network to obtain the spatial and channel information of the visual features efficiently; and match statistical information of visual features with audio latent vector to achieve the adjustment and injection of the audio content information to the visual information. To achieve exact lip synchronization and to generate realistic high-quality images, our approach adopts LPIPS Loss, which simulates human judgment of image quality and reduces instability possibility during the training process. The proposed method achieves outstanding performance in terms of lip synchronization accuracy and visual quality as demonstrated by subjective and objective evaluation results. The code for the paper is available at the following link: https://github.com/FelixChan9527/LPIPS-AttnWav2Lip

Event-based low-light image enhancement (LIE) methods mainly focus on incorporating high dynamic range (HDR) information from events while overlooking the essential global illumination in images and the inherent noise sensitivity of event signals in real-world scenarios. To address these issues, we propose EIC-LIE, an event-illumination collaborative LIE framework. Concretely, we first design an Event-Illumination Collaborative Interaction (EICI) module, which contains two key processes: forward gathering, which gathers HDR features across varying lighting conditions, and backward injection, which provides complementary content for illumination and event representations. Next, we introduce an Illumination-aware Event Filter (IAEF) that dynamically reduces event noise based on brightness statistics derived from images. Additionally, we build a beam-splitter-based hybrid imaging system to collect high-quality event-image pairs with temporal synchronization from dynamic scenes, providing the first high-resolution, real-world event-based LIE dataset. Extensive experiments show that our EIC-LIE outperforms state-of-the-art methods on five real-world and synthetic datasets, significantly surpassing previous methods with improvements of up to 1.24dB in PSNR and 0.069 in SSIM. The code and dataset are released at https://github.com/QUEAHREN/EIC-LIE.

Geologic map, as a fundamental diagram in geology science, provides critical insights into the structure and composition of Earth's subsurface and surface. These maps are indispensable in various fields, including disaster detection, resource exploration, and civil engineering. Despite their significance, current Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) often fall short in geologic map understanding. This gap is primarily due to the challenging nature of cartographic generalization, which involves handling high-resolution map, managing multiple associated components, and requiring domain-specific knowledge. To quantify this gap, we construct GeoMap-Bench, the first-ever benchmark for evaluating MLLMs in geologic map understanding, which assesses the full-scale abilities in extracting, referring, grounding, reasoning, and analyzing. To bridge this gap, we introduce GeoMap-Agent, the inaugural agent designed for geologic map understanding, which features three modules: Hierarchical Information Extraction (HIE), Domain Knowledge Injection (DKI), and Prompt-enhanced Question Answering (PEQA). Inspired by the interdisciplinary collaboration among human scientists, an AI expert group acts as consultants, utilizing a diverse tool pool to comprehensively analyze questions. Through comprehensive experiments, GeoMap-Agent achieves an overall score of 0.811 on GeoMap-Bench, significantly outperforming 0.369 of GPT-4o. Our work, emPowering gEologic mAp holistiC undErstanding (PEACE) with MLLMs, paves the way for advanced AI applications in geology, enhancing the efficiency and accuracy of geological investigations.

Semantic analysis on visible (RGB) and infrared (IR) images has gained attention for its ability to be more accurate and robust under low-illumination and complex weather conditions. Due to the lack of pre-trained foundation models on the large-scale infrared image datasets, existing methods prefer to design task-specific frameworks and directly fine-tune them with pre-trained foundation models on their RGB-IR semantic relevance datasets, which results in poor scalability and limited generalization. In this work, we propose a general and efficient framework called UniRGB-IR to unify RGB-IR semantic tasks, in which a novel adapter is developed to efficiently introduce richer RGB-IR features into the pre-trained RGB-based foundation model. Specifically, our framework consists of a RGB-based foundation model, a Multi-modal Feature Pool (MFP) module and a Supplementary Feature Injector (SFI) module. The MFP and SFI modules cooperate with each other as an adapter to effectively complement the RGB-based features with the rich RGB-IR features. During training process, we freeze the entire foundation model to inherit prior knowledge and only optimize the proposed adapter. Furthermore, to verify the effectiveness of our framework, we utilize the vanilla vision transformer (ViT-Base) as the pre-trained foundation model to perform extensive experiments. Experimental results on various RGB-IR downstream tasks demonstrate that our method can achieve state-of-the-art performance. The source code and results are available at https://github.com/PoTsui99/UniRGB-IR.git.

With the widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs), prompt injection attacks have emerged as a significant security threat. Existing defense mechanisms often face critical trade-offs between effectiveness and generalizability. This highlights the urgent need for efficient prompt injection detection methods that are applicable across a wide range of LLMs. To address this challenge, we propose DMPI-PMHFE, a dual-channel feature fusion detection framework. It integrates a pretrained language model with heuristic feature engineering to detect prompt injection attacks. Specifically, the framework employs DeBERTa-v3-base as a feature extractor to transform input text into semantic vectors enriched with contextual information. In parallel, we design heuristic rules based on known attack patterns to extract explicit structural features commonly observed in attacks. Features from both channels are subsequently fused and passed through a fully connected neural network to produce the final prediction. This dual-channel approach mitigates the limitations of relying only on DeBERTa to extract features. Experimental results on diverse benchmark datasets demonstrate that DMPI-PMHFE outperforms existing methods in terms of accuracy, recall, and F1-score. Furthermore, when deployed actually, it significantly reduces attack success rates across mainstream LLMs, including GLM-4, LLaMA 3, Qwen 2.5, and GPT-4o.

Feature engineering has demonstrated substantial utility for many machine learning workflows, such as in the small data regime or when distribution shifts are severe. Thus automating this capability can relieve much manual effort and improve model performance. Towards this, we propose AutoMAN, or Automated Mask-based Feature Engineering, an automated feature engineering framework that achieves high accuracy, low latency, and can be extended to heterogeneous and time-varying data. AutoMAN is based on effectively exploring the candidate transforms space, without explicitly manifesting transformed features. This is achieved by learning feature importance masks, which can be extended to support other modalities such as time series. AutoMAN learns feature transform importance end-to-end, incorporating a dataset's task target directly into feature engineering, resulting in state-of-the-art performance with significantly lower latency compared to alternatives.

Change detection in remote sensing images is essential for tracking environmental changes on the Earth's surface. Despite the success of vision transformers (ViTs) as backbones in numerous computer vision applications, they remain underutilized in change detection, where convolutional neural networks (CNNs) continue to dominate due to their powerful feature extraction capabilities. In this paper, our study uncovers ViTs' unique advantage in discerning large-scale changes, a capability where CNNs fall short. Capitalizing on this insight, we introduce ChangeViT, a framework that adopts a plain ViT backbone to enhance the performance of large-scale changes. This framework is supplemented by a detail-capture module that generates detailed spatial features and a feature injector that efficiently integrates fine-grained spatial information into high-level semantic learning. The feature integration ensures that ChangeViT excels in both detecting large-scale changes and capturing fine-grained details, providing comprehensive change detection across diverse scales. Without bells and whistles, ChangeViT achieves state-of-the-art performance on three popular high-resolution datasets (i.e., LEVIR-CD, WHU-CD, and CLCD) and one low-resolution dataset (i.e., OSCD), which underscores the unleashed potential of plain ViTs for change detection. Furthermore, thorough quantitative and qualitative analyses validate the efficacy of the introduced modules, solidifying the effectiveness of our approach. The source code is available at https://github.com/zhuduowang/ChangeViT.

Video generation and editing conditioned on text prompts or images have undergone significant advancements. However, challenges remain in accurately controlling global layout and geometry details solely by texts, and supporting motion control and local modification through images. In this paper, we aim to achieve sketch-based spatial and motion control for video generation and support fine-grained editing of real or synthetic videos. Based on the DiT video generation model, we propose a memory-efficient control structure with sketch control blocks that predict residual features of skipped DiT blocks. Sketches are drawn on one or two keyframes (at arbitrary time points) for easy interaction. To propagate such temporally sparse sketch conditions across all frames, we propose an inter-frame attention mechanism to analyze the relationship between the keyframes and each video frame. For sketch-based video editing, we design an additional video insertion module that maintains consistency between the newly edited content and the original video's spatial feature and dynamic motion. During inference, we use latent fusion for the accurate preservation of unedited regions. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our SketchVideo achieves superior performance in controllable video generation and editing.

Current open-source prompt-injection detectors converge on two architectural choices: regular-expression pattern matching and fine-tuned transformer classifiers. Both share failure modes that recent work has made concrete. Regular expressions miss paraphrased attacks. Fine-tuned classifiers are vulnerable to adaptive adversaries: a 2025 NAACL Findings study reported that eight published indirect-injection defenses were bypassed with greater than fifty percent attack success rates under adaptive attacks. This work proposes seven detection techniques that each port a specific mechanism from a discipline outside large-language-model security: forensic linguistics, materials-science fatigue analysis, deception technology from network security, local-sequence alignment from bioinformatics, mechanism design from economics, spectral signal analysis from epidemiology, and taint tracking from compiler theory. Three of the seven techniques are implemented in the prompt-shield v0.4.1 release (Apache 2.0) and evaluated in a four-configuration ablation across six datasets including deepset/prompt-injections, NotInject, LLMail-Inject, AgentHarm, and AgentDojo. The local-alignment detector lifts F1 on deepset from 0.033 to 0.378 with zero additional false positives. The stylometric detector adds 11.1 percentage points of F1 on an indirect-injection benchmark. The fatigue tracker is validated via a probing-campaign integration test. All code, data, and reproduction scripts are released under Apache 2.0.

Interventions on model-internal states are fundamental operations in many areas of AI, including model editing, steering, robustness, and interpretability. To facilitate such research, we introduce pyvene, an open-source Python library that supports customizable interventions on a range of different PyTorch modules. pyvene supports complex intervention schemes with an intuitive configuration format, and its interventions can be static or include trainable parameters. We show how pyvene provides a unified and extensible framework for performing interventions on neural models and sharing the intervened upon models with others. We illustrate the power of the library via interpretability analyses using causal abstraction and knowledge localization. We publish our library through Python Package Index (PyPI) and provide code, documentation, and tutorials at https://github.com/stanfordnlp/pyvene.

Context: Exhaustive fuzzing of modern JavaScript engines is infeasible due to the vast number of program states and execution paths. Coverage-guided fuzzers waste effort on low-risk inputs, often ignoring vulnerability-triggering ones that do not increase coverage. Existing heuristics proposed to mitigate this require expert effort, are brittle, and hard to adapt. Objective: We propose a data-centric, LLM-boosted alternative that learns from historical vulnerabilities to automatically identify minimal static (code) and dynamic (runtime) features for detecting high-risk inputs. Method: Guided by historical V8 bugs, iterative prompting generated 115 static and 49 dynamic features, with the latter requiring only five trace flags, minimizing instrumentation cost. After feature selection, 41 features remained to train an XGBoost model to predict high-risk inputs during fuzzing. Results: Combining static and dynamic features yields over 85% precision and under 1% false alarms. Only 25% of these features are needed for comparable performance, showing that most of the search space is irrelevant. Conclusion: This work introduces feature-guided fuzzing, an automated data-driven approach that replaces coverage with data-directed inference, guiding fuzzers toward high-risk states for faster, targeted, and reproducible vulnerability discovery. To support open science, all scripts and data are available at https://github.com/KKGanguly/DataCentricFuzzJS .

Prompt injection defenses are often framed as semantic understanding problems and delegated to increasingly large neural detectors. For the first screening layer, however, the requirements are different: the detector runs on every request and therefore must be fast, deterministic, non-promptable, and auditable. We introduce Mirror, a data-curation design pattern that organizes prompt injection corpora into matched positive and negative cells so that a classifier learns control-plane attack mechanics rather than incidental corpus shortcuts. Using 5,000 strictly curated open-source samples -- the largest corpus supportable under our public-data validity contract -- we define a 32-cell mirror topology, fill 31 of those cells with public data, train a sparse character n-gram linear SVM, compile its weights into a static Rust artifact, and obtain 95.97\% recall and 92.07\% F1 on a 524-case holdout at sub-millisecond latency with no external model runtime dependencies. On the same holdout, our next line of defense, a 22-million-parameter Prompt Guard~2 model reaches 44.35\% recall and 59.14\% F1 at 49\,ms median and 324\,ms p95 latency. Linear models still leave residual semantic ambiguities such as use-versus-mention for later pipeline layers, but within that scope our results show that for L1 prompt injection screening, strict data geometry can matter more than model scale.

When large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to automate tasks and interact with untrusted external data, prompt injection emerges as a significant security threat. By injecting malicious instructions into the data that LLMs access, an attacker can arbitrarily override the original user task and redirect the agent toward unintended, potentially harmful actions. Existing defenses either require access to model weights (fine-tuning), incur substantial utility loss (detection-based), or demand non-trivial system redesign (system-level). Motivated by this, we propose DataFilter, a test-time model-agnostic defense that removes malicious instructions from the data before it reaches the backend LLM. DataFilter is trained with supervised fine-tuning on simulated injections and leverages both the user's instruction and the data to selectively strip adversarial content while preserving benign information. Across multiple benchmarks, DataFilter consistently reduces the prompt injection attack success rates to near zero while maintaining the LLMs' utility. DataFilter delivers strong security, high utility, and plug-and-play deployment, making it a strong practical defense to secure black-box commercial LLMs against prompt injection. Our DataFilter model is released at https://huggingface.co/JoyYizhu/DataFilter for immediate use, with the code to reproduce our results at https://github.com/yizhu-joy/DataFilter.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

LLM agents are evolving from conversational chatbots to operational tools in real-world workspaces. In local agentic harnesses, an LLM can read and write files, call tools, and reuse workspace state across sessions. While such capabilities enhance utility, they also expose a new attack surface for attackers. Attackers can embed a prompt injection within a file or tool output. Agents may read this hidden instruction, store it, and execute it later. In this multi-step trojan attack paradigm, no individual step appears malicious on its own, but these steps can collectively turn untrusted text into persistent control content. However, existing defenses often inspect each step in isolation. As a result, they can block a clear harmful action, but fail to detect the earlier write operation that plants the backdoor. To reveal this threat, we introduce ClawTrojan, a benchmark designed to identify multi-step trojan attacks in local agentic harnesses. In an OpenClaw-style simulated workspace with GPT-5.4, ClawTrojan reaches a 95.5% attack success rate (ASR), while existing single-turn prompt-injection attacks produce near-zero ASR on the same model. To address this threat, we propose DASGuard, which scans control-like text in sensitive local files, traces its origin, and removes control content that does not originate from a trusted source. Our results show that DASGuard achieves strong dynamic defense by combining runtime attack blocking with sanitized commits to the workspace.

Recent 3D face editing methods using masks have produced high-quality edited images by leveraging Neural Radiance Fields (NeRF). Despite their impressive performance, existing methods often provide limited user control due to the use of pre-trained segmentation masks. To utilize masks with a desired layout, an extensive training dataset is required, which is challenging to gather. We present FFaceNeRF, a NeRF-based face editing technique that can overcome the challenge of limited user control due to the use of fixed mask layouts. Our method employs a geometry adapter with feature injection, allowing for effective manipulation of geometry attributes. Additionally, we adopt latent mixing for tri-plane augmentation, which enables training with a few samples. This facilitates rapid model adaptation to desired mask layouts, crucial for applications in fields like personalized medical imaging or creative face editing. Our comparative evaluations demonstrate that FFaceNeRF surpasses existing mask based face editing methods in terms of flexibility, control, and generated image quality, paving the way for future advancements in customized and high-fidelity 3D face editing. The code is available on the {https://kwanyun.github.io/FFaceNeRF_page/{project-page}}.

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are increasingly integrated into clinical workflows; however, prompt injection attacks can steer these systems toward clinically unsafe or misleading outputs. We introduce the Medical Prompt Injection Benchmark (MPIB), a dataset-and-benchmark suite for evaluating clinical safety under both direct prompt injection and indirect, RAG-mediated injection across clinically grounded tasks. MPIB emphasizes outcome-level risk via the Clinical Harm Event Rate (CHER), which measures high-severity clinical harm events under a clinically grounded taxonomy, and reports CHER alongside Attack Success Rate (ASR) to disentangle instruction compliance from downstream patient risk. The benchmark comprises 9,697 curated instances constructed through multi-stage quality gates and clinical safety linting. Evaluating MPIB across a diverse set of baseline LLMs and defense configurations, we find that ASR and CHER can diverge substantially, and that robustness depends critically on whether adversarial instructions appear in the user query or in retrieved context. We release MPIB with evaluation code, adversarial baselines, and comprehensive documentation to support reproducible and systematic research on clinical prompt injection. Code and data are available at GitHub (code) and Hugging Face (data).

Large Language Models (LLMs) treat all context tokens uniformly, lacking explicit separation between executable instructions and passive data. This leads to prompt injection vulnerabilities, ambiguous instruction binding, and unreliable execution control. We present a post-training methodology using LLMON (LLM Object Notation), a framework that enables separating instructions from data and requires explicit identifier-based execution. We construct a large-scale structured training corpus of 4.6B tokens spanning general, RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation), and tool-calling data, augmented with distractor-infused variants in which competing instructions and irrelevant data segments are present in context but not referenced. Post-training two Granite-4.1 base models (3B and 8B) through supervised fine-tuning followed by reinforcement learning, we show that LLMON-structured supervision reduces attack success rates on indirect prompt-injection benchmarks from 53-100% to 0.02-5.6% while preserving general capabilities. We further introduce attention-based interpretability metrics that diagnose failure modes at individual transformer layers for structured inputs, revealing how our approach reshapes internal attention patterns. Our results demonstrate that explicit execution semantics can be taught through standard post-training without architectural modification.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have seen rapid adoption in recent years, with industries increasingly relying on them to maintain a competitive advantage. These models excel at interpreting user instructions and generating human-like responses, leading to their integration across diverse domains, including consulting and information retrieval. However, their widespread deployment also introduces substantial security risks, most notably in the form of prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. To systematically evaluate LLM vulnerabilities -- particularly to external prompt injection -- we conducted a series of experiments on eight commercial models. Each model was tested without supplementary sanitization, relying solely on its built-in safeguards. The results exposed exploitable weaknesses and emphasized the need for stronger security measures. Four categories of attacks were examined: direct injection, indirect (external) injection, image-based injection, and prompt leakage. Comparative analysis indicated that Claude 3 demonstrated relatively greater robustness; nevertheless, empirical findings confirm that additional defenses, such as input normalization, remain necessary to achieve reliable protection.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

As the field of automated machine learning (AutoML) advances, it becomes increasingly important to incorporate domain knowledge into these systems. We present an approach for doing so by harnessing the power of large language models (LLMs). Specifically, we introduce Context-Aware Automated Feature Engineering (CAAFE), a feature engineering method for tabular datasets that utilizes an LLM to iteratively generate additional semantically meaningful features for tabular datasets based on the description of the dataset. The method produces both Python code for creating new features and explanations for the utility of the generated features. Despite being methodologically simple, CAAFE improves performance on 11 out of 14 datasets -- boosting mean ROC AUC performance from 0.798 to 0.822 across all dataset - similar to the improvement achieved by using a random forest instead of logistic regression on our datasets. Furthermore, CAAFE is interpretable by providing a textual explanation for each generated feature. CAAFE paves the way for more extensive semi-automation in data science tasks and emphasizes the significance of context-aware solutions that can extend the scope of AutoML systems to semantic AutoML. We release our https://github.com/automl/CAAFE{code}, a simple https://colab.research.google.com/drive/1mCA8xOAJZ4MaB_alZvyARTMjhl6RZf0a{demo} and a https://pypi.org/project/caafe/{python package}.

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

The remarkable instruction-following ability of modern LLMs has enabled their practical use as the minds of agents that can autonomously complete increasingly complex tasks. Therein, however, also lies their vulnerability to attacks which embed malicious instructions in text, common variants of which are known as indirect prompt injection (IPI). A fundamental task in addressing this vulnerability is successful segmentation of a given text into benign and malicious sentences (if any). While a number of approaches for this task have been proposed, no detector combines query-relative detection at the segment level, and none are hardened against adaptive evasion attacks realizable in agentic executions. We address the former limitation by developing an approach for malicious sentence classification that is both context- and query-aware. Next, to harden the resulting classifier against evasion, we present two adversarial training methods. The first is directly adapted feature-space adversarial training (AT) in which evasions are approximated using projected-gradient-based optimization in the embedding space. The second simulates realizable evasion attacks in the AT loop through LLM-based paraphrasing. Crucially, we parametrize both AT variants to facilitate a smooth tradeoff between utility and attack robustness. In extensive experiments using indirect prompt injection benchmarks we show that the proposed approach outperforms state-of-the-art IPI defense baselines under static attacks, while in the case of adaptive attacks, our AT variants provide significantly higher utility, lower attack success rate, and often both. Finally, we show that the best AT parameters can depend intimately on the particular application domain. Consequently, domain-dependent tuning of malicious text detectors is likely necessary in practice. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/tavia-liu/CAD.

Large language model (LLM) agents integrated with external tools are vulnerable to indirect prompt injections embedded in environmental states. However, existing studies largely rely on manually implemented or reused environments, stochastic LLM-based tool simulation, and predefined injection locations, limiting scalable security research across broader domains. To bridge this gap, we propose **ToolHazard**, a scalable adversarial environment synthesis framework that reduces human engineering and supports expansion with additional seed domains and compute. Through an Environment Simulator, an Attacker Agent, and a User Simulator, ToolHazard synthesizes executable stateful environments, discovers viable injection points and generates environment-specific payloads, and constructs state-grounded long-horizon tasks. Based on ToolHazard, we build **ToolHazard-Bench** for stress-testing agents under complex workflows and diverse environmental attacks. Experiments reveal substantial agent vulnerabilities and show that injection timing and placement affect attack effectiveness. Moreover, ToolHazard-generated alignment data improves security on both ToolHazard-Bench and AgentDojo while preserving benign task utility.

We introduce a novel method for low-rank personalization of a generic model for head avatar generation. Prior work proposes generic models that achieve high-quality face animation by leveraging large-scale datasets of multiple identities. However, such generic models usually fail to synthesize unique identity-specific details, since they learn a general domain prior. To adapt to specific subjects, we find that it is still challenging to capture high-frequency facial details via popular solutions like low-rank adaptation (LoRA). This motivates us to propose a specific architecture, a Register Module, that enhances the performance of LoRA, while requiring only a small number of parameters to adapt to an unseen identity. Our module is applied to intermediate features of a pre-trained model, storing and re-purposing information in a learnable 3D feature space. To demonstrate the efficacy of our personalization method, we collect a dataset of talking videos of individuals with distinctive facial details, such as wrinkles and tattoos. Our approach faithfully captures unseen faces, outperforming existing methods quantitatively and qualitatively. We will release the code, models, and dataset to the public.

Although multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, their instruction-following behavior leaves them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. Existing prompt injection methods predominantly rely on textual prompts or perceptible visual prompts that are observable by human users. In this work, we study imperceptible visual prompt injection against powerful closed-source MLLMs, where adversarial instructions are embedded in the visual modality. Our method adaptively embeds the malicious prompt into the input image via a bounded text overlay to provide semantic guidance. Meanwhile, the imperceptible visual perturbation is iteratively optimized to align the feature representation of the attacked image with those of the malicious visual and textual targets at both coarse- and fine-grained levels. Specifically, the visual target is instantiated as a text-rendered image and progressively refined during optimization to more faithfully represent the desired semantics and improve transferability. Extensive experiments on two multimodal understanding tasks across multiple closed-source MLLMs demonstrate the superior performance of our approach compared to existing methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained widespread use in various applications due to their powerful capability to generate human-like text. However, prompt injection attacks, which involve overwriting a model's original instructions with malicious prompts to manipulate the generated text, have raised significant concerns about the security and reliability of LLMs. Ensuring that LLMs are robust against such attacks is crucial for their deployment in real-world applications, particularly in critical tasks. In this paper, we propose PROMPTFUZZ, a novel testing framework that leverages fuzzing techniques to systematically assess the robustness of LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Inspired by software fuzzing, PROMPTFUZZ selects promising seed prompts and generates a diverse set of prompt injections to evaluate the target LLM's resilience. PROMPTFUZZ operates in two stages: the prepare phase, which involves selecting promising initial seeds and collecting few-shot examples, and the focus phase, which uses the collected examples to generate diverse, high-quality prompt injections. Using PROMPTFUZZ, we can uncover more vulnerabilities in LLMs, even those with strong defense prompts. By deploying the generated attack prompts from PROMPTFUZZ in a real-world competition, we achieved the 7th ranking out of over 4000 participants (top 0.14%) within 2 hours. Additionally, we construct a dataset to fine-tune LLMs for enhanced robustness against prompt injection attacks. While the fine-tuned model shows improved robustness, PROMPTFUZZ continues to identify vulnerabilities, highlighting the importance of robust testing for LLMs. Our work emphasizes the critical need for effective testing tools and provides a practical framework for evaluating and improving the robustness of LLMs against prompt injection attacks.

Large language models (LLMs) sometimes exhibit dangerous unintended behaviors. Finding and fixing these is challenging because the attack surface is massive -- it is not tractable to exhaustively search for all possible inputs that may elicit such behavior. One specific and particularly challenging case is that if data-poisoning-injected trojans, since there is no way to know what they are to search for them. To our knowledge, there is no generally applicable method to unlearn unknown trojans injected during pre-training. This work seeks to provide a general purpose recipe (filters) and a specific implementation (LoRA) filters that work in practice on small to medium sized models. The focus is primarily empirical, though some perplexing behavior opens the door to the fundamental question of how LLMs store and process information. Not unexpectedly, we find that our filters work best on the residual stream and the latest layers.

Prompt injection remains a major security risk for large language models. However, the efficacy of existing guardrail models in context-aware settings remains underexplored, as they often rely on static attack benchmarks. Additionally, they have over-defense tendencies. We introduce CAPTURE, a novel context-aware benchmark assessing both attack detection and over-defense tendencies with minimal in-domain examples. Our experiments reveal that current prompt injection guardrail models suffer from high false negatives in adversarial cases and excessive false positives in benign scenarios, highlighting critical limitations. To demonstrate our framework's utility, we train CaptureGuard on our generated data. This new model drastically reduces both false negative and false positive rates on our context-aware datasets while also generalizing effectively to external benchmarks, establishing a path toward more robust and practical prompt injection defenses.

Feature engineering remains a cornerstone of tabular data analysis, and Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a promising paradigm for its automation, giving rise to LLM-powered Automated Tabular Feature Engineering (LATTE). However, the field lacks standardized, cost-aware evaluation platforms, and the combinatorial explosion of design choices obscures true algorithmic progress. To bridge these gaps, we systematically deconstruct 15 representative LATTE methods into a unified 6-dimensional taxonomy. Based on this abstraction, we introduce LATTEArena, a standardized, modular, and extensible benchmarking framework that decouples monolithic pipelines into reusable execution blocks. By distilling the massive combinatorial space, we evaluate 24 core LATTE configurations across 7 research questions. Our head-to-head benchmarking goes beyond predictive accuracy to quantify token efficiency and execution robustness, yielding 17 empirical findings on cost-effectiveness trade-offs. Furthermore, we provide 3 concrete recommendations for optimal real-world deployment. By enabling controlled component-level comparisons, LATTEArena shifts the paradigm from ad-hoc prompt engineering to systematic context management. All code, datasets, and over 4,000 execution logs are publicly available to foster a dynamic, community-driven benchmark. Our framework, leaderboard, and all artifacts are hosted on the LATTEArena project website at https://goodenhak.github.io/LATTEArena.

The integration of large language models with external content has enabled applications such as Microsoft Copilot but also introduced vulnerabilities to indirect prompt injection attacks. In these attacks, malicious instructions embedded within external content can manipulate LLM outputs, causing deviations from user expectations. To address this critical yet under-explored issue, we introduce the first benchmark for indirect prompt injection attacks, named BIPIA, to assess the risk of such vulnerabilities. Using BIPIA, we evaluate existing LLMs and find them universally vulnerable. Our analysis identifies two key factors contributing to their success: LLMs' inability to distinguish between informational context and actionable instructions, and their lack of awareness in avoiding the execution of instructions within external content. Based on these findings, we propose two novel defense mechanisms-boundary awareness and explicit reminder-to address these vulnerabilities in both black-box and white-box settings. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our black-box defense provides substantial mitigation, while our white-box defense reduces the attack success rate to near-zero levels, all while preserving the output quality of LLMs. We hope this work inspires further research into securing LLM applications and fostering their safe and reliable use.

Automated feature engineering plays a critical role in improving predictive model performance for tabular learning tasks. Traditional automated feature engineering methods are limited by their reliance on pre-defined transformations within fixed, manually designed search spaces, often neglecting domain knowledge. Recent advances using Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the integration of domain knowledge into the feature engineering process. However, existing LLM-based approaches use direct prompting or rely solely on validation scores for feature selection, failing to leverage insights from prior feature discovery experiments or establish meaningful reasoning between feature generation and data-driven performance. To address these challenges, we propose LLM-FE, a novel framework that combines evolutionary search with the domain knowledge and reasoning capabilities of LLMs to automatically discover effective features for tabular learning tasks. LLM-FE formulates feature engineering as a program search problem, where LLMs propose new feature transformation programs iteratively, and data-driven feedback guides the search process. Our results demonstrate that LLM-FE consistently outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, significantly enhancing the performance of tabular prediction models across diverse classification and regression benchmarks.

Model-internal features can be studied through both their ability to identify a specified concept and their causal effect when manipulated, e.g., through steering or weight editing. A prominent approach to feature learning is Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs), which learn broad feature dictionaries whose relation to particular concepts is typically identified post hoc. However, many interpretability questions are instead hypothesis-driven and concern a concept specified in advance. We study this setting as targeted feature learning, where a single feature is constructed for such a predefined concept. We present a controlled comparison across three model signals (activation values, activation gradients, and parameter gradients) and two estimators (contrastive mean and a learned one-dimensional encoder-decoder), yielding six targeted methods, with CAA and GRADIEND as existing instances and four new methods covering the remaining combinations. We compare these methods against pretrained SAEs across 15 tasks and three language models, evaluating both detection and causal intervention. Across models, the strongest detection performance is achieved by contrastive activation value methods, whereas the strongest intervention performance is achieved by gradient-based methods. Overall, our results show that targeted feature quality depends jointly on the model signal and estimator, with detection and intervention capturing complementary properties.

Multi-modal large language model (MLLM)-based web agents interact with webpage environments by generating actions based on screenshots of the webpages. In this work, we propose WebInject, a prompt injection attack that manipulates the webpage environment to induce a web agent to perform an attacker-specified action. Our attack adds a perturbation to the raw pixel values of the rendered webpage. After these perturbed pixels are mapped into a screenshot, the perturbation induces the web agent to perform the attacker-specified action. We formulate the task of finding the perturbation as an optimization problem. A key challenge in solving this problem is that the mapping between raw pixel values and screenshot is non-differentiable, making it difficult to backpropagate gradients to the perturbation. To overcome this, we train a neural network to approximate the mapping and apply projected gradient descent to solve the reformulated optimization problem. Extensive evaluation on multiple datasets shows that WebInject is highly effective and significantly outperforms baselines.

We surface a new threat to closed-weight Large Language Models (LLMs) that enables an attacker to compute optimization-based prompt injections. Specifically, we characterize how an attacker can leverage the loss-like information returned from the remote fine-tuning interface to guide the search for adversarial prompts. The fine-tuning interface is hosted by an LLM vendor and allows developers to fine-tune LLMs for their tasks, thus providing utility, but also exposes enough information for an attacker to compute adversarial prompts. Through an experimental analysis, we characterize the loss-like values returned by the Gemini fine-tuning API and demonstrate that they provide a useful signal for discrete optimization of adversarial prompts using a greedy search algorithm. Using the PurpleLlama prompt injection benchmark, we demonstrate attack success rates between 65% and 82% on Google's Gemini family of LLMs. These attacks exploit the classic utility-security tradeoff - the fine-tuning interface provides a useful feature for developers but also exposes the LLMs to powerful attacks.

Universal adversarial attacks on aligned multimodal large language models are increasingly reported with attack success rates in the 60-80% range, suggesting the visual modality is highly vulnerable to imperceptible perturbations as a prompt-injection channel. We argue that this number conflates two distinct events: (i) the model's output was perturbed (Influence), and (ii) the attacker's chosen target concept was actually emitted (Precise Injection). We compose two existing techniques -- Universal Adversarial Attack and AnyAttack -- under an L_{inf} budget of 16/255, and we add a dual-axis evaluation: a deterministic Ratcliff-Obershelp drift score for Influence (programmatic baseline) plus a 4-tier ordinal categorical none/weak/partial/confirmed for Precise Injection. The judge is DeepSeek-V4-Pro in thinking mode, calibrated against Claude Opus 4.7 with Cohen's κ = 0.77 on the injection axis (substantial agreement); the entire 4475-entry SHA-256 input cache ships with the dataset so reviewers can re-derive paper numbers bit-exact without an API key. Across 6615 pairs over four open VLMs, seven attack prompts, and seven test images, the two axes diverge by roughly 90times: 66.4% of pairs are programmatically disturbed (LLM-judged 46.6% at the substantial-or-complete tier), but only 0.756% (50/6615) reach any non-none injection tier and only 0.030% (2/6615) verbatim. The few injections that do land cluster on screenshot- or document-style carriers whose semantics already invite text transcription. BLIP-2 shows zero detectable drift at L_{inf} = 16/255 across all 2205 pairs even when used as a Stage-1 surrogate. We release the full dataset -- 21 universal images, 147 adversarial photos, 6,615 response pairs, the v3 dual-axis judge results, and the cache at huggingface.co/datasets/jeffliulab/visinject.

The widespread adoption of generative artificial intelligence in recent years has brought a parallel rise in prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. By embedding malicious instructions, these exploits manipulate language models to bypass intended behavior and operational boundaries. In traditional chatbots, such attacks are confined to a single session because state memory is not preserved across conversations. However, persistent memory features in modern conversational interfaces enable cross-session attack propagation, establishing a threat vector known as memory injection. This work explores this emerging vulnerability in leading LLM-as-a-service platforms, highlighting its real-world severity and the need for countermeasures. While existing literature focuses on violations tailored to specific platform features, we present a general threat model. We demonstrate that all NIST attack goals are collectively achievable across ChatGPT Instant 5.3, Claude Sonnet 4.6, and Gemini 3 Flash under this model. We also show that memory injections can exploit multiple attack vectors, including personal memories, projects, skills, organization instructions, and Model Context Protocol (MCP)-connected resources. Our findings reveal that all evaluated services can be manipulated to persistently spread disinformation, generate harmful content, or simulate offline unresponsiveness, even in fresh sessions. In the particular case of Claude, shared-memory features allow an attacker to compromise multiple users within an organization and also exfiltrate user prompts. To address these vulnerabilities, we derive defense mechanisms from our proposed threat model and foundational cybersecurity principles. Our analysis indicates that nearly half of these mitigations remain unimplemented across the target services. Datasets and attack artifacts are available at https://github.com/PedroBarcha/Memory-injection.

Facial appearance editing is crucial for digital avatars, AR/VR, and personalized content creation, driving realistic user experiences. However, preserving identity with generative models is challenging, especially in scenarios with limited data availability. Traditional methods often require multiple images and still struggle with unnatural face shifts, inconsistent hair alignment, or excessive smoothing effects. To overcome these challenges, we introduce a novel diffusion-based framework, InstaFace, to generate realistic images while preserving identity using only a single image. Central to InstaFace, we introduce an efficient guidance network that harnesses 3D perspectives by integrating multiple 3DMM-based conditionals without introducing additional trainable parameters. Moreover, to ensure maximum identity retention as well as preservation of background, hair, and other contextual features like accessories, we introduce a novel module that utilizes feature embeddings from a facial recognition model and a pre-trained vision-language model. Quantitative evaluations demonstrate that our method outperforms several state-of-the-art approaches in terms of identity preservation, photorealism, and effective control of pose, expression, and lighting.

Adapter-based training has emerged as a key mechanism for extending the capabilities of powerful foundation image generators, enabling personalized and stylized text-to-image synthesis. These adapters are typically trained to capture a specific target attribute, such as subject identity, using single-image reconstruction objectives. However, because the input image inevitably contains a mixture of visual factors, adapters are prone to entangle the target attribute with incidental ones, such as pose, expression, and lighting. This spurious correlation problem limits generalization and obstructs the model's ability to adhere to the input text prompt. In this work, we uncover a simple yet effective solution: provide the very shortcuts we wish to eliminate during adapter training. In Shortcut-Rerouted Adapter Training, confounding factors are routed through auxiliary modules, such as ControlNet or LoRA, eliminating the incentive for the adapter to internalize them. The auxiliary modules are then removed during inference. When applied to tasks like facial and full-body identity injection, our approach improves generation quality, diversity, and prompt adherence. These results point to a general design principle in the era of large models: when seeking disentangled representations, the most effective path may be to establish shortcuts for what should NOT be learned.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as purpose-specific agents to handle domain-specific tasks such as customer service and code generation. These agents are expected to comply with not only generic safety guardrails but also purpose-specific restrictions tailored to their designated roles. Such additional restrictions enlarge the attack surface, particularly to prompt injection (PI) attacks. To defend against such attacks, existing detection methods primarily rely on analyzing input-output patterns, yet yield limited effectiveness. To address this limitation, we turn to analyzing the hidden activation space and discover that LLMs inherently retain latent policy-violation (PV) concepts when prompted with requests beyond their designated purpose. Particularly, PV concepts capture the semantics of conflicts between user queries and predefined restrictions, implicitly reflecting LLMs' intrinsic awareness of recognizing policy violations. Building on this insight, we propose PVDetector, a training-free framework that detects PI attacks during LLM inference by measuring hidden-state alignment with PV concepts, which are derived offline from the contrastive pairs of policy-violating and policy-compliant prompts. Experiments across multiple LLMs and datasets show that PVDetector achieves <1\% false negative rate with minimal auxiliary overhead, consistently outperforming state-of-the-art methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/Claresigle/PVDetector .

Image-to-Video (I2V) generation models, which condition video generation on reference images, have shown emerging visual instruction-following capability, allowing certain visual cues in reference images to act as implicit control signals for video generation. However, this capability also introduces a previously overlooked risk: adversaries may exploit visual instructions to inject malicious intent through the image modality. In this work, we uncover this risk by proposing Visual Instruction Injection (VII), a training-free and transferable jailbreaking framework that intentionally disguises the malicious intent of unsafe text prompts as benign visual instructions in the safe reference image. Specifically, VII coordinates a Malicious Intent Reprogramming module to distill malicious intent from unsafe text prompts while minimizing their static harmfulness, and a Visual Instruction Grounding module to ground the distilled intent onto a safe input image by rendering visual instructions that preserve semantic consistency with the original unsafe text prompt, thereby inducing harmful content during I2V generation. Empirically, our extensive experiments on four state-of-the-art commercial I2V models (Kling-v2.5-turbo, Gemini Veo-3.1, Seedance-1.5-pro, and PixVerse-V5) demonstrate that VII achieves Attack Success Rates of up to 83.5% while reducing Refusal Rates to near zero, significantly outperforming existing baselines.

Manipulation of facial images to meet specific controls such as pose, expression, and lighting, also known as face rigging, is a complex task in computer vision. Existing methods are limited by their reliance on image datasets, which necessitates individual-specific fine-tuning and limits their ability to retain fine-grained identity and semantic details, reducing practical usability. To overcome these limitations, we introduce ControlFace, a novel face rigging method conditioned on 3DMM renderings that enables flexible, high-fidelity control. We employ a dual-branch U-Nets: one, referred to as FaceNet, captures identity and fine details, while the other focuses on generation. To enhance control precision, the control mixer module encodes the correlated features between the target-aligned control and reference-aligned control, and a novel guidance method, reference control guidance, steers the generation process for better control adherence. By training on a facial video dataset, we fully utilize FaceNet's rich representations while ensuring control adherence. Extensive experiments demonstrate ControlFace's superior performance in identity preservation and control precision, highlighting its practicality. Please see the project website: https://cvlab-kaist.github.io/ControlFace/.

Retrieving task-relevant code dependencies is critical for repository-level code generation. Existing approaches obtain dependency context through similarity-based retrieval, repository graphs, or LLM-driven exploration. A central challenge is to identify the dispersed dependencies needed to implement a functional requirement, rather than merely retrieve broadly related code. This paper presents FeatLens, a feature-guided dependency retrieval approach for repository-level code generation. FeatLens first builds an offline index linking natural-language feature descriptions to function-level code entities. Given a task requirement and target function location, it selects relevant features and constructs dependency seeds. It then expands the seed graph and applies semantic and structural heuristics to select dependencies for inclusion in the generation context. Experiments on DevEval and EvoCodeBench show that FeatLens achieves the highest dependency recall among the evaluated baselines at each fixed retrieval budget, reaching DR@15 values of 0.527 and 0.529, respectively. On DevEval, the retrieved context supports the highest non-oracle Pass@1 with both DeepSeek-V3.2 and GPT-5-mini. These results are obtained without LLM calls in the online dependency retrieval stage.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for software evolution, yet most interaction paradigms remain code-centric and require manual context management and prompt iteration. We present FeatX, a feature-oriented tool for editing software by editing features. Given an existing repository, FeatX extracts a hierarchical epic-feature structure with explicit feature-to-code mappings, then invokes a three-stage Evolution Agent to translate feature edits into code patches. The workflow is exposed through four coordinated panels. Across a controlled user study and replay experiments on 38 real-world feature-editing commits, FeatX significantly reduces cognitive load and improves usability compared with vanilla ChatGPT. It also achieves a 42.6\% relative improvement in function-level modification localization F1 over strong LLM baselines, at substantially lower cost (\$0.07 in total). The tool and collected dataset are available at https://github.com/a496263365/FeatX/tree/demo, with a demonstration video at https://youtu.be/OZqKZ4Ii-yM.

This study systematically analyzes the vulnerability of 36 large language models (LLMs) to various prompt injection attacks, a technique that leverages carefully crafted prompts to elicit malicious LLM behavior. Across 144 prompt injection tests, we observed a strong correlation between model parameters and vulnerability, with statistical analyses, such as logistic regression and random forest feature analysis, indicating that parameter size and architecture significantly influence susceptibility. Results revealed that 56 percent of tests led to successful prompt injections, emphasizing widespread vulnerability across various parameter sizes, with clustering analysis identifying distinct vulnerability profiles associated with specific model configurations. Additionally, our analysis uncovered correlations between certain prompt injection techniques, suggesting potential overlaps in vulnerabilities. These findings underscore the urgent need for robust, multi-layered defenses in LLMs deployed across critical infrastructure and sensitive industries. Successful prompt injection attacks could result in severe consequences, including data breaches, unauthorized access, or misinformation. Future research should explore multilingual and multi-step defenses alongside adaptive mitigation strategies to strengthen LLM security in diverse, real-world environments.

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), enabling goal hijacking and data leakage. Prompt guard models, though effective in defense, suffer from over-defense -- falsely flagging benign inputs as malicious due to trigger word bias. To address this issue, we introduce NotInject, an evaluation dataset that systematically measures over-defense across various prompt guard models. NotInject contains 339 benign samples enriched with trigger words common in prompt injection attacks, enabling fine-grained evaluation. Our results show that state-of-the-art models suffer from over-defense issues, with accuracy dropping close to random guessing levels (60%). To mitigate this, we propose InjecGuard, a novel prompt guard model that incorporates a new training strategy, Mitigating Over-defense for Free (MOF), which significantly reduces the bias on trigger words. InjecGuard demonstrates state-of-the-art performance on diverse benchmarks including NotInject, surpassing the existing best model by 30.8%, offering a robust and open-source solution for detecting prompt injection attacks. The code and datasets are released at https://github.com/SaFoLab-WISC/InjecGuard.

The widespread availability of large-scale code datasets has accelerated the development of code large language models (CodeLLMs), raising concerns about unauthorized dataset usage. Dataset poisoning offers a proactive defense by reducing the utility of such unauthorized training. However, existing poisoning methods often require full dataset poisoning and introduce transformations that break code compilability. In this paper, we introduce FunPoison, a functionality-preserving poisoning approach that injects short, compilable weak-use fragments into executed code paths. FunPoison leverages reusable statement-level templates with automatic repair and conservative safety checking to ensure side-effect freedom, while a type-aware synthesis module suppresses static analysis warnings and enhances stealth. Extensive experiments show that FunPoison achieves effective poisoning by contaminating only 10% of the dataset, while maintaining 100% compilability and functional correctness, and remains robust against various advanced code sanitization techniques.

Current application designers have moved to integrate large language models (LLMs) into their products. These LLM-integrated applications are vulnerable to prompt injection vulnerabilities. While attempts have been made to address this problem by building a detector that can monitor inputs to the LLM and detect attacks, we find that many detectors are not yet suitable for practical deployment. To support research in this area, we design the PromptShield benchmark for evaluating practical prompt injection detectors. We also construct a new detector, the PromptShield detector, which achieves significantly better performance at detecting prompt injection attacks than any prior scheme. Our work suggests that larger models, more training data, appropriate metrics, and careful curation of training data can contribute to strong detector performance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into web-based systems for content summarization, yet their susceptibility to prompt injection attacks remains a pressing concern. In this study, we explore how non-visible HTML elements such as <meta>, aria-label, and alt attributes can be exploited to embed adversarial instructions without altering the visible content of a webpage. We introduce a novel dataset comprising 280 static web pages, evenly divided between clean and adversarial injected versions, crafted using diverse HTML-based strategies. These pages are processed through a browser automation pipeline to extract both raw HTML and rendered text, closely mimicking real-world LLM deployment scenarios. We evaluate two state-of-the-art open-source models, Llama 4 Scout (Meta) and Gemma 9B IT (Google), on their ability to summarize this content. Using both lexical (ROUGE-L) and semantic (SBERT cosine similarity) metrics, along with manual annotations, we assess the impact of these covert injections. Our findings reveal that over 29% of injected samples led to noticeable changes in the Llama 4 Scout summaries, while Gemma 9B IT showed a lower, yet non-trivial, success rate of 15%. These results highlight a critical and largely overlooked vulnerability in LLM driven web pipelines, where hidden adversarial content can subtly manipulate model outputs. Our work offers a reproducible framework and benchmark for evaluating HTML-based prompt injection and underscores the urgent need for robust mitigation strategies in LLM applications involving web content.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in instruction-following, becoming increasingly crucial across various applications. However, this capability brings with it the risk of prompt injection attacks, where attackers inject instructions into LLMs' input to elicit undesirable actions or content. Understanding the robustness of LLMs against such attacks is vital for their safe implementation. In this work, we establish a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of instruction-following LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Our objective is to determine the extent to which LLMs can be influenced by injected instructions and their ability to differentiate between these injected and original target instructions. Through extensive experiments with leading instruction-following LLMs, we uncover significant vulnerabilities in their robustness to such attacks. Our results indicate that some models are overly tuned to follow any embedded instructions in the prompt, overly focusing on the latter parts of the prompt without fully grasping the entire context. By contrast, models with a better grasp of the context and instruction-following capabilities will potentially be more susceptible to compromise by injected instructions. This underscores the need to shift the focus from merely enhancing LLMs' instruction-following capabilities to improving their overall comprehension of prompts and discernment of instructions that are appropriate to follow. We hope our in-depth analysis offers insights into the underlying causes of these vulnerabilities, aiding in the development of future solutions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval

LLMs are increasingly used for code generation, but their outputs often follow recurring templates that can induce predictable vulnerabilities. We study vulnerability persistence in LLM-generated software and introduce Feature--Security Table (FSTab) with two components. First, FSTab enables a black-box attack that predicts likely backend vulnerabilities from observable frontend features and knowledge of the source LLM, without access to backend code or source code. Second, FSTab provides a model-centric evaluation that quantifies how consistently a given model reproduces the same vulnerabilities across programs, semantics-preserving rephrasings, and application domains. We evaluate FSTab on state-of-the-art code LLMs, including GPT-5.2, Claude-4.5 Opus, and Gemini-3 Pro, across diverse application domains. Our results show strong cross-domain transfer: even when the target domain is excluded from training, FSTab achieves up to 94\% attack success and 93\% vulnerability coverage on Internal Tools (Claude-4.5 Opus). These findings expose an underexplored attack surface in LLM-generated software and highlight the security risks of code generation. Our code is available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/FSTab-024E.

Prompt injection attacks pose serious security risks across a wide range of real-world applications. While receiving increasing attention, the community faces a critical gap: the lack of a unified platform for prompt injection evaluation. This makes it challenging to reliably compare defenses, understand their true robustness under diverse attacks, or assess how well they generalize across tasks and benchmarks. For instance, many defenses initially reported as effective were later found to exhibit limited robustness on diverse datasets and attacks. To bridge this gap, we introduce PIArena, a unified and extensible platform for prompt injection evaluation that enables users to easily integrate state-of-the-art attacks and defenses and evaluate them across a variety of existing and new benchmarks. We also design a dynamic strategy-based attack that adaptively optimizes injected prompts based on defense feedback. Through comprehensive evaluation using PIArena, we uncover critical limitations of state-of-the-art defenses: limited generalizability across tasks, vulnerability to adaptive attacks, and fundamental challenges when an injected task aligns with the target task. The code and datasets are available at https://github.com/sleeepeer/PIArena.

Recent face anti-spoofing (FAS) methods have shown remarkable cross-domain performance by employing vision-language models like CLIP. However, existing CLIP-based FAS models do not fully exploit CLIP's patch embedding tokens, failing to detect critical spoofing clues. Moreover, these models rely on a single text prompt per class (e.g., 'live' or 'fake'), which limits generalization. To address these issues, we propose MVP-FAS, a novel framework incorporating two key modules: Multi-View Slot attention (MVS) and Multi-Text Patch Alignment (MTPA). Both modules utilize multiple paraphrased texts to generate generalized features and reduce dependence on domain-specific text. MVS extracts local detailed spatial features and global context from patch embeddings by leveraging diverse texts with multiple perspectives. MTPA aligns patches with multiple text representations to improve semantic robustness. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MVP-FAS achieves superior generalization performance, outperforming previous state-of-the-art methods on cross-domain datasets. Code: https://github.com/Elune001/MVP-FAS.

Model-sharing platforms, such as Hugging Face, ModelScope, and OpenCSG, have become central to modern machine learning development, enabling developers to share, load, and fine-tune pre-trained models with minimal effort. However, the flexibility of these ecosystems introduces a critical security concern: the execution of untrusted code during model loading (i.e., via trust_remote_code or trust_repo). In this work, we conduct the first large-scale empirical study of custom model loading practices across five major model-sharing platforms to assess their prevalence, associated risks, and developer perceptions. We first quantify the frequency with which models require custom code to function and identify those that execute arbitrary Python files during loading. We then apply three complementary static analysis tools: Bandit, CodeQL, and Semgrep, to detect security smells and potential vulnerabilities, categorizing our findings by CWE identifiers to provide a standardized risk taxonomy. We also use YARA to identify malicious patterns and payload signatures. In parallel, we systematically analyze the documentation, API design, and safety mechanisms of each platform to understand their mitigation strategies and enforcement levels. Finally, we conduct a qualitative analysis of over 600 developer discussions from GitHub, Hugging Face, and PyTorch Hub forums, as well as Stack Overflow, to capture community concerns and misconceptions regarding security and usability. Our findings reveal widespread reliance on unsafe defaults, uneven security enforcement across platforms, and persistent confusion among developers about the implications of executing remote code. We conclude with actionable recommendations for designing safer model-sharing infrastructures and striking a balance between usability and security in future AI ecosystems.

Getting large language models (LLMs) to refuse to answer hostile toxicity questions is a core issue under the theme of LLMs security. Previous approaches have used prompts engineering to jailbreak LLMs and answer some toxicity questions. These approaches can easily fail after the model manufacturer makes additional fine-tuning to the model. To promote the further understanding of model jailbreaking by researchers, we are inspired by Representation Engineering to propose a jailbreaking method that does not require elaborate construction prompts, is not affected by model fine-tuning, and can be widely applied to any open-source LLMs in a pluggable manner. We have evaluated this method on multiple mainstream LLMs on carefully supplemented toxicity datasets, and the experimental results demonstrate the significant effectiveness of our approach. After being surprised by some interesting jailbreaking cases, we did extensive in-depth research to explore the techniques behind this method.

The development of machine learning (ML) techniques has led to ample opportunities for developers to develop and deploy their own models. Hugging Face serves as an open source platform where developers can share and download other models in an effort to make ML development more collaborative. In order for models to be shared, they first need to be serialized. Certain Python serialization methods are considered unsafe, as they are vulnerable to object injection. This paper investigates the pervasiveness of these unsafe serialization methods across Hugging Face, and demonstrates through an exploitation approach, that models using unsafe serialization methods can be exploited and shared, creating an unsafe environment for ML developers. We investigate to what extent Hugging Face is able to flag repositories and files using unsafe serialization methods, and develop a technique to detect malicious models. Our results show that Hugging Face is home to a wide range of potentially vulnerable models.

Effective instruction tuning is indispensable for optimizing code LLMs, aligning model behavior with user expectations and enhancing model performance in real-world applications. However, most existing methods focus on code snippets, which are limited to specific functionalities and rigid structures, restricting the complexity and diversity of the synthesized data. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel feature tree-based synthesis framework inspired by Abstract Syntax Trees (AST). Unlike AST, which captures syntactic structure of code, our framework models semantic relationships between code elements, enabling the generation of more nuanced and diverse data. The feature tree is constructed from raw data and refined iteratively to increase the quantity and diversity of the extracted features. This process enables the identification of more complex patterns and relationships within the code. By sampling subtrees with controlled depth and breadth, our framework allows precise adjustments to the complexity of the generated code, supporting a wide range of tasks from simple function-level operations to intricate multi-file scenarios. We fine-tuned widely-used base models to create the EpiCoder series, achieving state-of-the-art performance at both the function and file levels across multiple benchmarks. Notably, empirical evidence indicates that our approach shows significant potential in synthesizing highly complex repository-level code data. Further analysis elucidates the merits of this approach by rigorously assessing data complexity and diversity through software engineering principles and LLM-as-a-judge method.

Prompt injection is one of the most critical vulnerabilities in LLM agents; yet, effective automated attacks remain largely unexplored from an optimization perspective. Existing methods heavily depend on human red-teamers and hand-crafted prompts, limiting their scalability and adaptability. We propose AutoInject, a reinforcement learning framework that generates universal, transferable adversarial suffixes while jointly optimizing for attack success and utility preservation on benign tasks. Our black-box method supports both query-based optimization and transfer attacks to unseen models and tasks. Using only a 1.5B parameter adversarial suffix generator, we successfully compromise frontier systems including GPT 5 Nano, Claude Sonnet 3.5, and Gemini 2.5 Flash on the AgentDojo benchmark, establishing a stronger baseline for automated prompt injection research.

Recent advancement in personalized image generation have unveiled the intriguing capability of pre-trained text-to-image models on learning identity information from a collection of portrait images. However, existing solutions are vulnerable in producing truthful details, and usually suffer from several defects such as (i) The generated face exhibit its own unique characteristics, \ie facial shape and facial feature positioning may not resemble key characteristics of the input, and (ii) The synthesized face may contain warped, blurred or corrupted regions. In this paper, we present FaceChain, a personalized portrait generation framework that combines a series of customized image-generation model and a rich set of face-related perceptual understanding models (\eg, face detection, deep face embedding extraction, and facial attribute recognition), to tackle aforementioned challenges and to generate truthful personalized portraits, with only a handful of portrait images as input. Concretely, we inject several SOTA face models into the generation procedure, achieving a more efficient label-tagging, data-processing, and model post-processing compared to previous solutions, such as DreamBooth ~ruiz2023dreambooth , InstantBooth ~shi2023instantbooth , or other LoRA-only approaches ~hu2021lora . Besides, based on FaceChain, we further develop several applications to build a broader playground for better showing its value, including virtual try on and 2D talking head. We hope it can grow to serve the burgeoning needs from the communities. Note that this is an ongoing work that will be consistently refined and improved upon. FaceChain is open-sourced under Apache-2.0 license at https://github.com/modelscope/facechain.

The widespread distribution of Large Language Models (LLMs) through public platforms like Hugging Face introduces significant security challenges. While these platforms perform basic security scans, they often fail to detect subtle manipulations within the embedding layer. This work identifies a novel class of deployment phase attacks that exploit this vulnerability by injecting imperceptible perturbations directly into the embedding layer outputs without modifying model weights or input text. These perturbations, though statistically benign, systematically bypass safety alignment mechanisms and induce harmful behaviors during inference. We propose Search based Embedding Poisoning(SEP), a practical, model agnostic framework that introduces carefully optimized perturbations into embeddings associated with high risk tokens. SEP leverages a predictable linear transition in model responses, from refusal to harmful output to semantic deviation to identify a narrow perturbation window that evades alignment safeguards. Evaluated across six aligned LLMs, SEP achieves an average attack success rate of 96.43% while preserving benign task performance and evading conventional detection mechanisms. Our findings reveal a critical oversight in deployment security and emphasize the urgent need for embedding level integrity checks in future LLM defense strategies.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown strong capability in diverse software engineering tasks, e.g. code completion, bug fixing, and document generation. However, feature-driven development (FDD), a highly prevalent real-world task that involves developing new functionalities for large, existing codebases, remains underexplored. We therefore introduce SWE-Dev, the first large-scale dataset (with 14,000 training and 500 test samples) designed to evaluate and train autonomous coding systems on real-world feature development tasks. To ensure verifiable and diverse training, SWE-Dev uniquely provides all instances with a runnable environment and its developer-authored executable unit tests. This collection not only provides high-quality data for Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), but also enables Reinforcement Learning (RL) by delivering accurate reward signals from executable unit tests. Our extensive evaluations on SWE-Dev, covering 17 chatbot LLMs, 10 reasoning models, and 10 Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), reveal that FDD is a profoundly challenging frontier for current AI (e.g., Claude-3.7-Sonnet achieves only 22.45\% Pass@3 on the hard test split). Crucially, we demonstrate that SWE-Dev serves as an effective platform for model improvement: fine-tuning on training set enabled a 7B model comparable to GPT-4o on hard split, underscoring the value of its high-quality training data. Code is available here https://github.com/justLittleWhite/SWE-Dev{https://github.com/justLittleWhite/SWE-Dev}.

Prompt injection attacks manipulate large language models (LLMs) by misleading them to deviate from the original input instructions and execute maliciously injected instructions, because of their instruction-following capabilities and inability to distinguish between the original input instructions and maliciously injected instructions. To defend against such attacks, recent studies have developed various detection mechanisms. If we restrict ourselves specifically to works which perform detection rather than direct defense, most of them focus on direct prompt injection attacks, while there are few works for the indirect scenario, where injected instructions are indirectly from external tools, such as a search engine. Moreover, current works mainly investigate injection detection methods and pay less attention to the post-processing method that aims to mitigate the injection after detection. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of detecting and removing indirect prompt injection attacks, and we construct a benchmark dataset for evaluation. For detection, we assess the performance of existing LLMs and open-source detection models, and we further train detection models using our crafted training datasets. For removal, we evaluate two intuitive methods: (1) the segmentation removal method, which segments the injected document and removes parts containing injected instructions, and (2) the extraction removal method, which trains an extraction model to identify and remove injected instructions.

Despite recent advances, frontier large language model (LLM) agents remain limited in discovering and patching complex vulnerabilities in real-world software. Generally available agents can already aid attackers, who only need to find one exploitable weakness, while defenders must continuously identify and patch all vulnerabilities across fast-growing codebases. Stronger defensive agents would help close this gap, yet the scarcity of security training data with reproducible build and execution environments remains a bottleneck. We present CyberForge, a framework that synthesizes executable, repository-level security training data by injecting vulnerabilities into real C/C++ projects. It validates each instance dynamically: the injected build must pass the project's unit tests, and generated proof-of-vulnerability (PoV) must trigger on the injected build and not on the clean one. CyberForge is not limited by the availability of disclosed vulnerabilities, therefore it can scale in comparison to data augmentation techniques which rely on historic CVE data. The resulting corpus holds 1034 validated vulnerabilities across 80 projects and 63 weakness categories, with edit locality similar to real CVE patches under a real-versus-real noise floor. Fine-tuning on trajectories collected over this corpus improves SEC-bench patch repair by +3.3 to +14.7 points, in all six configurations of three model scales and two teachers, with the 31B student reaching its GPT-5.4-mini teacher, 72.7% against 74.0%. These gains generalize out of distribution to PatchEval, a corpus containing other programming languages, where every configuration also improves and the 31B student passes its teacher.

We study a practical question: can a small correction module fix errors in a frozen language model's outputs without degrading its base capabilities? We propose CRN v2, a lightweight logit-level correction module (~34M trainable parameters, 0.73% of the 4.65B text module) that sits atop a fully frozen Gemma 4 E2B model. The base model is never updated; only the correction module learns, via supervised fine-tuning followed by reference-free DPO on 83,400 error-correction pairs. On a 60-question domain exam (CEHRI: Certified Human-Robot Intelligence, covering facts, arithmetic, and implicit-goal reasoning), CRN v2 corrects 53.3% of base-model errors (reworded variant: 43.3%) while showing no degradation on tested capability benchmarks (MMLU/BoolQ N=200; car-wash N=8). A LoRA baseline at the matched CRN v1 budget (6.6M params, rank 19) achieves 83.3% correction but suffers 30-75% capability loss on the same benchmarks -- the correction-capability tradeoff. An ablation shows that the KL preservation term (lambda=0.1) is critical: lowering it to 0.01 degrades correction to 35.0%. A hidden-state injection variant at earlier layers (1.6M params, SFT-only) reaches 50.0%/55.8% but does not exceed logit correction; shallower injection (layer 4) drops to 30.0%/28.3%; multi-depth logit correction (~35M) reaches only 40%; and longer training (5,000 SFT + 2,000 DPO) stays at 53.3% -- none of the alternative configurations we tested exceeded the rank-128 logit result, consistent with a best-achieved result of ~53% rather than a floor. This is a study of a design principle (frozen base + logit correction + KL anchoring), not a claim of architectural novelty. All code, main-result weights, and evaluation scripts are released (deep variant as code only -- no trained deep checkpoints).

Fine-tuning a pre-trained Text-to-Image (T2I) model on a tailored portrait dataset is the mainstream method for text-driven customization of portrait attributes. Due to Semantic Pollution during fine-tuning, existing methods struggle to maintain the original model's behavior and achieve incremental learning while customizing target attributes. To address this issue, we propose SPF-Portrait, a pioneering work to purely understand customized semantics while eliminating semantic pollution in text-driven portrait customization. In our SPF-Portrait, we propose a dual-path pipeline that introduces the original model as a reference for the conventional fine-tuning path. Through contrastive learning, we ensure adaptation to target attributes and purposefully align other unrelated attributes with the original portrait. We introduce a novel Semantic-Aware Fine Control Map, which represents the precise response regions of the target semantics, to spatially guide the alignment process between the contrastive paths. This alignment process not only effectively preserves the performance of the original model but also avoids over-alignment. Furthermore, we propose a novel response enhancement mechanism to reinforce the performance of target attributes, while mitigating representation discrepancy inherent in direct cross-modal supervision. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SPF-Portrait achieves state-of-the-art performance. Project webpage: https://spf-portrait.github.io/SPF-Portrait/

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, particularly in the face of stealthy and complex jailbreaks, presents a formidable challenge. In this study, we present a simple yet highly effective defense strategy, i.e., Intention Analysis Prompting (IAPrompt). The principle behind is to trigger LLMs' inherent self-correct and improve ability through a two-stage process: 1) essential intention analysis, and 2) policy-aligned response. Notably, IAPrompt is an inference-only method, thus could enhance the safety of LLMs without compromising their helpfulness. Extensive experiments on SAP200 and DAN benchmarks across Vicuna, ChatGLM, MPT, DeepSeek, and GPT-3.5 show that IAPrompt could consistently and significantly reduce the harmfulness in response (averagely -46.5% attack success rate) and maintain the general helpfulness. Further analyses present some insights into how our method works. To facilitate reproducibility, We release our code and scripts at: https://github.com/alphadl/SafeLLM_with_IntentionAnalysis

We present a benchmark for large language models designed to tackle one of the most knowledge-intensive tasks in data science: writing feature engineering code, which requires domain knowledge in addition to a deep understanding of the underlying problem and data structure. The model is provided with a dataset description in a prompt and asked to generate code transforming it. The evaluation score is derived from the improvement achieved by an XGBoost model fit on the modified dataset compared to the original data. By an extensive evaluation of state-of-the-art models and comparison to well-established benchmarks, we demonstrate that the FeatEng of our proposal can cheaply and efficiently assess the broad capabilities of LLMs, in contrast to the existing methods.

Prompt injection was initially framed as the large language model (LLM) analogue of SQL injection. However, over the past three years, attacks labeled as prompt injection have evolved from isolated input-manipulation exploits into multistep attack mechanisms that resemble malware. In this paper, we argue that prompt injections evolved into promptware, a new class of malware execution mechanism triggered through prompts engineered to exploit an application's LLM. We introduce a seven-stage promptware kill chain: Initial Access (prompt injection), Privilege Escalation (jailbreaking), Reconnaissance, Persistence (memory and retrieval poisoning), Command and Control, Lateral Movement, and Actions on Objective. We analyze thirty-six prominent studies and real-world incidents affecting production LLM systems and show that at least twenty-one documented attacks that traverse four or more stages of this kill chain, demonstrating that the threat model is not merely theoretical. We discuss the need for a defense-in-depth approach that addresses all stages of the promptware life cycle and review relevant countermeasures for each step. By moving the conversation from prompt injection to a promptware kill chain, our work provides analytical clarity, enables structured risk assessment, and lays a foundation for systematic security engineering of LLM-based systems.

Everything a language model sees is tokens. The serving stack knows what each span is -- user input, tool output, instructions -- but the model must keep track of that itself, and it can lose track or be confused: text can be written to read like anything. Prompt injection is a natural exploit of this phenomenon. By scrambling the model's understanding of span identity, an attacker can induce unwanted and potentially dangerous actions. Adding a non-textual channel to the model's input -- a way to communicate span identity beyond text -- mitigates this class of attack. We thus introduce a general steering technique called Semantic Overlays: small learned adapters applied at chosen prefill positions to a frozen model's residual stream. Laying an overlay over a span creates an out-of-band annotation channel that cannot be replicated by tokens. Unlike steering vectors, Semantic Overlays are trained, adaptable, and selectively applied. An overlay can encode complex semantics that reshape how the model perceives the marked span: asked to copy a code snippet under an overlay asserting that it is in a different programming language than it is, the model rewrites the snippet, faithfully, in the asserted language. Overlays are also composable, allow for transparent reading of underlying content, and can carry complex payloads -- including imperatives that the model will follow. An overlay which marks a span as "non-executable" defends against the broad class of prompt injections that add instructions in untrusted context. We report strong results on prompt injection benchmarks: SEP separation rises from 24.3% to 96.5% with utility unchanged (our scoring rule; we also correct a defect in the published grader), TensorTrust attack success rate falls from 34.8% to 6.6%, and all four PIArena attack families drop to 0% compliance, all while marked spans stay readable (92.5% exact copy rate).

The proliferation of agentic AI coding assistants, including Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and emerging skill-based architectures, has fundamentally transformed software development workflows. These systems leverage Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external tools, file systems, and shell access through protocols like the Model Context Protocol (MCP). However, this expanded capability surface introduces critical security vulnerabilities. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting agentic coding assistants. We propose a novel three-dimensional taxonomy categorizing attacks across delivery vectors, attack modalities, and propagation behaviors. Our meta-analysis synthesizes findings from 78 recent studies (2021--2026), consolidating evidence that attack success rates against state-of-the-art defenses exceed 85\% when adaptive attack strategies are employed. We systematically catalog 42 distinct attack techniques spanning input manipulation, tool poisoning, protocol exploitation, multimodal injection, and cross-origin context poisoning. Through critical analysis of 18 defense mechanisms reported in prior work, we identify that most achieve less than 50\% mitigation against sophisticated adaptive attacks. We contribute: (1) a unified taxonomy bridging disparate attack classifications, (2) the first systematic analysis of skill-based architecture vulnerabilities with concrete exploit chains, and (3) a defense-in-depth framework grounded in the limitations we identify. Our findings indicate that the security community must treat prompt injection as a first-class vulnerability class requiring architectural-level mitigations rather than ad-hoc filtering approaches.

Vision-Language Model (VLM) based Web Agents represent a significant step towards automating complex tasks by simulating human-like interaction with websites. However, their deployment in uncontrolled web environments introduces significant security vulnerabilities. Existing research on adversarial environmental injection attacks often relies on unrealistic assumptions, such as direct HTML manipulation, knowledge of user intent, or access to agent model parameters, limiting their practical applicability. In this paper, we propose AdInject, a novel and real-world black-box attack method that leverages the internet advertising delivery to inject malicious content into the Web Agent's environment. AdInject operates under a significantly more realistic threat model than prior work, assuming a black-box agent, static malicious content constraints, and no specific knowledge of user intent. AdInject includes strategies for designing malicious ad content aimed at misleading agents into clicking, and a VLM-based ad content optimization technique that infers potential user intents from the target website's context and integrates these intents into the ad content to make it appear more relevant or critical to the agent's task, thus enhancing attack effectiveness. Experimental evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of AdInject, attack success rates exceeding 60% in most scenarios and approaching 100% in certain cases. This strongly demonstrates that prevalent advertising delivery constitutes a potent and real-world vector for environment injection attacks against Web Agents. This work highlights a critical vulnerability in Web Agent security arising from real-world environment manipulation channels, underscoring the urgent need for developing robust defense mechanisms against such threats. Our code is available at https://github.com/NicerWang/AdInject.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized various domains but remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious inputs manipulate the model into ignoring original instructions and executing designated action. In this paper, we investigate the underlying mechanisms of these attacks by analyzing the attention patterns within LLMs. We introduce the concept of the distraction effect, where specific attention heads, termed important heads, shift focus from the original instruction to the injected instruction. Building on this discovery, we propose Attention Tracker, a training-free detection method that tracks attention patterns on instruction to detect prompt injection attacks without the need for additional LLM inference. Our method generalizes effectively across diverse models, datasets, and attack types, showing an AUROC improvement of up to 10.0% over existing methods, and performs well even on small LLMs. We demonstrate the robustness of our approach through extensive evaluations and provide insights into safeguarding LLM-integrated systems from prompt injection vulnerabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are seeing significant adoption in every type of organization due to their exceptional generative capabilities. However, LLMs are found to be vulnerable to various adversarial attacks, particularly prompt injection attacks, which trick them into producing harmful or inappropriate content. Adversaries execute such attacks by crafting malicious prompts to deceive the LLMs. In this paper, we propose a novel approach based on embedding-based Machine Learning (ML) classifiers to protect LLM-based applications against this severe threat. We leverage three commonly used embedding models to generate embeddings of malicious and benign prompts and utilize ML classifiers to predict whether an input prompt is malicious. Out of several traditional ML methods, we achieve the best performance with classifiers built using Random Forest and XGBoost. Our classifiers outperform state-of-the-art prompt injection classifiers available in open-source implementations, which use encoder-only neural networks.

Large language model (LLM) assistants are increasingly integrated into enterprise workflows, raising new security concerns as they bridge internal and external data sources. This paper presents an in-depth case study of EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711), a zero-click prompt injection vulnerability in Microsoft 365 Copilot that enabled remote, unauthenticated data exfiltration via a single crafted email. By chaining multiple bypasses-evading Microsofts XPIA (Cross Prompt Injection Attempt) classifier, circumventing link redaction with reference-style Markdown, exploiting auto-fetched images, and abusing a Microsoft Teams proxy allowed by the content security policy-EchoLeak achieved full privilege escalation across LLM trust boundaries without user interaction. We analyze why existing defenses failed, and outline a set of engineering mitigations including prompt partitioning, enhanced input/output filtering, provenance-based access control, and strict content security policies. Beyond the specific exploit, we derive generalizable lessons for building secure AI copilots, emphasizing the principle of least privilege, defense-in-depth architectures, and continuous adversarial testing. Our findings establish prompt injection as a practical, high-severity vulnerability class in production AI systems and provide a blueprint for defending against future AI-native threats.

Detecting prompt injection and jailbreak attacks is critical for deploying LLM-based agents safely. As agents increasingly process untrusted data from emails, documents, tool outputs, and external APIs, robust attack detection becomes essential. Yet current evaluation practices and production systems have fundamental limitations. We present a comprehensive analysis using a diverse benchmark of 18 datasets spanning harmful requests, jailbreaks, indirect prompt injections, and extraction attacks. We propose Leave-One-Dataset-Out (LODO) evaluation to measure true out-of-distribution generalization, revealing that the standard practice of train-test splits from the same dataset sources severely overestimates performance: aggregate metrics show an 8.4 percentage point AUC inflation, but per-dataset gaps range from 1% to 25% accuracy-exposing heterogeneous failure modes. To understand why classifiers fail to generalize, we analyze Sparse Auto-Encoder (SAE) feature coefficients across LODO folds, finding that 28% of top features are dataset-dependent shortcuts whose class signal depends on specific dataset compositions rather than semantic content. We systematically compare production guardrails (PromptGuard 2, LlamaGuard) and LLM-as-judge approaches on our benchmark, finding all three fail on indirect attacks targeting agents (7-37% detection) and that PromptGuard 2 and LlamaGuard cannot evaluate agentic tool injection due to architectural limitations. Finally, we show that LODO-stable SAE features provide more reliable explanations for classifier decisions by filtering dataset artifacts. We release our evaluation framework at https://github.com/maxf-zn/prompt-mining to establish LODO as the appropriate protocol for prompt attack detection research.

This technical report presents a diffusion model based framework for face swapping between two portrait images. The basic framework consists of three components, i.e., IP-Adapter, ControlNet, and Stable Diffusion's inpainting pipeline, for face feature encoding, multi-conditional generation, and face inpainting respectively. Besides, I introduce facial guidance optimization and CodeFormer based blending to further improve the generation quality. Specifically, we engage a recent light-weighted customization method (i.e., DreamBooth-LoRA), to guarantee the identity consistency by 1) using a rare identifier "sks" to represent the source identity, and 2) injecting the image features of source portrait into each cross-attention layer like the text features. Then I resort to the strong inpainting ability of Stable Diffusion, and utilize canny image and face detection annotation of the target portrait as the conditions, to guide ContorlNet's generation and align source portrait with the target portrait. To further correct face alignment, we add the facial guidance loss to optimize the text embedding during the sample generation.

While poisoning attacks on machine learning models have been extensively studied, the mechanisms by which adversaries can distribute poisoned models at scale remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we shed light on how model leaderboards -- ranked platforms for model discovery and evaluation -- can serve as a powerful channel for adversaries for stealthy large-scale distribution of poisoned models. We present TrojanClimb, a general framework that enables injection of malicious behaviors while maintaining competitive leaderboard performance. We demonstrate its effectiveness across four diverse modalities: text-embedding, text-generation, text-to-speech and text-to-image, showing that adversaries can successfully achieve high leaderboard rankings while embedding arbitrary harmful functionalities, from backdoors to bias injection. Our findings reveal a significant vulnerability in the machine learning ecosystem, highlighting the urgent need to redesign leaderboard evaluation mechanisms to detect and filter malicious (e.g., poisoned) models, while exposing broader security implications for the machine learning community regarding the risks of adopting models from unverified sources.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in processing and generating human language, powered by their ability to interpret and follow instructions. However, their capabilities can be exploited through prompt injection attacks. These attacks manipulate LLM-integrated applications into producing responses aligned with the attacker's injected content, deviating from the user's actual requests. The substantial risks posed by these attacks underscore the need for a thorough understanding of the threats. Yet, research in this area faces challenges due to the lack of a unified goal for such attacks and their reliance on manually crafted prompts, complicating comprehensive assessments of prompt injection robustness. We introduce a unified framework for understanding the objectives of prompt injection attacks and present an automated gradient-based method for generating highly effective and universal prompt injection data, even in the face of defensive measures. With only five training samples (0.3% relative to the test data), our attack can achieve superior performance compared with baselines. Our findings emphasize the importance of gradient-based testing, which can avoid overestimation of robustness, especially for defense mechanisms.

A central premise in mechanistic interpretability is that meaningful concepts in language models are represented by linear features in activation space. For such features to support reliable interventions, manipulating one feature should not substantially alter the effects of others. In practice, however, feature entanglement leads to interference such that localized interventions can have unintended downstream effects. Motivated by the Independent Causal Mechanisms principle, we propose to constrain internal features to be almost orthogonal. We argue that this promotes modular representations amenable to causal intervention. We formalize this problem by characterizing the gap between an idealized isolated intervention and its realized effect on model outputs in terms of feature interference. We upper-bound the propagation of feature interference in terms of the self-coherence of the feature dictionary, and relate this discrepancy to an explicit orthogonality regularization on the dictionary itself. Empirically, we show that this regularization enables more isolated interventions on mathematical reasoning concepts while preserving model performance. Our code is available under https://github.com/mrtzmllr/sae-icm.

Responsible practices for deploying language models include guiding models to recognize and refuse answering prompts that are considered unsafe, while complying with safe prompts. Achieving such behavior typically requires updating model weights, which is costly and inflexible. We explore opportunities to steering model activations at inference time, which does not require updating weights. Using sparse autoencoders, we identify and steer features in Phi-3 Mini that mediate refusal behavior. We find that feature steering can improve Phi-3 Minis robustness to jailbreak attempts across various harms, including challenging multi-turn attacks. However, we discover that feature steering can adversely affect overall performance on benchmarks. These results suggest that identifying steerable mechanisms for refusal via sparse autoencoders is a promising approach for enhancing language model safety, but that more research is needed to mitigate feature steerings adverse effects on performance.

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), with prior work focusing on cutting-edge LLM applications like personal copilots. In contrast, simpler LLM applications, such as customer service chatbots, are widespread on the web, yet their security posture and exposure to such attacks remain poorly understood. These applications often rely on third-party chatbot plugins that act as intermediaries to commercial LLM APIs, offering non-expert website builders intuitive ways to customize chatbot behaviors. To bridge this gap, we present the first large-scale study of 17 third-party chatbot plugins used by over 10,000 public websites, uncovering previously unknown prompt injection risks in practice. First, 8 of these plugins (used by 8,000 websites) fail to enforce the integrity of the conversation history transmitted in network requests between the website visitor and the chatbot. This oversight amplifies the impact of direct prompt injection attacks by allowing adversaries to forge conversation histories (including fake system messages), boosting their ability to elicit unintended behavior (e.g., code generation) by 3 to 8x. Second, 15 plugins offer tools, such as web-scraping, to enrich the chatbot's context with website-specific content. However, these tools do not distinguish the website's trusted content (e.g., product descriptions) from untrusted, third-party content (e.g., customer reviews), introducing a risk of indirect prompt injection. Notably, we found that ~13% of e-commerce websites have already exposed their chatbots to third-party content. We systematically evaluate both vulnerabilities through controlled experiments grounded in real-world observations, focusing on factors such as system prompt design and the underlying LLM. Our findings show that many plugins adopt insecure practices that undermine the built-in LLM safeguards.

Recent advancements in generative AI have led to the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) in software engineering, addressing numerous long-standing challenges. However, a comprehensive study examining the capabilities of LLMs in software vulnerability detection (SVD), a crucial aspect of software security, is currently lacking. Existing research primarily focuses on evaluating LLMs using C/C++ datasets. It typically explores only one or two strategies among prompt engineering, instruction tuning, and sequence classification fine-tuning for open-source LLMs. Consequently, there is a significant knowledge gap regarding the effectiveness of diverse LLMs in detecting vulnerabilities across various programming languages. To address this knowledge gap, we present a comprehensive empirical study evaluating the performance of LLMs on the SVD task. We have compiled a comprehensive dataset comprising 8,260 vulnerable functions in Python, 7,505 in Java, and 28,983 in JavaScript. We assess five open-source LLMs using multiple approaches, including prompt engineering, instruction tuning, and sequence classification fine-tuning. These LLMs are benchmarked against five fine-tuned small language models and two open-source static application security testing tools. Furthermore, we explore two avenues to improve LLM performance on SVD: a) Data perspective: Retraining models using downsampled balanced datasets. b) Model perspective: Investigating ensemble learning methods that combine predictions from multiple LLMs. Our comprehensive experiments demonstrate that SVD remains a challenging task for LLMs. This study provides a thorough understanding of the role of LLMs in SVD and offers practical insights for future advancements in leveraging generative AI to enhance software security practices.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

Large language models are increasingly used for text classification tasks such as sentiment analysis, yet their reliance on natural language prompts exposes them to prompt injection attacks. In particular, class-directive injections exploit knowledge of the model's label set (e.g., positive vs. negative) to override its intended behavior through adversarial instructions. Existing defenses, such as detection-based filters, instruction hierarchies, and signed prompts, either require model retraining or remain vulnerable to obfuscation. This paper introduces Label Disguise Defense (LDD), a lightweight and model-agnostic strategy that conceals true labels by replacing them with semantically transformed or unrelated alias labels(e.g., blue vs. yellow). The model learns these new label mappings implicitly through few-shot demonstrations, preventing direct correspondence between injected directives and decision outputs. We evaluate LDD across nine state-of-the-art models, including GPT-5, GPT-4o, LLaMA3.2, Gemma3, and Mistral variants, under varying few-shot and an adversarial setting. Our results show that the ability of LDD to recover performance lost to the adversarial attack varies across models and alias choices. For every model evaluated, LDD is able to restore a portion of the accuracy degradation caused by the attack. Moreover, for the vast majority of models, we can identify more than one alias pair that achieves higher accuracy than the under-attack baseline, in which the model relies solely on few-shot learning without any defensive mechanism. A linguistic analysis further reveals that semantically aligned alias labels(e.g., good vs. bad) yield stronger robustness than unaligned symbols(e.g., blue vs. yellow). Overall, this study demonstrates that label semantics can serve as an effective defense layer, transforming meaning itself into a shield against prompt injection.

Facial Appearance Editing (FAE) aims to modify physical attributes, such as pose, expression and lighting, of human facial images while preserving attributes like identity and background, showing great importance in photograph. In spite of the great progress in this area, current researches generally meet three challenges: low generation fidelity, poor attribute preservation, and inefficient inference. To overcome above challenges, this paper presents DiffFAE, a one-stage and highly-efficient diffusion-based framework tailored for high-fidelity FAE. For high-fidelity query attributes transfer, we adopt Space-sensitive Physical Customization (SPC), which ensures the fidelity and generalization ability by utilizing rendering texture derived from 3D Morphable Model (3DMM). In order to preserve source attributes, we introduce the Region-responsive Semantic Composition (RSC). This module is guided to learn decoupled source-regarding features, thereby better preserving the identity and alleviating artifacts from non-facial attributes such as hair, clothes, and background. We further introduce a consistency regularization for our pipeline to enhance editing controllability by leveraging prior knowledge in the attention matrices of diffusion model. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of DiffFAE over existing methods, achieving state-of-the-art performance in facial appearance editing.

There has been significant progress in personalized image synthesis with methods such as Textual Inversion, DreamBooth, and LoRA. Yet, their real-world applicability is hindered by high storage demands, lengthy fine-tuning processes, and the need for multiple reference images. Conversely, existing ID embedding-based methods, while requiring only a single forward inference, face challenges: they either necessitate extensive fine-tuning across numerous model parameters, lack compatibility with community pre-trained models, or fail to maintain high face fidelity. Addressing these limitations, we introduce InstantID, a powerful diffusion model-based solution. Our plug-and-play module adeptly handles image personalization in various styles using just a single facial image, while ensuring high fidelity. To achieve this, we design a novel IdentityNet by imposing strong semantic and weak spatial conditions, integrating facial and landmark images with textual prompts to steer the image generation. InstantID demonstrates exceptional performance and efficiency, proving highly beneficial in real-world applications where identity preservation is paramount. Moreover, our work seamlessly integrates with popular pre-trained text-to-image diffusion models like SD1.5 and SDXL, serving as an adaptable plugin. Our codes and pre-trained checkpoints will be available at https://github.com/InstantID/InstantID.

Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) decompose residual-stream activations into interpretable features. Recent latent-space defenses increasingly rely on these decompositions, assuming that identified "unsafe" SAE features serve as actionable handles for monitoring and intervention. In this paradigm, clamping a specific harmful feature is expected to reliably prevent model misbehavior. However, we show that this success may hide a recoverable failure mode: the clamp may block one visible route to a behavior without eliminating the behavior itself. We formulate this vulnerability as post-intervention recovery, a constrained residual-space optimization problem. Starting from the post-intervention residual state, we optimize residual perturbations to recover the pre-intervention behavior while preserving the post-intervention values of the targeted SAE features. Even under a strong threat model where the intervention remains active throughout optimization and generation, recovery remains possible. To rule out that recovery simply undoes the intervention, we use encoder-orthogonal updates for single-layer interventions and the corresponding feature-map Jacobian in the cross-layer setting. Across TPP, unlearning, IOI, and refusal steering experiments, this stress test reveals recoverable behavior despite successful feature-level intervention. Especially in the safety-critical refusal-steering setting, we achieve a 95.8% recovery rate on valid samples while keeping defended-feature relative drift to 0.131, substantially below suffix-based baselines. A recovery-path attribution analysis further localizes this recovery to the SAE reconstruction residual, the component left unexplained by the SAE. These results expose a gap between feature-level control and behavioral completeness: SAE features can support causal intervention, but controlling them does not guarantee control over the underlying behavior.

Open-Source Software (OSS) vulnerabilities bring great challenges to the software security and pose potential risks to our society. Enormous efforts have been devoted into automated vulnerability detection, among which deep learning (DL)-based approaches have proven to be the most effective. However, the current labeled data present the following limitations: (1) Tangled Patches: Developers may submit code changes unrelated to vulnerability fixes within patches, leading to tangled patches. (2) Lacking Inter-procedural Vulnerabilities: The existing vulnerability datasets typically contain function-level and file-level vulnerabilities, ignoring the relations between functions, thus rendering the approaches unable to detect the inter-procedural vulnerabilities. (3) Outdated Patches: The existing datasets usually contain outdated patches, which may bias the model during training. To address the above limitations, in this paper, we propose an automated data collection framework and construct the first repository-level high-quality vulnerability dataset named ReposVul. The proposed framework mainly contains three modules: (1) A vulnerability untangling module, aiming at distinguishing vulnerability-fixing related code changes from tangled patches, in which the Large Language Models (LLMs) and static analysis tools are jointly employed. (2) A multi-granularity dependency extraction module, aiming at capturing the inter-procedural call relationships of vulnerabilities, in which we construct multiple-granularity information for each vulnerability patch, including repository-level, file-level, function-level, and line-level. (3) A trace-based filtering module, aiming at filtering the outdated patches, which leverages the file path trace-based filter and commit time trace-based filter to construct an up-to-date dataset.

In the rapidly evolving software development landscape, Python stands out for its simplicity, versatility, and extensive ecosystem. Python packages, as units of organization, reusability, and distribution, have become a pressing concern, highlighted by the considerable number of vulnerability reports. As a scripting language, Python often cooperates with other languages for performance or interoperability. This adds complexity to the vulnerabilities inherent to Python packages, and the effectiveness of current vulnerability detection tools remains underexplored. This paper addresses these gaps by introducing PyVul, the first comprehensive benchmark suite of Python-package vulnerabilities. PyVul includes 1,157 publicly reported, developer-verified vulnerabilities, each linked to its affected packages. To accommodate diverse detection techniques, it provides annotations at both commit and function levels. An LLM-assisted data cleansing method is incorporated to improve label accuracy, achieving 100% commit-level and 94% function-level accuracy, establishing PyVul as the most precise large-scale Python vulnerability benchmark. We further carry out a distribution analysis of PyVul, which demonstrates that vulnerabilities in Python packages involve multiple programming languages and exhibit a wide variety of types. Moreover, our analysis reveals that multi-lingual Python packages are potentially more susceptible to vulnerabilities. Evaluation of state-of-the-art detectors using this benchmark reveals a significant discrepancy between the capabilities of existing tools and the demands of effectively identifying real-world security issues in Python packages. Additionally, we conduct an empirical review of the top-ranked CWEs observed in Python packages, to diagnose the fine-grained limitations of current detection tools and highlight the necessity for future advancements in the field.

Large language models (LLMs) introduce new security risks, but there are few comprehensive evaluation suites to measure and reduce these risks. We present BenchmarkName, a novel benchmark to quantify LLM security risks and capabilities. We introduce two new areas for testing: prompt injection and code interpreter abuse. We evaluated multiple state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, including GPT-4, Mistral, Meta Llama 3 70B-Instruct, and Code Llama. Our results show that conditioning away risk of attack remains an unsolved problem; for example, all tested models showed between 26% and 41% successful prompt injection tests. We further introduce the safety-utility tradeoff: conditioning an LLM to reject unsafe prompts can cause the LLM to falsely reject answering benign prompts, which lowers utility. We propose quantifying this tradeoff using False Refusal Rate (FRR). As an illustration, we introduce a novel test set to quantify FRR for cyberattack helpfulness risk. We find many LLMs able to successfully comply with "borderline" benign requests while still rejecting most unsafe requests. Finally, we quantify the utility of LLMs for automating a core cybersecurity task, that of exploiting software vulnerabilities. This is important because the offensive capabilities of LLMs are of intense interest; we quantify this by creating novel test sets for four representative problems. We find that models with coding capabilities perform better than those without, but that further work is needed for LLMs to become proficient at exploit generation. Our code is open source and can be used to evaluate other LLMs.

Agents powered by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly adopted in the software industry, contributing code as collaborators or even autonomous developers. As their presence grows, it becomes important to assess the current boundaries of their coding abilities. Existing agentic coding benchmarks, however, cover a limited task scope, e.g., bug fixing within a single pull request (PR), and often rely on non-executable evaluations or lack an automated approach for continually updating the evaluation coverage. To address such issues, we propose FeatureBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate agentic coding performance in end-to-end, feature-oriented software development. FeatureBench incorporates an execution-based evaluation protocol and a scalable test-driven method that automatically derives tasks from code repositories with minimal human effort. By tracing from unit tests along a dependency graph, our approach can identify feature-level coding tasks spanning multiple commits and PRs scattered across the development timeline, while ensuring the proper functioning of other features after the separation. Using this framework, we curated 200 challenging evaluation tasks and 3825 executable environments from 24 open-source repositories in the first version of our benchmark. Empirical evaluation reveals that the state-of-the-art agentic model, such as Claude 4.5 Opus, which achieves a 74.4% resolved rate on SWE-bench, succeeds on only 11.0% of tasks, opening new opportunities for advancing agentic coding. Moreover, benefiting from our automated task collection toolkit, FeatureBench can be easily scaled and updated over time to mitigate data leakage. The inherent verifiability of constructed environments also makes our method potentially valuable for agent training.

The advancement of makeup transfer, editing, and image encoding has demonstrated their effectiveness and superior quality. However, existing makeup works primarily focus on low-dimensional features such as color distributions and patterns, limiting their versatillity across a wide range of makeup applications. Futhermore, existing high-dimensional latent encoding methods mainly target global features such as structure and style, and are less effective for tasks that require detailed attention to local color and pattern features of makeup. To overcome these limitations, we propose BeautyBank, a novel makeup encoder that disentangles pattern features of bare and makeup faces. Our method encodes makeup features into a high-dimensional space, preserving essential details necessary for makeup reconstruction and broadening the scope of potential makeup research applications. We also propose a Progressive Makeup Tuning (PMT) strategy, specifically designed to enhance the preservation of detailed makeup features while preventing the inclusion of irrelevant attributes. We further explore novel makeup applications, including facial image generation with makeup injection and makeup similarity measure. Extensive empirical experiments validate that our method offers superior task adaptability and holds significant potential for widespread application in various makeup-related fields. Furthermore, to address the lack of large-scale, high-quality paired makeup datasets in the field, we constructed the Bare-Makeup Synthesis Dataset (BMS), comprising 324,000 pairs of 512x512 pixel images of bare and makeup-enhanced faces.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to red teaming attacks, which can induce LLMs to generate harmful content. Previous research constructs attack prompts via manual or automatic methods, which have their own limitations on construction cost and quality. To address these issues, we propose an integrated approach that combines manual and automatic methods to economically generate high-quality attack prompts. Specifically, considering the impressive capabilities of newly emerged LLMs, we propose an attack framework to instruct LLMs to mimic human-generated prompts through in-context learning. Furthermore, we propose a defense framework that fine-tunes victim LLMs through iterative interactions with the attack framework to enhance their safety against red teaming attacks. Extensive experiments on different LLMs validate the effectiveness of our proposed attack and defense frameworks. Additionally, we release a series of attack prompts datasets named SAP with varying sizes, facilitating the safety evaluation and enhancement of more LLMs. Our code and dataset is available on https://github.com/Aatrox103/SAP .

The ability to fine-tune generative models for text-to-image generation tasks is crucial, particularly facing the complexity involved in accurately interpreting and visualizing textual inputs. While LoRA is efficient for language model adaptation, it often falls short in text-to-image tasks due to the intricate demands of image generation, such as accommodating a broad spectrum of styles and nuances. To bridge this gap, we introduce StyleInject, a specialized fine-tuning approach tailored for text-to-image models. StyleInject comprises multiple parallel low-rank parameter matrices, maintaining the diversity of visual features. It dynamically adapts to varying styles by adjusting the variance of visual features based on the characteristics of the input signal. This approach significantly minimizes the impact on the original model's text-image alignment capabilities while adeptly adapting to various styles in transfer learning. StyleInject proves particularly effective in learning from and enhancing a range of advanced, community-fine-tuned generative models. Our comprehensive experiments, including both small-sample and large-scale data fine-tuning as well as base model distillation, show that StyleInject surpasses traditional LoRA in both text-image semantic consistency and human preference evaluation, all while ensuring greater parameter efficiency.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents that interact with external tools and services via the Model Context Protocol (MCP), a standardized interface for dynamic tool invocation. While MCP simplifies integration, it also expands the attack surface and enables generic exploits across multiple servers. Despite prior work on malicious MCP servers, the vulnerability landscape of MCP servers remains underexplored. In this work, we systematically analyze MCP server vulnerabilities, focusing on metadata characteristics, vulnerable code patterns, and community responses. Our study reveals that taint-style vulnerabilities constitute a substantial fraction of MCP server vulnerabilities, require significant code modifications to remediate, and are met with slow community responses. Motivated by these findings, we propose SPELLSMITH, presenting a novel textbased avenue for shielding taint-style vulnerabilities in MCP servers. In particular, SPELLSMITH analyzes the high-risk capabilities exposed by an MCP server and combines them with tool descriptions and parameter semantics to identify potential taint-style vulnerability risks, thereby constructing a tool-level risk profile. Then, SPELLSMITH leverages the Description property of the protocol to embed behavioral guidance (Description Enhancement Module) and exploits LLMs' self-reflection capabilities (Self-Reflection Module) to iteratively evaluate and refine outputs. By strengthening LLM internal decision-making, SPELLSMITH provides an active and unified mitigation strategy that generalizes across multiple vulnerabilities, reducing reliance on context-specific code-level fixes. Our experiments demonstrate that SPELLSMITH effectively mitigates taint-style vulnerability exploitation in MCP servers, highlighting its practical applicability and advantages over traditional code-level mitigations.

This paper studies the challenging task of makeup transfer, which aims to apply diverse makeup styles precisely and naturally to a given facial image. Due to the absence of paired data, current methods typically synthesize sub-optimal pseudo ground truths to guide the model training, resulting in low makeup fidelity. Additionally, different makeup styles generally have varying effects on the person face, but existing methods struggle to deal with this diversity. To address these issues, we propose a novel Self-supervised Hierarchical Makeup Transfer (SHMT) method via latent diffusion models. Following a "decoupling-and-reconstruction" paradigm, SHMT works in a self-supervised manner, freeing itself from the misguidance of imprecise pseudo-paired data. Furthermore, to accommodate a variety of makeup styles, hierarchical texture details are decomposed via a Laplacian pyramid and selectively introduced to the content representation. Finally, we design a novel Iterative Dual Alignment (IDA) module that dynamically adjusts the injection condition of the diffusion model, allowing the alignment errors caused by the domain gap between content and makeup representations to be corrected. Extensive quantitative and qualitative analyses demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. Our code is available at https://github.com/Snowfallingplum/SHMT.

Model customization introduces new concepts to existing text-to-image models, enabling the generation of the new concept in novel contexts. However, such methods lack accurate camera view control w.r.t the object, and users must resort to prompt engineering (e.g., adding "top-view") to achieve coarse view control. In this work, we introduce a new task -- enabling explicit control of camera viewpoint for model customization. This allows us to modify object properties amongst various background scenes via text prompts, all while incorporating the target camera pose as additional control. This new task presents significant challenges in merging a 3D representation from the multi-view images of the new concept with a general, 2D text-to-image model. To bridge this gap, we propose to condition the 2D diffusion process on rendered, view-dependent features of the new object. During training, we jointly adapt the 2D diffusion modules and 3D feature predictions to reconstruct the object's appearance and geometry while reducing overfitting to the input multi-view images. Our method outperforms existing image editing and model personalization baselines in preserving the custom object's identity while following the input text prompt and the object's camera pose.

The growing deployment of large language model (LLM) based agents that interact with external environments has created new attack surfaces for adversarial manipulation. One major threat is indirect prompt injection, where attackers embed malicious instructions in external environment output, causing agents to interpret and execute them as if they were legitimate prompts. While previous research has focused primarily on plain-text injection attacks, we find a significant yet underexplored vulnerability: LLMs' dependence on structured chat templates and their susceptibility to contextual manipulation through persuasive multi-turn dialogues. To this end, we introduce ChatInject, an attack that formats malicious payloads to mimic native chat templates, thereby exploiting the model's inherent instruction-following tendencies. Building on this foundation, we develop a persuasion-driven Multi-turn variant that primes the agent across conversational turns to accept and execute otherwise suspicious actions. Through comprehensive experiments across frontier LLMs, we demonstrate three critical findings: (1) ChatInject achieves significantly higher average attack success rates than traditional prompt injection methods, improving from 5.18% to 32.05% on AgentDojo and from 15.13% to 45.90% on InjecAgent, with multi-turn dialogues showing particularly strong performance at average 52.33% success rate on InjecAgent, (2) chat-template-based payloads demonstrate strong transferability across models and remain effective even against closed-source LLMs, despite their unknown template structures, and (3) existing prompt-based defenses are largely ineffective against this attack approach, especially against Multi-turn variants. These findings highlight vulnerabilities in current agent systems.

Content Warning: This paper may contain unsafe or harmful content generated by LLMs that may be offensive to readers. Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly serve as tooling platforms through structured output APIs, but the grammar-guided decoding that powers this feature opens a critical control-plane attack surface orthogonal to traditional data-plane vulnerabilities. We introduce Constrained Decoding Attack (CDA), a new jailbreak class that targets the LLM control plane. CDA is best characterized as a control-to-semantic pipeline: (1) schema-enforced logit masking injects a malicious prefix into the generation trajectory, and (2) the model itself completes the harmful intent. Unlike data-plane jailbreaks that rely on bypassing alignment with visible inputs, CDA acts on the decoding process itself, so internal safety alignment alone cannot stop it. We instantiate CDA with EnumAttack, which hides malicious content in enum fields, and the more evasive DictAttack, which decouples the payload across a benign prompt and a dictionary-based grammar. Across 13 proprietary/open-weight models and five standard benchmarks, DictAttack achieves 94.3--99.5% Attack Success Rate (ASR) on flagship models including gpt-5, gemini-2.5-pro, deepseek-r1, and gpt-oss-120b. While basic grammar auditing mitigates EnumAttack, DictAttack still sustains 75.8% ASR against SOTA jailbreak guardrails, exposing a "semantic gap" that demands cross-plane defenses bridging the data and control planes. Project page and code are available at https://ict-cda.github.io/.

Tool selection is a key component of LLM agents. A popular approach follows a two-step process - retrieval and selection - to pick the most appropriate tool from a tool library for a given task. In this work, we introduce ToolHijacker, a novel prompt injection attack targeting tool selection in no-box scenarios. ToolHijacker injects a malicious tool document into the tool library to manipulate the LLM agent's tool selection process, compelling it to consistently choose the attacker's malicious tool for an attacker-chosen target task. Specifically, we formulate the crafting of such tool documents as an optimization problem and propose a two-phase optimization strategy to solve it. Our extensive experimental evaluation shows that ToolHijacker is highly effective, significantly outperforming existing manual-based and automated prompt injection attacks when applied to tool selection. Moreover, we explore various defenses, including prevention-based defenses (StruQ and SecAlign) and detection-based defenses (known-answer detection, DataSentinel, perplexity detection, and perplexity windowed detection). Our experimental results indicate that these defenses are insufficient, highlighting the urgent need for developing new defense strategies.

Large Language Models (LLMs), renowned for their superior proficiency in language comprehension and generation, stimulate a vibrant ecosystem of applications around them. However, their extensive assimilation into various services introduces significant security risks. This study deconstructs the complexities and implications of prompt injection attacks on actual LLM-integrated applications. Initially, we conduct an exploratory analysis on ten commercial applications, highlighting the constraints of current attack strategies in practice. Prompted by these limitations, we subsequently formulate HouYi, a novel black-box prompt injection attack technique, which draws inspiration from traditional web injection attacks. HouYi is compartmentalized into three crucial elements: a seamlessly-incorporated pre-constructed prompt, an injection prompt inducing context partition, and a malicious payload designed to fulfill the attack objectives. Leveraging HouYi, we unveil previously unknown and severe attack outcomes, such as unrestricted arbitrary LLM usage and uncomplicated application prompt theft. We deploy HouYi on 36 actual LLM-integrated applications and discern 31 applications susceptible to prompt injection. 10 vendors have validated our discoveries, including Notion, which has the potential to impact millions of users. Our investigation illuminates both the possible risks of prompt injection attacks and the possible tactics for mitigation.

Software supply chain attacks targeting the npm ecosystem have become increasingly sophisticated, leveraging obfuscation and complex logic to evade traditional detection mechanisms. Recently, large language models (LLMs) have attracted significant attention for malicious code detection due to their strong capabilities in semantic code understanding. However, the practical deployment of LLMs in this domain is severely constrained by limited context windows and high computational costs. Naive approaches, such as token-based code splitting, often fragment semantic context, leading to degraded detection performance. To overcome these challenges, this paper introduces a novel LLM-based framework for malicious npm package detection that leverages code slicing techniques. A specialized taint-based slicing method tailored to the JavaScript ecosystem is proposed to recover malicious data flows. By isolating security-relevant logic from benign boilerplate code, the approach reduces the input code volume by over 99\% while preserving critical malicious behaviors. The framework is evaluated on a curated dataset comprising over 7000 malicious and benign npm packages. Experimental results using the DeepSeek-Coder-6.7B model demonstrate that the proposed approach achieves a detection accuracy of 87.04\%, significantly outperforming a full-package baseline based on naive token splitting (75.41\%). These results indicate that semantically optimized input representations via code slicing not only mitigate the LLM context window bottleneck but also enhance reasoning precision for security analysis, providing an effective defense against evolving open-source software supply chain threats.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) enable exciting LLM-integrated applications, which perform text-based tasks by utilizing their advanced language understanding capabilities. However, as LLMs have improved, so have the attacks against them. Prompt injection attacks are an important threat: they trick the model to deviate from the original application's instructions and instead follow user directives. These attacks rely on the LLM's ability to follow instructions and inability to separate the prompts and user data. We introduce structured queries, a general approach to tackle this problem. Structured queries separate prompts and data into two channels. We implement a system that supports structured queries. This system is made of (1) a secure front-end that formats a prompt and user data into a special format, and (2) a specially trained LLM that can produce high-quality outputs from these inputs. The LLM is trained using a novel fine-tuning strategy: we convert a base (non-instruction-tuned) LLM to a structured instruction-tuned model that will only follow instructions in the prompt portion of a query. To do so, we augment standard instruction tuning datasets with examples that also include instructions in the data portion of the query, and fine-tune the model to ignore these. Our system significantly improves resistance to prompt injection attacks, with little or no impact on utility. Our code is released at https://github.com/Sizhe-Chen/PromptInjectionDefense.