Daily Papers

LLM-based agents are increasingly capable of complex task execution, yet current agentic systems remain constrained by text-centric paradigms. Traditional approaches rely on procedural JSON-based function calling, which often struggles with long-horizon tasks due to fragile multi-turn dependencies and context drift. In this paper, we present CaveAgent, a framework that transforms the paradigm from "LLM-as-Text-Generator" to "LLM-as-Runtime-Operator." We introduce a Dual-stream Context Architecture that decouples state management into a lightweight semantic stream for reasoning and a persistent, deterministic Python Runtime stream for execution. In addition to leveraging code generation to efficiently resolve interdependent sub-tasks (e.g., loops, conditionals) in a single step, we introduce Stateful Runtime Management in CaveAgent. Distinct from existing code-based approaches that remain text-bound and lack the support for external object injection and retrieval, CaveAgent injects, manipulates, and retrieves complex Python objects (e.g., DataFrames, database connections) that persist across turns. This persistence mechanism acts as a high-fidelity external memory to eliminate context drift, avoid catastrophic forgetting, while ensuring that processed data flows losslessly to downstream applications. Comprehensive evaluations on Tau^2-bench, BFCL and various case studies across representative SOTA LLMs demonstrate CaveAgent's superiority. Specifically, our framework achieves a 10.5\% success rate improvement on retail tasks and reduces total token consumption by 28.4\% in multi-turn scenarios. On data-intensive tasks, direct variable storage and retrieval reduces token consumption by 59\%, allowing CaveAgent to handle large-scale data that causes context overflow failures in both JSON-based and Code-based agents.

Object insertion aims to seamlessly composite a reference object into a specified region of a background image. Recent diffusion-based methods achieve high visual quality but formulate insertion as a simple 2D inpainting task, providing no explicit control over the object's 3D pose and limiting their practical applicability. We propose DIRECT (Decomposed Injection for Reference Composition and Target-integration), a novel framework that integrates interactive pose manipulation with high-fidelity 2D image synthesis to enable pose-controllable object insertion. Our method decomposes the insertion conditions into three complementary components: appearance guidance capturing visual details from the reference object, geometry guidance derived from the user-adjusted 3D proxy, and context guidance from the target background. By injecting them through separate pathways, DIRECT avoids feature entanglement and simultaneously preserves reference appearance, follows the user-specified pose, and adapts the object to the target scene. We also introduce an automated data construction pipeline to improve the diversity and quality of training data. Experiments show that DIRECT outperforms previous methods in both geometric controllability and visual quality.

We introduce ObjectAdd, a training-free diffusion modification method to add user-expected objects into user-specified area. The motive of ObjectAdd stems from: first, describing everything in one prompt can be difficult, and second, users often need to add objects into the generated image. To accommodate with real world, our ObjectAdd maintains accurate image consistency after adding objects with technical innovations in: (1) embedding-level concatenation to ensure correct text embedding coalesce; (2) object-driven layout control with latent and attention injection to ensure objects accessing user-specified area; (3) prompted image inpainting in an attention refocusing & object expansion fashion to ensure rest of the image stays the same. With a text-prompted image, our ObjectAdd allows users to specify a box and an object, and achieves: (1) adding object inside the box area; (2) exact content outside the box area; (3) flawless fusion between the two areas

Advances in video generation have significantly improved the realism and quality of created scenes. This has fueled interest in developing intuitive tools that let users leverage video generation as world simulators. Text-to-video (T2V) generation is one such approach, enabling video creation from text descriptions only. Yet, due to the inherent ambiguity in texts and the limited temporal information offered by text prompts, researchers have explored additional control signals like trajectory-guided systems, for more accurate T2V generation. Nonetheless, methods to evaluate whether T2V models can generate realistic interactions between multiple objects are lacking. We introduce InTraGen, a pipeline for improved trajectory-based generation of object interaction scenarios. We propose 4 new datasets and a novel trajectory quality metric to evaluate the performance of the proposed InTraGen. To achieve object interaction, we introduce a multi-modal interaction encoding pipeline with an object ID injection mechanism that enriches object-environment interactions. Our results demonstrate improvements in both visual fidelity and quantitative performance. Code and datasets are available at https://github.com/insait-institute/InTraGen

Recent work has embodied LLMs as agents, allowing them to access tools, perform actions, and interact with external content (e.g., emails or websites). However, external content introduces the risk of indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious instructions are embedded within the content processed by LLMs, aiming to manipulate these agents into executing detrimental actions against users. Given the potentially severe consequences of such attacks, establishing benchmarks to assess and mitigate these risks is imperative. In this work, we introduce InjecAgent, a benchmark designed to assess the vulnerability of tool-integrated LLM agents to IPI attacks. InjecAgent comprises 1,054 test cases covering 17 different user tools and 62 attacker tools. We categorize attack intentions into two primary types: direct harm to users and exfiltration of private data. We evaluate 30 different LLM agents and show that agents are vulnerable to IPI attacks, with ReAct-prompted GPT-4 vulnerable to attacks 24% of the time. Further investigation into an enhanced setting, where the attacker instructions are reinforced with a hacking prompt, shows additional increases in success rates, nearly doubling the attack success rate on the ReAct-prompted GPT-4. Our findings raise questions about the widespread deployment of LLM Agents. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/uiuc-kang-lab/InjecAgent.

The integration of large language models with external content has enabled applications such as Microsoft Copilot but also introduced vulnerabilities to indirect prompt injection attacks. In these attacks, malicious instructions embedded within external content can manipulate LLM outputs, causing deviations from user expectations. To address this critical yet under-explored issue, we introduce the first benchmark for indirect prompt injection attacks, named BIPIA, to assess the risk of such vulnerabilities. Using BIPIA, we evaluate existing LLMs and find them universally vulnerable. Our analysis identifies two key factors contributing to their success: LLMs' inability to distinguish between informational context and actionable instructions, and their lack of awareness in avoiding the execution of instructions within external content. Based on these findings, we propose two novel defense mechanisms-boundary awareness and explicit reminder-to address these vulnerabilities in both black-box and white-box settings. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our black-box defense provides substantial mitigation, while our white-box defense reduces the attack success rate to near-zero levels, all while preserving the output quality of LLMs. We hope this work inspires further research into securing LLM applications and fostering their safe and reliable use.

The growing deployment of large language model (LLM) based agents that interact with external environments has created new attack surfaces for adversarial manipulation. One major threat is indirect prompt injection, where attackers embed malicious instructions in external environment output, causing agents to interpret and execute them as if they were legitimate prompts. While previous research has focused primarily on plain-text injection attacks, we find a significant yet underexplored vulnerability: LLMs' dependence on structured chat templates and their susceptibility to contextual manipulation through persuasive multi-turn dialogues. To this end, we introduce ChatInject, an attack that formats malicious payloads to mimic native chat templates, thereby exploiting the model's inherent instruction-following tendencies. Building on this foundation, we develop a persuasion-driven Multi-turn variant that primes the agent across conversational turns to accept and execute otherwise suspicious actions. Through comprehensive experiments across frontier LLMs, we demonstrate three critical findings: (1) ChatInject achieves significantly higher average attack success rates than traditional prompt injection methods, improving from 5.18% to 32.05% on AgentDojo and from 15.13% to 45.90% on InjecAgent, with multi-turn dialogues showing particularly strong performance at average 52.33% success rate on InjecAgent, (2) chat-template-based payloads demonstrate strong transferability across models and remain effective even against closed-source LLMs, despite their unknown template structures, and (3) existing prompt-based defenses are largely ineffective against this attack approach, especially against Multi-turn variants. These findings highlight vulnerabilities in current agent systems.

AI agents that autonomously interact with external tools and environments show great promise across real-world applications. However, the external data which agent consumes also leads to the risk of indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in third-party content hijack agent behavior. Guided by benchmarks, such as AgentDojo, there has been significant amount of progress in developing defense against the said attacks. As the technology continues to mature, and that agents are increasingly being relied upon for more complex tasks, there is increasing pressing need to also evolve the benchmark to reflect threat landscape faced by emerging agentic systems. In this work, we reveal three fundamental flaws in current benchmarks and push the frontier along these dimensions: (i) lack of dynamic open-ended tasks, (ii) lack of helpful instructions, and (iii) simplistic user tasks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AgentDyn, a manually designed benchmark featuring 60 challenging open-ended tasks and 560 injection test cases across Shopping, GitHub, and Daily Life. Unlike prior static benchmarks, AgentDyn requires dynamic planning and incorporates helpful third-party instructions. Our evaluation of ten state-of-the-art defenses suggests that almost all existing defenses are either not secure enough or suffer from significant over-defense, revealing that existing defenses are still far from real-world deployment. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/leolee99/AgentDyn.

Video object removal and injection are reciprocal editing operations between object-present and object-absent video states, yet they differ substantially in training difficulty. Removal can be effectively bootstrapped from video inpainting and further adapted to erase object-related interaction effects. Injection, however, requires large-scale paired supervision to model object appearance, dynamics, and scene-dependent effects, while perfectly aligned real-world pairs are difficult to collect and synthetic data lacks sufficient realism and diversity. To address this challenge, we present UniVOE, a removal-driven framework for training both video object removal and injection models. We first train an effect-aware remover by transferring video inpainting priors and finetuning on object-present/object-absent pairs. The trained remover converts real object-present videos into object-absent counterparts, creating large-scale paired supervision for injection. An injection model is trained on these pairs in the reverse direction to recover objects together with their dynamics and interaction effects. Moreover, since pixel-level reconstruction alone cannot adequately capture perceptual realism, we introduce a reward-based post-training method that aligns injection results with human preferences using a proprietary reward model. Experiments against strong open-source and commercial systems demonstrate that UniVOE achieves state-of-the-art performance on both object removal and injection, particularly in challenging interaction-effect cases.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

Image-to-Video (I2V) generation models, which condition video generation on reference images, have shown emerging visual instruction-following capability, allowing certain visual cues in reference images to act as implicit control signals for video generation. However, this capability also introduces a previously overlooked risk: adversaries may exploit visual instructions to inject malicious intent through the image modality. In this work, we uncover this risk by proposing Visual Instruction Injection (VII), a training-free and transferable jailbreaking framework that intentionally disguises the malicious intent of unsafe text prompts as benign visual instructions in the safe reference image. Specifically, VII coordinates a Malicious Intent Reprogramming module to distill malicious intent from unsafe text prompts while minimizing their static harmfulness, and a Visual Instruction Grounding module to ground the distilled intent onto a safe input image by rendering visual instructions that preserve semantic consistency with the original unsafe text prompt, thereby inducing harmful content during I2V generation. Empirically, our extensive experiments on four state-of-the-art commercial I2V models (Kling-v2.5-turbo, Gemini Veo-3.1, Seedance-1.5-pro, and PixVerse-V5) demonstrate that VII achieves Attack Success Rates of up to 83.5% while reducing Refusal Rates to near zero, significantly outperforming existing baselines.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on retrieving information from external corpora. This creates a new attack surface: indirect prompt injection (IPI), where hidden instructions are planted in the corpora and hijack model behavior once retrieved. Previous studies have highlighted this risk but often avoid the hardest step: ensuring that malicious content is actually retrieved. In practice, unoptimized IPI is rarely retrieved under natural queries, which leaves its real-world impact unclear. We address this challenge by decomposing the malicious content into a trigger fragment that guarantees retrieval and an attack fragment that encodes arbitrary attack objectives. Based on this idea, we design an efficient and effective black-box attack algorithm that constructs a compact trigger fragment to guarantee retrieval for any attack fragment. Our attack requires only API access to embedding models, is cost-efficient (as little as $0.21 per target user query on OpenAI's embedding models), and achieves near-100% retrieval across 11 benchmarks and 8 embedding models (including both open-source models and proprietary services). Based on this attack, we present the first end-to-end IPI exploits under natural queries and realistic external corpora, spanning both RAG and agentic systems with diverse attack objectives. These results establish IPI as a practical and severe threat: when a user issued a natural query to summarize emails on frequently asked topics, a single poisoned email was sufficient to coerce GPT-4o into exfiltrating SSH keys with over 80% success in a multi-agent workflow. We further evaluate several defenses and find that they are insufficient to prevent the retrieval of malicious text, highlighting retrieval as a critical open vulnerability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have seen rapid adoption in recent years, with industries increasingly relying on them to maintain a competitive advantage. These models excel at interpreting user instructions and generating human-like responses, leading to their integration across diverse domains, including consulting and information retrieval. However, their widespread deployment also introduces substantial security risks, most notably in the form of prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. To systematically evaluate LLM vulnerabilities -- particularly to external prompt injection -- we conducted a series of experiments on eight commercial models. Each model was tested without supplementary sanitization, relying solely on its built-in safeguards. The results exposed exploitable weaknesses and emphasized the need for stronger security measures. Four categories of attacks were examined: direct injection, indirect (external) injection, image-based injection, and prompt leakage. Comparative analysis indicated that Claude 3 demonstrated relatively greater robustness; nevertheless, empirical findings confirm that additional defenses, such as input normalization, remain necessary to achieve reliable protection.

Video object removal aims to eliminate target objects from videos while plausibly completing missing regions and preserving spatio-temporal consistency. Although diffusion models have recently advanced this task, it remains challenging to remove object-induced side effects (e.g., shadows, reflections, and illumination changes) without compromising overall coherence. This limitation stems from the insufficient physical and semantic understanding of the target object and its interactions with the scene. In this paper, we propose to introduce understanding into erasing from two complementary perspectives. Externally, we introduce a distillation scheme that transfers the relationships between objects and their induced effects from vision foundation models to video diffusion models. Internally, we propose a framewise context cross-attention mechanism that grounds each denoising block in informative, unmasked context surrounding the target region. External and internal guidance jointly enable our model to understand the target object, its induced effects, and the global background context, resulting in clear and coherent object removal. Extensive experiments demonstrate our state-of-the-art performance, and we establish the first real-world benchmark for video object removal to facilitate future research and community progress. Our code, data, and models are available at: https://github.com/WeChatCV/UnderEraser.

Recent text-to-image generative models can generate high-fidelity images from text prompts. However, these models struggle to consistently generate the same objects in different contexts with the same appearance. Consistent object generation is important to many downstream tasks like generating comic book illustrations with consistent characters and setting. Numerous approaches attempt to solve this problem by extending the vocabulary of diffusion models through fine-tuning. However, even lightweight fine-tuning approaches can be prohibitively expensive to run at scale and in real-time. We introduce a method called ObjectComposer for generating compositions of multiple objects that resemble user-specified images. Our approach is training-free, leveraging the abilities of preexisting models. We build upon the recent BLIP-Diffusion model, which can generate images of single objects specified by reference images. ObjectComposer enables the consistent generation of compositions containing multiple specific objects simultaneously, all without modifying the weights of the underlying models.

Persistent personal agents combine long-term memory with access to users' external environments, enabling personalized foreground assistance and proactive background execution. This integration also creates a new path to compromise: untrusted external content can be silently written into persistent memory and later reused as trusted state. We study this threat as stealth memory injection, in which a remote black-box adversary delivers a single email payload that must induce the agent to write poisoned memory, stay hidden in the agent's response to the user, and affect future behavior. We introduce WhisperBench, a 108-case benchmark spanning five risk categories and both fact and preference poisoning. Built on a real IMAP/SMTP workflow and an authentic email agent skill, it enables full-cycle evaluation of stealth memory injection attacks. To enable this black-box attack under single-email delivery and without runtime feedback, we propose MemGhost, a one-shot payload generation framework. MemGhost uses an environment proxy to emulate persistent-agent execution and an objective proxy to convert memory adoption and conversational stealth into dense rubric-based rewards, then trains the attacker policy with supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning. Across 56 held-out test cases, MemGhost achieves 87.5% end-to-end success on OpenClaw with GPT-5.4 and 71.4% on Claude Code SDK with Sonnet 4.6. It also transfers across personal-agent architectures (NanoClaw and Hermes Agent) and memory backends (filesystem and vector-based Mem0), and remains effective against input-level, model-level, and system-level defenses. These results suggest that persistent memory can turn ordinary external processing into a practical pathway for long-term agent compromise.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on long-term memory and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to persist experiences and refine future performance. While this experience learning capability enhances agentic autonomy, it introduces a critical, unexplored attack surface, i.e., the trust boundary between an agent's reasoning core and its own past. In this paper, we introduce MemoryGraft. It is a novel indirect injection attack that compromises agent behavior not through immediate jailbreaks, but by implanting malicious successful experiences into the agent's long-term memory. Unlike traditional prompt injections that are transient, or standard RAG poisoning that targets factual knowledge, MemoryGraft exploits the agent's semantic imitation heuristic which is the tendency to replicate patterns from retrieved successful tasks. We demonstrate that an attacker who can supply benign ingestion-level artifacts that the agent reads during execution can induce it to construct a poisoned RAG store where a small set of malicious procedure templates is persisted alongside benign experiences. When the agent later encounters semantically similar tasks, union retrieval over lexical and embedding similarity reliably surfaces these grafted memories, and the agent adopts the embedded unsafe patterns, leading to persistent behavioral drift across sessions. We validate MemoryGraft on MetaGPT's DataInterpreter agent with GPT-4o and find that a small number of poisoned records can account for a large fraction of retrieved experiences on benign workloads, turning experience-based self-improvement into a vector for stealthy and durable compromise. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, our code and evaluation data are available at https://github.com/Jacobhhy/Agent-Memory-Poisoning.

Indirect prompt injection poses a critical threat to LLM agents that interact with untrusted external data, yet automated attack methods--proven effective for jailbreaking--remain underexplored in realistic agentic settings. We present a comprehensive empirical evaluation of automated prompt injection attacks against LLM agents, adapting both white-box (GCG) and black-box (TAP) methods to the agentic setting within the AgentDojo framework. We evaluate across 80 task pairs spanning four domains and multiple models, and find that black-box optimization substantially outperforms gradient-based methods, a gap we attribute to GCG's optimization instability under reasonable compute budgets. We also find that TAP's effectiveness depends on the attacker model, as both general capability and safety tuning affect attack success--stronger models produce more effective injections, while safety-tuned attackers can refuse to generate adversarial prompts. Task-universal attacks transfer effectively to unseen tasks and out-of-distribution domains, but attacks optimized on smaller open-source models do not transfer to frontier models like GPT-5. These findings highlight automated prompt injection as a credible but model-dependent threat, with significant barriers remaining for model-agnostic exploitation.

The emergence of multimodal large language models has redefined the agent paradigm by integrating language and vision modalities with external data sources, enabling agents to better interpret human instructions and execute increasingly complex tasks. However, in this paper, we identify a critical yet previously overlooked security vulnerability in multimodal agents: cross-modal prompt injection attacks. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose CrossInject, a novel attack framework in which attackers embed adversarial perturbations across multiple modalities to align with target malicious content, allowing external instructions to hijack the agent's decision-making process and execute unauthorized tasks. Our approach incorporates two key coordinated components. First, we introduce Visual Latent Alignment, where we optimize adversarial features to the malicious instructions in the visual embedding space based on a text-to-image generative model, ensuring that adversarial images subtly encode cues for malicious task execution. Subsequently, we present Textual Guidance Enhancement, where a large language model is leveraged to construct the black-box defensive system prompt through adversarial meta prompting and generate an malicious textual command that steers the agent's output toward better compliance with attackers' requests. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art attacks, achieving at least a +30.1% increase in attack success rates across diverse tasks. Furthermore, we validate our attack's effectiveness in real-world multimodal autonomous agents, highlighting its potential implications for safety-critical applications.

Indirect Prompt Injection attacks exploit the inherent limitation of Large Language Models (LLMs) to distinguish between instructions and data in their inputs. Despite numerous defense proposals, the systematic evaluation against adaptive adversaries remains limited, even when successful attacks can have wide security and privacy implications, and many real-world LLM-based applications remain vulnerable. We present the results of LLMail-Inject, a public challenge simulating a realistic scenario in which participants adaptively attempted to inject malicious instructions into emails in order to trigger unauthorized tool calls in an LLM-based email assistant. The challenge spanned multiple defense strategies, LLM architectures, and retrieval configurations, resulting in a dataset of 208,095 unique attack submissions from 839 participants. We release the challenge code, the full dataset of submissions, and our analysis demonstrating how this data can provide new insights into the instruction-data separation problem. We hope this will serve as a foundation for future research towards practical structural solutions to prompt injection.

Image-driven video editing aims to propagate edit contents from the modified first frame to the remaining frames. Existing methods usually invert the source video to noise using a pre-trained image-to-video (I2V) model and then guide the sampling process using the edited first frame. Generally, a popular choice for maintaining motion and layout from the source video is intervening in the denoising process by injecting attention during reconstruction. However, such injection often leads to unsatisfactory results, where excessive injection leads to conflicting semantics with the source video while insufficient injection brings limited source representation. Recognizing this, we propose an Editing-awaRE (REE) injection method to modulate the injection intensity of each token. Specifically, we first compute the pixel difference between the source and edited first frame to form a corresponding editing mask. Next, we track the editing area throughout the entire video by using optical flow to warp the first-frame mask. Then, editing-aware feature injection intensity for each token is generated accordingly, where injection is not conducted in editing areas. Building upon REE injection, we further propose a zero-shot image-driven video editing framework with recent-emerging rectified-Flow models, dubbed FREE-Edit. Without fine-tuning or training, our FREE-Edit demonstrates effectiveness in various image-driven video editing scenarios, showing its capability to produce higher-quality outputs compared with existing techniques. Project page: https://free-edit.github.io/page/.

Indirect prompt injection threatens LLM agents by embedding malicious instructions in external content, enabling unauthorized actions and data theft. LLM agents maintain working memory through their context window, which stores interaction history for decision-making. Conventional agents indiscriminately accumulate all tool outputs and reasoning traces in this memory, creating two critical vulnerabilities: (1) injected instructions persist throughout the workflow, granting attackers multiple opportunities to manipulate behavior, and (2) verbose, non-essential content degrades decision-making capabilities. Existing defenses treat bloated memory as given and focus on remaining resilient, rather than reducing unnecessary accumulation to prevent the attack. We present AgentSys, a framework that defends against indirect prompt injection through explicit memory management. Inspired by process memory isolation in operating systems, AgentSys organizes agents hierarchically: a main agent spawns worker agents for tool calls, each running in an isolated context and able to spawn nested workers for subtasks. External data and subtask traces never enter the main agent's memory; only schema-validated return values can cross boundaries through deterministic JSON parsing. Ablations show isolation alone cuts attack success to 2.19%, and adding a validator/sanitizer further improves defense with event-triggered checks whose overhead scales with operations rather than context length. On AgentDojo and ASB, AgentSys achieves 0.78% and 4.25% attack success while slightly improving benign utility over undefended baselines. It remains robust to adaptive attackers and across multiple foundation models, showing that explicit memory management enables secure, dynamic LLM agent architectures. Our code is available at: https://github.com/ruoyaow/agentsys-memory.

Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents. Thus, a growing body of work have proposed a variety of defensive approaches against IPI. These can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) prompt-based (using prompting as a way to prevent agents from following malicious instructions), 2) detection-based (identifying and filtering malicious instructions), and 3) system-level (using systems insights, such as control and data isolation, for defense). However, commonly used benchmarks for evaluating defense, such as AgentDojo, are inherently static, generating a fixed distribution of IPI attacks. Consequently, static benchmarks do not usefully evaluate defense robustness to adaptive threats. We address this issue by developing AutoDojo, an adaptive extension of AgentDojo that optimizes IPI against a given defense. Using AutoDojo against state-of-the-art IPI defenses across three task suites and five target models, we make two key observations. First, many defenses offer only limited protection: a cheap, black-box adaptive attack using a frontier LLM to iteratively optimize the injection raises attack success rate (ASR) well above the level achieved by static injections against nearly all evaluated defenses. Against a filter that reduces static ASR to 0\%, AutoDojo recovers 28\% overall and 64\% on action-open tasks. Second, for prompt-level and filter-based defenses, ASR is substantially higher on action-open tasks -- where the user's request delegates the action itself to attacker-controlled content -- than on precisely specified tasks. This is a structural limit: on such tasks the injection can pose as ordinary data rather than an explicit instruction, bypassing defenses that rely on detecting instruction-like text. AutoDojo is publicly available at https://github.com/xhOwenMa/AutoDojo.

Vision-Language Model (VLM) based Web Agents represent a significant step towards automating complex tasks by simulating human-like interaction with websites. However, their deployment in uncontrolled web environments introduces significant security vulnerabilities. Existing research on adversarial environmental injection attacks often relies on unrealistic assumptions, such as direct HTML manipulation, knowledge of user intent, or access to agent model parameters, limiting their practical applicability. In this paper, we propose AdInject, a novel and real-world black-box attack method that leverages the internet advertising delivery to inject malicious content into the Web Agent's environment. AdInject operates under a significantly more realistic threat model than prior work, assuming a black-box agent, static malicious content constraints, and no specific knowledge of user intent. AdInject includes strategies for designing malicious ad content aimed at misleading agents into clicking, and a VLM-based ad content optimization technique that infers potential user intents from the target website's context and integrates these intents into the ad content to make it appear more relevant or critical to the agent's task, thus enhancing attack effectiveness. Experimental evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of AdInject, attack success rates exceeding 60% in most scenarios and approaching 100% in certain cases. This strongly demonstrates that prevalent advertising delivery constitutes a potent and real-world vector for environment injection attacks against Web Agents. This work highlights a critical vulnerability in Web Agent security arising from real-world environment manipulation channels, underscoring the urgent need for developing robust defense mechanisms against such threats. Our code is available at https://github.com/NicerWang/AdInject.

Inference-time guided sampling steers state-of-the-art diffusion and flow models without fine-tuning by interpreting the generation process as a controllable trajectory. This provides a simple and flexible way to inject external constraints (e.g., cost functions or pre-trained verifiers) for controlled generation. However, existing methods often fail when composing multiple constraints simultaneously, which leads to deviations from the true data manifold. In this work, we identify root causes of this off-manifold drift and find that the approximation error scales severely with gradient misalignment. Building on these findings, we propose Conflict-Aware Additive Guidance (g^car), a lightweight and learnable method, which actively rectifies off-manifold drift by dynamically detecting and resolving gradient conflicts. We validate g^car across diverse domains, ranging from synthetic datasets and image editing to generative decision-making for planning and control. Our results demonstrate that g^car effectively rectifies off-manifold drift, surpassing baselines in generation fidelity while using light compute. Code is available at https://github.com/yuxuehui/CAR-guidance.

The neural implicit representation has shown its effectiveness in novel view synthesis and high-quality 3D reconstruction from multi-view images. However, most approaches focus on holistic scene representation yet ignore individual objects inside it, thus limiting potential downstream applications. In order to learn object-compositional representation, a few works incorporate the 2D semantic map as a cue in training to grasp the difference between objects. But they neglect the strong connections between object geometry and instance semantic information, which leads to inaccurate modeling of individual instance. This paper proposes a novel framework, ObjectSDF, to build an object-compositional neural implicit representation with high fidelity in 3D reconstruction and object representation. Observing the ambiguity of conventional volume rendering pipelines, we model the scene by combining the Signed Distance Functions (SDF) of individual object to exert explicit surface constraint. The key in distinguishing different instances is to revisit the strong association between an individual object's SDF and semantic label. Particularly, we convert the semantic information to a function of object SDF and develop a unified and compact representation for scene and objects. Experimental results show the superiority of ObjectSDF framework in representing both the holistic object-compositional scene and the individual instances. Code can be found at https://qianyiwu.github.io/objectsdf/

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents to navigate mobile graphical user interfaces (GUIs). Operating in dynamic on-device ecosystems, which include notifications, pop-ups, and inter-app interactions, exposes them to a unique and underexplored threat vector: environmental injection. Unlike prompt-based attacks that manipulate textual instructions, environmental injection corrupts an agent's visual perception by inserting adversarial UI elements (for example, deceptive overlays or spoofed notifications) directly into the GUI. This bypasses textual safeguards and can derail execution, causing privacy leakage, financial loss, or irreversible device compromise. To systematically evaluate this threat, we introduce GhostEI-Bench, the first benchmark for assessing mobile agents under environmental injection attacks within dynamic, executable environments. Moving beyond static image-based assessments, GhostEI-Bench injects adversarial events into realistic application workflows inside fully operational Android emulators and evaluates performance across critical risk scenarios. We further propose a judge-LLM protocol that conducts fine-grained failure analysis by reviewing the agent's action trajectory alongside the corresponding screenshot sequence, pinpointing failure in perception, recognition, or reasoning. Comprehensive experiments on state-of-the-art agents reveal pronounced vulnerability to deceptive environmental cues: current models systematically fail to perceive and reason about manipulated UIs. GhostEI-Bench provides a framework for quantifying and mitigating this emerging threat, paving the way toward more robust and secure embodied agents.

A major challenge in monocular 3D object detection is the limited diversity and quantity of objects in real datasets. While augmenting real scenes with virtual objects holds promise to improve both the diversity and quantity of the objects, it remains elusive due to the lack of an effective 3D object insertion method in complex real captured scenes. In this work, we study augmenting complex real indoor scenes with virtual objects for monocular 3D object detection. The main challenge is to automatically identify plausible physical properties for virtual assets (e.g., locations, appearances, sizes, etc.) in cluttered real scenes. To address this challenge, we propose a physically plausible indoor 3D object insertion approach to automatically copy virtual objects and paste them into real scenes. The resulting objects in scenes have 3D bounding boxes with plausible physical locations and appearances. In particular, our method first identifies physically feasible locations and poses for the inserted objects to prevent collisions with the existing room layout. Subsequently, it estimates spatially-varying illumination for the insertion location, enabling the immersive blending of the virtual objects into the original scene with plausible appearances and cast shadows. We show that our augmentation method significantly improves existing monocular 3D object models and achieves state-of-the-art performance. For the first time, we demonstrate that a physically plausible 3D object insertion, serving as a generative data augmentation technique, can lead to significant improvements for discriminative downstream tasks such as monocular 3D object detection. Project website: https://gyhandy.github.io/3D-Copy-Paste/

Tool-augmented LLM agents raise new security risks: tool executions can introduce runtime-only behaviors, including prompt injection and unintended exposure of external inputs (e.g., environment secrets or local files). While existing scanners often focus on static artifacts, analyzing runtime behavior is challenging because directly executing untrusted tools can itself be dangerous. We present MCP-SandboxScan, a lightweight framework motivated by the Model Context Protocol (MCP) that safely executes untrusted tools inside a WebAssembly/WASI sandbox and produces auditable reports of external-to-sink exposures. Our prototype (i) extracts LLM-relevant sinks from runtime outputs (prompt/messages and structured tool-return fields), (ii) instantiates external-input candidates from environment values, mounted file contents, and output-surfaced HTTP fetch intents, and (iii) links sources to sinks via snippet-based substring matching. Case studies on three representative tools show that MCP-SandboxScan can surface provenance evidence when external inputs appear in prompt/messages or tool-return payloads, and can expose filesystem capability violations as runtime evidence. We further compare against a lightweight static string-signature baseline and use a micro-benchmark to characterize false negatives under transformations and false positives from short-token collisions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

Self-evolving LLM agents update their internal state across sessions, often by writing and reusing long-term memory. This design improves performance on long-horizon tasks but creates a security risk: untrusted external content observed during a benign session can be stored as memory and later treated as instruction. We study this risk and formalize a persistent attack we call a Zombie Agent, where an attacker covertly implants a payload that survives across sessions, effectively turning the agent into a puppet of the attacker. We present a black-box attack framework that uses only indirect exposure through attacker-controlled web content. The attack has two phases. During infection, the agent reads a poisoned source while completing a benign task and writes the payload into long-term memory through its normal update process. During trigger, the payload is retrieved or carried forward and causes unauthorized tool behavior. We design mechanism-specific persistence strategies for common memory implementations, including sliding-window and retrieval-augmented memory, to resist truncation and relevance filtering. We evaluate the attack on representative agent setups and tasks, measuring both persistence over time and the ability to induce unauthorized actions while preserving benign task quality. Our results show that memory evolution can convert one-time indirect injection into persistent compromise, which suggests that defenses focused only on per-session prompt filtering are not sufficient for self-evolving agents.

Text-to-Image (T2I) generation models have advanced rapidly in recent years, but accurately capturing spatial relationships like "above" or "to the right of" poses a persistent challenge. Earlier methods improved spatial relationship following with external position control. However, as architectures evolved to enhance image quality, these techniques became incompatible with modern models. We propose Stitch, a training-free method for incorporating external position control into Multi-Modal Diffusion Transformers (MMDiT) via automatically-generated bounding boxes. Stitch produces images that are both spatially accurate and visually appealing by generating individual objects within designated bounding boxes and seamlessly stitching them together. We find that targeted attention heads capture the information necessary to isolate and cut out individual objects mid-generation, without needing to fully complete the image. We evaluate Stitch on PosEval, our benchmark for position-based T2I generation. Featuring five new tasks that extend the concept of Position beyond the basic GenEval task, PosEval demonstrates that even top models still have significant room for improvement in position-based generation. Tested on Qwen-Image, FLUX, and SD3.5, Stitch consistently enhances base models, even improving FLUX by 218% on GenEval's Position task and by 206% on PosEval. Stitch achieves state-of-the-art results with Qwen-Image on PosEval, improving over previous models by 54%, all accomplished while integrating position control into leading models training-free. Code is available at https://github.com/ExplainableML/Stitch.

The remarkable instruction-following ability of modern LLMs has enabled their practical use as the minds of agents that can autonomously complete increasingly complex tasks. Therein, however, also lies their vulnerability to attacks which embed malicious instructions in text, common variants of which are known as indirect prompt injection (IPI). A fundamental task in addressing this vulnerability is successful segmentation of a given text into benign and malicious sentences (if any). While a number of approaches for this task have been proposed, no detector combines query-relative detection at the segment level, and none are hardened against adaptive evasion attacks realizable in agentic executions. We address the former limitation by developing an approach for malicious sentence classification that is both context- and query-aware. Next, to harden the resulting classifier against evasion, we present two adversarial training methods. The first is directly adapted feature-space adversarial training (AT) in which evasions are approximated using projected-gradient-based optimization in the embedding space. The second simulates realizable evasion attacks in the AT loop through LLM-based paraphrasing. Crucially, we parametrize both AT variants to facilitate a smooth tradeoff between utility and attack robustness. In extensive experiments using indirect prompt injection benchmarks we show that the proposed approach outperforms state-of-the-art IPI defense baselines under static attacks, while in the case of adaptive attacks, our AT variants provide significantly higher utility, lower attack success rate, and often both. Finally, we show that the best AT parameters can depend intimately on the particular application domain. Consequently, domain-dependent tuning of malicious text detectors is likely necessary in practice. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/tavia-liu/CAD.

This paper introduces a tuning-free method for both object insertion and subject-driven generation. The task involves composing an object, given multiple views, into a scene specified by either an image or text. Existing methods struggle to fully meet the task's challenging objectives: (i) seamlessly composing the object into the scene with photorealistic pose and lighting, and (ii) preserving the object's identity. We hypothesize that achieving these goals requires large scale supervision, but manually collecting sufficient data is simply too expensive. The key observation in this paper is that many mass-produced objects recur across multiple images of large unlabeled datasets, in different scenes, poses, and lighting conditions. We use this observation to create massive supervision by retrieving sets of diverse views of the same object. This powerful paired dataset enables us to train a straightforward text-to-image diffusion architecture to map the object and scene descriptions to the composited image. We compare our method, ObjectMate, with state-of-the-art methods for object insertion and subject-driven generation, using a single or multiple references. Empirically, ObjectMate achieves superior identity preservation and more photorealistic composition. Differently from many other multi-reference methods, ObjectMate does not require slow test-time tuning.

Although multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, their instruction-following behavior leaves them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. Existing prompt injection methods predominantly rely on textual prompts or perceptible visual prompts that are observable by human users. In this work, we study imperceptible visual prompt injection against powerful closed-source MLLMs, where adversarial instructions are embedded in the visual modality. Our method adaptively embeds the malicious prompt into the input image via a bounded text overlay to provide semantic guidance. Meanwhile, the imperceptible visual perturbation is iteratively optimized to align the feature representation of the attacked image with those of the malicious visual and textual targets at both coarse- and fine-grained levels. Specifically, the visual target is instantiated as a text-rendered image and progressively refined during optimization to more faithfully represent the desired semantics and improve transferability. Extensive experiments on two multimodal understanding tasks across multiple closed-source MLLMs demonstrate the superior performance of our approach compared to existing methods.

By providing a standardized interface for LLM agents to interact with external tools, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) is quickly becoming a cornerstone of the modern autonomous agent ecosystem. However, it creates novel attack surfaces due to untrusted external tools. While prior work has focused on attacks injected through external tool outputs, we investigate a more fundamental vulnerability: Tool Poisoning, where malicious instructions are embedded within a tool's metadata without execution. To date, this threat has been primarily demonstrated through isolated cases, lacking a systematic, large-scale evaluation. We introduce MCPTox, the first benchmark to systematically evaluate agent robustness against Tool Poisoning in realistic MCP settings. MCPTox is constructed upon 45 live, real-world MCP servers and 353 authentic tools. To achieve this, we design three distinct attack templates to generate a comprehensive suite of 1312 malicious test cases by few-shot learning, covering 10 categories of potential risks. Our evaluation on 20 prominent LLM agents setting reveals a widespread vulnerability to Tool Poisoning, with o1-mini, achieving an attack success rate of 72.8\%. We find that more capable models are often more susceptible, as the attack exploits their superior instruction-following abilities. Finally, the failure case analysis reveals that agents rarely refuse these attacks, with the highest refused rate (Claude-3.7-Sonnet) less than 3\%, demonstrating that existing safety alignment is ineffective against malicious actions that use legitimate tools for unauthorized operation. Our findings create a crucial empirical baseline for understanding and mitigating this widespread threat, and we release MCPTox for the development of verifiably safer AI agents. Our dataset is available at an anonymized repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/AAAI26-7C02.

We present PhysInsert, a framework for physically plausible reference-based object insertion that jointly adapts objects and their surrounding scenes. Existing methods often rely on masked inputs, generation-based pairs, or training pairs with limited viewpoint variation, leaving pose and illumination adaptation and bidirectional object-scene interactions insufficiently constrained. We construct the Insert World dataset with strictly aligned Blender-rendered counterfactual pairs and object references across viewpoints and lighting conditions. Building on these data, Geometry-Guided Adaptation couples a VGGT geometry stream with image and text streams under target-scene feature supervision to guide spatially consistent insertion. Complementary 2D Object-Scene Spatial Supervision jointly supervises object occupancy and environmental changes while grounding spatial instructions in object regions through image-text attention. We introduce PhysInsert-Bench with dedicated cross-environment and cross-view cases requiring illumination and pose adaptation beyond appearance copying. Experiments on PhysInsert-Bench and DreamBooth demonstrate improved image fidelity; a user study further shows more accurate placement and improved lighting integration, perspective, and pose plausibility.

Current open-source prompt-injection detectors converge on two architectural choices: regular-expression pattern matching and fine-tuned transformer classifiers. Both share failure modes that recent work has made concrete. Regular expressions miss paraphrased attacks. Fine-tuned classifiers are vulnerable to adaptive adversaries: a 2025 NAACL Findings study reported that eight published indirect-injection defenses were bypassed with greater than fifty percent attack success rates under adaptive attacks. This work proposes seven detection techniques that each port a specific mechanism from a discipline outside large-language-model security: forensic linguistics, materials-science fatigue analysis, deception technology from network security, local-sequence alignment from bioinformatics, mechanism design from economics, spectral signal analysis from epidemiology, and taint tracking from compiler theory. Three of the seven techniques are implemented in the prompt-shield v0.4.1 release (Apache 2.0) and evaluated in a four-configuration ablation across six datasets including deepset/prompt-injections, NotInject, LLMail-Inject, AgentHarm, and AgentDojo. The local-alignment detector lifts F1 on deepset from 0.033 to 0.378 with zero additional false positives. The stylometric detector adds 11.1 percentage points of F1 on an indirect-injection benchmark. The fatigue tracker is validated via a probing-campaign integration test. All code, data, and reproduction scripts are released under Apache 2.0.

Multi-modal large language model (MLLM)-based web agents interact with webpage environments by generating actions based on screenshots of the webpages. In this work, we propose WebInject, a prompt injection attack that manipulates the webpage environment to induce a web agent to perform an attacker-specified action. Our attack adds a perturbation to the raw pixel values of the rendered webpage. After these perturbed pixels are mapped into a screenshot, the perturbation induces the web agent to perform the attacker-specified action. We formulate the task of finding the perturbation as an optimization problem. A key challenge in solving this problem is that the mapping between raw pixel values and screenshot is non-differentiable, making it difficult to backpropagate gradients to the perturbation. To overcome this, we train a neural network to approximate the mapping and apply projected gradient descent to solve the reformulated optimization problem. Extensive evaluation on multiple datasets shows that WebInject is highly effective and significantly outperforms baselines.

As large-scale text-to-image generation models have made remarkable progress in the field of text-to-image generation, many fine-tuning methods have been proposed. However, these models often struggle with novel objects, especially with one-shot scenarios. Our proposed method aims to address the challenges of generalizability and fidelity in an object-driven way, using only a single input image and the object-specific regions of interest. To improve generalizability and mitigate overfitting, in our paradigm, a prototypical embedding is initialized based on the object's appearance and its class, before fine-tuning the diffusion model. And during fine-tuning, we propose a class-characterizing regularization to preserve prior knowledge of object classes. To further improve fidelity, we introduce object-specific loss, which can also use to implant multiple objects. Overall, our proposed object-driven method for implanting new objects can integrate seamlessly with existing concepts as well as with high fidelity and generalization. Our method outperforms several existing works. The code will be released.

Foundation video generation models such as WAN 2.2 exhibit strong text- and image-conditioned synthesis abilities but remain constrained to the same-view generation setting. In this work, we introduce Exo2EgoSyn, an adaptation of WAN 2.2 that unlocks Exocentric-to-Egocentric(Exo2Ego) cross-view video synthesis. Our framework consists of three key modules. Ego-Exo View Alignment(EgoExo-Align) enforces latent-space alignment between exocentric and egocentric first-frame representations, reorienting the generative space from the given exo view toward the ego view. Multi-view Exocentric Video Conditioning (MultiExoCon) aggregates multi-view exocentric videos into a unified conditioning signal, extending WAN2.2 beyond its vanilla single-image or text conditioning. Furthermore, Pose-Aware Latent Injection (PoseInj) injects relative exo-to-ego camera pose information into the latent state, guiding geometry-aware synthesis across viewpoints. Together, these modules enable high-fidelity ego view video generation from third-person observations without retraining from scratch. Experiments on ExoEgo4D validate that Exo2EgoSyn significantly improves Ego2Exo synthesis, paving the way for scalable cross-view video generation with foundation models. Source code and models will be released publicly.

Given the large-scale multi-modal training of recent vision-based models and their generalization capabilities, understanding the extent of their robustness is critical for their real-world deployment. In this work, we evaluate the resilience of current vision-based models against diverse object-to-background context variations. The majority of robustness evaluation methods have introduced synthetic datasets to induce changes to object characteristics (viewpoints, scale, color) or utilized image transformation techniques (adversarial changes, common corruptions) on real images to simulate shifts in distributions. Recent works have explored leveraging large language models and diffusion models to generate changes in the background. However, these methods either lack in offering control over the changes to be made or distort the object semantics, making them unsuitable for the task. Our method, on the other hand, can induce diverse object-to-background changes while preserving the original semantics and appearance of the object. To achieve this goal, we harness the generative capabilities of text-to-image, image-to-text, and image-to-segment models to automatically generate a broad spectrum of object-to-background changes. We induce both natural and adversarial background changes by either modifying the textual prompts or optimizing the latents and textual embedding of text-to-image models. We produce various versions of standard vision datasets (ImageNet, COCO), incorporating either diverse and realistic backgrounds into the images or introducing color, texture, and adversarial changes in the background. We conduct extensive experiments to analyze the robustness of vision-based models against object-to-background context variations across diverse tasks. Code https://github.com/Muhammad-Huzaifaa/ObjectCompose.

Self-evolving personal agents act for users and learn from user feedback. However, if an agent obeys an instruction that an untrusted third party hides in content, the third party gains control of the agent. Such indirect prompt injection (IPI) poses severe risks. We investigate whether self-evolution degrades the robustness of personal agents to IPI. To study this question, we design a controlled two-phase methodology. In the adaptation phase, the user asks the agent to read external content and complete the task described in it, a common request in daily use. The agent then learns from the user's feedback and improves itself as designed. In the test phase, a third party writes a similar task into new external content, but the user's test request does not authorize the injected task. Using this methodology, we build multiple tasks with diverse test instances in different domains for a real personal agent. Our extensive experiments reveal that self-evolution substantially degrades robustness to IPI. Specifically, compared with the base agent, which does not evolve from user feedback, the average attack success rate rises by 14.0--48.8 percentage points under skill evolution and by 3.0--39.3 percentage points under reinforcement learning, posing safety risks. The code is available at https://github.com/SaFo-Lab/Evolve-IPI

Zero-shot customized video generation has gained significant attention due to its substantial application potential. Existing methods rely on additional models to extract and inject reference subject features, assuming that the Video Diffusion Model (VDM) alone is insufficient for zero-shot customized video generation. However, these methods often struggle to maintain consistent subject appearance due to suboptimal feature extraction and injection techniques. In this paper, we reveal that VDM inherently possesses the force to extract and inject subject features. Departing from previous heuristic approaches, we introduce a novel framework that leverages VDM's inherent force to enable high-quality zero-shot customized video generation. Specifically, for feature extraction, we directly input reference images into VDM and use its intrinsic feature extraction process, which not only provides fine-grained features but also significantly aligns with VDM's pre-trained knowledge. For feature injection, we devise an innovative bidirectional interaction between subject features and generated content through spatial self-attention within VDM, ensuring that VDM has better subject fidelity while maintaining the diversity of the generated video.Experiments on both customized human and object video generation validate the effectiveness of our framework.

Generating and inserting new objects into 3D content is a compelling approach for achieving versatile scene recreation. Existing methods, which rely on SDS optimization or single-view inpainting, often struggle to produce high-quality results. To address this, we propose a novel method for object insertion in 3D content represented by Gaussian Splatting. Our approach introduces a multi-view diffusion model, dubbed MVInpainter, which is built upon a pre-trained stable video diffusion model to facilitate view-consistent object inpainting. Within MVInpainter, we incorporate a ControlNet-based conditional injection module to enable controlled and more predictable multi-view generation. After generating the multi-view inpainted results, we further propose a mask-aware 3D reconstruction technique to refine Gaussian Splatting reconstruction from these sparse inpainted views. By leveraging these fabricate techniques, our approach yields diverse results, ensures view-consistent and harmonious insertions, and produces better object quality. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach outperforms existing methods.

The widespread adoption of generative artificial intelligence in recent years has brought a parallel rise in prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. By embedding malicious instructions, these exploits manipulate language models to bypass intended behavior and operational boundaries. In traditional chatbots, such attacks are confined to a single session because state memory is not preserved across conversations. However, persistent memory features in modern conversational interfaces enable cross-session attack propagation, establishing a threat vector known as memory injection. This work explores this emerging vulnerability in leading LLM-as-a-service platforms, highlighting its real-world severity and the need for countermeasures. While existing literature focuses on violations tailored to specific platform features, we present a general threat model. We demonstrate that all NIST attack goals are collectively achievable across ChatGPT Instant 5.3, Claude Sonnet 4.6, and Gemini 3 Flash under this model. We also show that memory injections can exploit multiple attack vectors, including personal memories, projects, skills, organization instructions, and Model Context Protocol (MCP)-connected resources. Our findings reveal that all evaluated services can be manipulated to persistently spread disinformation, generate harmful content, or simulate offline unresponsiveness, even in fresh sessions. In the particular case of Claude, shared-memory features allow an attacker to compromise multiple users within an organization and also exfiltrate user prompts. To address these vulnerabilities, we derive defense mechanisms from our proposed threat model and foundational cybersecurity principles. Our analysis indicates that nearly half of these mitigations remain unimplemented across the target services. Datasets and attack artifacts are available at https://github.com/PedroBarcha/Memory-injection.

Explorable image-to-scene generation is essential for applications in gaming, robotics, and virtual reality. Existing methods based on video diffusion model (VDM) commonly rely on incomplete conditioning signals such as sparse point clouds or 2D panoramas, leading to stochastic hallucinations, long-term drifts and suboptimal 3D consistency. We present SpatialCrafter, a novel two-stage framework that addresses these issues by introducing a global 3D proxy for high-fidelity image-to-scene generation. Specifically, we decompose the generation process into global proxy generation and appearance refinement. For proxy generation, we propose a Point-anchored Sparse Structure~(PaSS) Flow module that predicts a spatially aligned and geometrically consistent 3D proxy. For appearance refinement, we re-frame the VDM as a Generative Deferred Refiner which synthesizes high-frequency photorealistic details upon proxy-defined scene geometry. To better integrate the proxy with the pre-trained VDM, we introduce Parallel Geometry Injection and Proxy-Aware Corruption training strategies, which improve robustness to proxy artifacts without disrupting the pretrained generative manifold. Furthermore, as no suitable dataset exists for this explorable scene generation task, we construct a new large-scale dataset of 115K scenes. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first hybrid dataset for image-to-scene generation. Extensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets show that SpatialCrafter outperforms state-of-the-art methods, mitigates long-term drift, and remains robust and consistent under rapid camera motion and extreme viewpoint changes. Our project page: https://fangchuan.github.io/SpatialCrafter/{fangchuan.github.io/SpatialCrafter/}

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense. In this work, we trace this collapse to two failure modes. First, existing defense methods are confined to recognizing specific attack patterns, rather than assessing whether the intent of every embedded instruction is relevant to the user task. Second, training-based defenses, which otherwise offer the strongest safety-utility trade-off, assemble their adversarial examples from a handful of hand-crafted templates, and the resulting defender fails to generalize outside that narrow strategy distribution. To address these gaps, we propose RETA, a training-based method that grounds defense decisions on the user tasks rather than attacker-controlled data. At each tool-output step, the defender undertakes chain-of-thought reasoning verifying that its actions are consistent with the user task. Leveraging red-teaming, a simulated attacker synthesizes adversarial training data and receives a dictionary-learning diversity reward, achieving broad coverage of injection-reformulation strategies. Together, these allow the defender to be optimized via multi-objective reinforcement learning and achieve better safety-utility trade-off. Across six black-box adaptive attacks, RETA keeps every per-attack ASR below 10%, with average ASR of 2.92% and 3.75% on the two target models, while preserving most utility under attack and on clean inputs.

Prompt injection attacks manipulate large language models (LLMs) by misleading them to deviate from the original input instructions and execute maliciously injected instructions, because of their instruction-following capabilities and inability to distinguish between the original input instructions and maliciously injected instructions. To defend against such attacks, recent studies have developed various detection mechanisms. If we restrict ourselves specifically to works which perform detection rather than direct defense, most of them focus on direct prompt injection attacks, while there are few works for the indirect scenario, where injected instructions are indirectly from external tools, such as a search engine. Moreover, current works mainly investigate injection detection methods and pay less attention to the post-processing method that aims to mitigate the injection after detection. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of detecting and removing indirect prompt injection attacks, and we construct a benchmark dataset for evaluation. For detection, we assess the performance of existing LLMs and open-source detection models, and we further train detection models using our crafted training datasets. For removal, we evaluate two intuitive methods: (1) the segmentation removal method, which segments the injected document and removes parts containing injected instructions, and (2) the extraction removal method, which trains an extraction model to identify and remove injected instructions.

Agent skills provide a lightweight mechanism for extending general-purpose agents, but their open format exposes them to skill-poisoning attacks. A practically dangerous injection must stay invisible: if executing the payload derails the user's legitimate task, the resulting failure signal invites inspection of the skill. We therefore evaluate attacks by Attack Success Rate, which requires the injected payload to execute and the user's task to still pass its verifier in the same trial. Prior skill-poisoning attacks face a reliability-stealth trade-off under this lens: YAML-header injections are reliably loaded but easily inspected, whereas stealthier body injections that place explicit malicious commands in the skill prose are less reliable because out-of-context commands invite the agent's own suspicion. We introduce POISE, a position-aware attack that compresses the trigger into a single, benign-looking body instruction, placing it at a feasible position and using a context-aware generator to blend it with nearby setup or prerequisite steps. On Skill-Inject with codex+gpt-5.2, POISE achieves an 89.3% ASR, 28.0 points above a random-placement body baseline and 2.6 points above a YAML-only baseline, while retaining the stealth advantage of body placement. That stealth is the decisive margin: because legitimate skill bodies naturally require privileged tool operations, LLM scanners are hyper-sensitive, falsely flagging 74.6% of clean skills on average across four judges and both benchmarks. Blending into these false alarms, POISE causes only 5.6% of poisoned variants to gain a new high-risk alert over their clean baselines, rendering current static defenses ineffective.

Reference-based object composition methods fail when inserting real-world objects into stylized domains. This under-explored problem is currently split between practical "blenders" that lack generative fidelity and "generators" that require impractical, per-subject online finetuning. In this work, we introduce Insert In Style, the first zero-shot generative framework that is both practical and high-fidelity. Our core contribution is a unified framework with two key innovations: (i) a novel multi-stage training protocol that disentangles representations for identity, style, and composition, and (ii) a specialized masked-attention architecture that surgically enforces this disentanglement during generation. This approach prevents the concept interference common in general-purpose, unified-attention models. Our framework is trained on a new 100k sample dataset, curated from a novel data pipeline. This pipeline couples large-scale generation with a rigorous, two-stage filtering process to ensure both high-fidelity semantic identity and style coherence. Unlike prior work, our model is truly zero-shot and requires no text prompts. We also introduce a new public benchmark for stylized composition. We demonstrate state-of-the-art performance, significantly outperforming existing methods on both identity and style metrics, a result strongly corroborated by user studies.

We propose a diffusion-based approach for Text-to-Image (T2I) generation with consistent and interactive 3D layout control and editing. While prior methods improve spatial adherence using 2D cues or iterative copy-warp-paste strategies, they often distort object geometry and fail to preserve consistency across edits. To address these limitations, we introduce a framework for Positioning Objects Consistently and Interactively (POCI-Diff), a novel formulation for jointly enforcing 3D geometric constraints and instance-level semantic binding within a unified diffusion process. Our method enables explicit per-object semantic control by binding individual text descriptions to specific 3D bounding boxes through Blended Latent Diffusion, allowing one-shot synthesis of complex multi-object scenes. We further propose a warping-free generative editing pipeline that supports object insertion, removal, and transformation via regeneration rather than pixel deformation. To preserve object identity and consistency across edits, we condition the diffusion process on reference images using IP-Adapter, enabling coherent object appearance throughout interactive 3D editing while maintaining global scene coherence. Experimental results demonstrate that POCI-Diff produces high-quality images consistent with the specified 3D layouts and edits, outperforming state-of-the-art methods in both visual fidelity and layout adherence while eliminating warping-induced geometric artifacts.

Video object insertion is a critical task for dynamically inserting new objects into existing environments. Previous video generation methods focus primarily on synthesizing entire scenes while struggling with ensuring consistent object appearance, spatial alignment, and temporal coherence when inserting objects into existing videos. In this paper, we propose a novel solution for Video Object Insertion, which integrates multi-view object priors to address the common challenges of appearance inconsistency and occlusion handling in dynamic environments. By lifting 2D reference images into multi-view representations and leveraging a dual-path view-consistent conditioning mechanism, our framework ensures stable identity guidance and robust integration across diverse viewpoints. A quality-aware weighting mechanism is also employed to adaptively handle noisy or imperfect inputs. Additionally, we introduce an Integration-Aware Consistency Module that guarantees spatial realism, effectively resolving occlusion and boundary artifacts while maintaining temporal continuity across frames. Experimental results show that our solution significantly improves the quality of video object insertion, providing stable and realistic integration.

Tool-augmented LLM agents can harbor implicit state that persists across sessions, activates through events, and propagates across agent boundaries---largely invisible to standard debugging. We formalize this as Persistent Semantic Entities (PSEs): constructs defined by name binding, event triggering, and cross-boundary propagation, and evaluate them across 24 models from 11 families (1.5B--1T parameters). First, every tested model is susceptible (20--100% on the 20-model susceptibility panel), with name binding as the necessary and dominant mechanism: without it, contamination is 0%. Second, persistence depends on contamination type rather than scale or deployment: preference contamination persists undecayed on every model probed (100% at t=10) and instruction contamination persists wherever adopted, persona-style injection decays partially (90%to10%), while factual injection is model-dependent---self-corrected on Llama-3.1-8B and GPT-4o-mini but held at ceiling on both Qwen2.5-coder variants, so we do not claim it self-corrects in general. The preference and instruction results hold across providers in our controlled setting. Third, context-isolated self-verification achieves 20--79% reduction (median 36.5%) without oracle references while keyword-based detection produces systematic false positives, and contamination compounds 1.9times along a four-stage agent pipeline (40%to75%). Preference and instruction contamination---persistent, lacking self-correction, and poorly captured by standard monitoring---represent a particularly concerning attack surface for deployed agent systems.

Prompt injection remains a central obstacle to the safe deployment of large language models, particularly in multi-agent settings where intermediate outputs can propagate or amplify malicious instructions. Building on earlier work that introduced a four-metric Total Injection Vulnerability Score (TIVS), this paper extends the evaluation framework with semantic similarity-based caching and a fifth metric (Observability Score Ratio) to yield TIVS-O, investigating how defence effectiveness interacts with transparency in a HOPE-inspired Nested Learning architecture. The proposed system combines an agentic pipeline with Continuum Memory Systems that implement semantic similarity-based caching across 301 synthetically generated injection-focused prompts drawn from ten attack families, while a fourth agent performs comprehensive security analysis using five key performance indicators. In addition to traditional injection metrics, OSR quantifies the richness and clarity of security-relevant reasoning exposed by each agent, enabling an explicit analysis of trade-offs between strict mitigation and auditability. Experiments show that the system achieves secure responses with zero high-risk breaches, while semantic caching delivers substantial computational savings, achieving a 41.6% reduction in LLM calls and corresponding decreases in latency, energy consumption, and carbon emissions. Five TIVS-O configurations reveal optimal trade-offs between mitigation strictness and forensic transparency. These results indicate that observability-aware evaluation can reveal non-monotonic effects within multi-agent pipelines and that memory-augmented agents can jointly maximize security robustness, real-time performance, operational cost savings, and environmental sustainability without modifying underlying model weights, providing a production-ready pathway for secure and green LLM deployments.

We introduce precise object silhouette as a new form of user control in text-to-image diffusion models, which we dub Shape-Guided Diffusion. Our training-free method uses an Inside-Outside Attention mechanism during the inversion and generation process to apply a shape constraint to the cross- and self-attention maps. Our mechanism designates which spatial region is the object (inside) vs. background (outside) then associates edits to the correct region. We demonstrate the efficacy of our method on the shape-guided editing task, where the model must replace an object according to a text prompt and object mask. We curate a new ShapePrompts benchmark derived from MS-COCO and achieve SOTA results in shape faithfulness without a degradation in text alignment or image realism according to both automatic metrics and annotator ratings. Our data and code will be made available at https://shape-guided-diffusion.github.io.

Human-Object Interaction (HOI) video generation aims to synthesize realistic videos of humans manipulating diverse objects, serving as a promising avenue for AI-driven live streaming e-commerce. A primary obstacle in this domain lies in the complexity of modeling fine-grained physical dynamics and the intricate spatial-temporal coordination between human hands and objects. Existing approaches to this problem typically rely on dense temporal guidance, e.g., frame-wise hand-object pose sequences, to strictly control the interaction process. However, such dense guidance incurs high annotation costs and affects motion synthesis diversity. To overcome these limitations, we introduce SparseCtrl-HOI, a novel sparse temporal control framework for HOI video generation. It requires only a few keyframes that capture interaction states at designated timestamps. Specifically, we employ a Time-Controlled Rotary Positional Embedding (TiRoPE) mechanism to temporally anchor these keyframes while preserving their spatial integrity. Subsequently, to govern the dynamics across intermediate frames, we propose a Motion Prior Injection Module that leverages Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) to extract high-level motion priors. This empowers the model to hallucinate logically and physically plausible transitions. Furthermore, we build SparseHOI-5K, a high-quality and richly annotated dataset for HOI video generation with sparse temporal control. Comprehensive evaluations confirm that our method substantially reduces annotation overhead while synthesizing superior live-streaming e-commerce videos. Both our code and dataset are publicly available at https://mpi-lab.github.io/SparseCtrl-HOI.

Large Language Models (LLMs), while powerful, are built and trained to process a single text input. In common applications, multiple inputs can be processed by concatenating them together into a single stream of text. However, the LLM is unable to distinguish which sections of prompt belong to various input sources. Indirect prompt injection attacks take advantage of this vulnerability by embedding adversarial instructions into untrusted data being processed alongside user commands. Often, the LLM will mistake the adversarial instructions as user commands to be followed, creating a security vulnerability in the larger system. We introduce spotlighting, a family of prompt engineering techniques that can be used to improve LLMs' ability to distinguish among multiple sources of input. The key insight is to utilize transformations of an input to provide a reliable and continuous signal of its provenance. We evaluate spotlighting as a defense against indirect prompt injection attacks, and find that it is a robust defense that has minimal detrimental impact to underlying NLP tasks. Using GPT-family models, we find that spotlighting reduces the attack success rate from greater than {50}\% to below {2}\% in our experiments with minimal impact on task efficacy.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the development of powerful agentic systems capable of automating complex workflows across various fields. However, these systems are highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in external data can hijack agent behavior. In this work, we present ReasAlign, a model-level solution to improve safety alignment against indirect prompt injection attacks. The core idea of ReasAlign is to incorporate structured reasoning steps to analyze user queries, detect conflicting instructions, and preserve the continuity of the user's intended tasks to defend against indirect injection attacks. To further ensure reasoning logic and accuracy, we introduce a test-time scaling mechanism with a preference-optimized judge model that scores reasoning steps and selects the best trajectory. Comprehensive evaluations across various benchmarks show that ReasAlign maintains utility comparable to an undefended model while consistently outperforming Meta SecAlign, the strongest prior guardrail. On the representative open-ended CyberSecEval2 benchmark, which includes multiple prompt-injected tasks, ReasAlign achieves 94.6% utility and only 3.6% ASR, far surpassing the state-of-the-art defensive model of Meta SecAlign (56.4% utility and 74.4% ASR). These results demonstrate that ReasAlign achieves the best trade-off between security and utility, establishing a robust and practical defense against prompt injection attacks in real-world agentic systems. Our code and experimental results could be found at https://github.com/leolee99/ReasAlign.

Large language models are increasingly embedded into systems that interact with user data, retrieved web content, and external tools, creating a new attack surface: prompt injection, where malicious commands embedded in untrusted data override the trusted command and induce unintended behavior. Existing defenses mainly rely on fine-tuning the model to preserve an explicit boundary between trusted commands and the untrusted data portion, so that the model learns to prioritize the trusted field and ignore malicious commands in data. However, we observe that while these defenses can block obviously malicious responses caused by injected commands, they generalize poorly to real-world scenarios where the model's response to the injected command is much nearer to the correct response. This is because existing methods typically train against only a fixed set of hand-crafted attack targets, which yields a loose boundary around the correct response and leaves it easier to bypass. To address this challenge, we propose LocalAlign, a more generalizable prompt injection defense inspired by adversarial training. LocalAlign automatically and efficiently generates adversarial examples in which the command embedded in the data portion induces a response that stays near to the correct response while still being wrong. We generate such near-but-wrong adversarial examples using prompting and a single inference step. This design enforces a tighter robustness boundary around the correct response: even small response shifts induced by commands in untrusted data are explicitly penalized. Moreover, the resulting adversarial examples can vary substantially in quality across samples. To address this issue, we further introduce a margin-aware alignment algorithm that quantifies each sample's distance to the correct response and assigns larger training weight to nearer ones.

Humans can look at a static scene and instantly predict what happens next -- will moving this object cause a collision? We call this ability Causal Spatial Reasoning. However, current multimodal large language models (MLLMs) cannot do this, as they remain largely restricted to static spatial perception, struggling to answer "what-if" questions in a 3D scene. We introduce CausalSpatial, a diagnostic benchmark evaluating whether models can anticipate consequences of object motions across four tasks: Collision, Compatibility, Occlusion, and Trajectory. Results expose a severe gap: humans score 84% while GPT-5 achieves only 54%. Why do MLLMs fail? Our analysis uncovers a fundamental deficiency: models over-rely on textual chain-of-thought reasoning that drifts from visual evidence, producing fluent but spatially ungrounded hallucinations. To address this, we propose the Causal Object World model (COW), a framework that externalizes the simulation process by generating videos of hypothetical dynamics. With explicit visual cues of causality, COW enables models to ground their reasoning in physical reality rather than linguistic priors. We make the dataset and code publicly available here: https://github.com/CausalSpatial/CausalSpatial

Controllable video generation for complex hand-object interactions is a critical step toward building visual world models. However, existing methods often struggle to achieve fine-grained, 3D-consistent hand articulation in generated videos. By relying on dense 2D trajectories or implicit pose representations, they collapse crucial geometric structures into spatially ambiguous signals, leading to severe motion inconsistencies and hallucinated artifacts under egocentric occlusions. To address this, we propose leveraging sparse 3D hand joints as explicit control signals with three key advantages: explicit geometry to resolve occlusions, an intuitive interface for interactive editing, and cross-embodiment generalization to robotic hands. Built upon this, our efficient control module extracts occlusion-aware features from the source reference frame by penalizing unreliable visual features from hidden joints, and employs a 3D-based weighting mechanism to handle dynamically occluded target joints during motion propagation. Meanwhile, it directly injects 3D geometric embeddings into the latent space to enforce structural consistency. To facilitate robust training and evaluation, we develop an automated annotation pipeline, yielding 1M high-quality egocentric video clips paired with precise hand trajectories. Experiments demonstrate that our approach outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, generating high-fidelity egocentric videos with realistic hand-object interactions.

Text-to-image based object customization, aiming to generate images with the same identity (ID) as objects of interest in accordance with text prompts and reference images, has made significant progress. However, recent customizing research is dominated by specialized tasks, such as human customization or virtual try-on, leaving a gap in general object customization. To this end, we introduce AnyMaker, an innovative zero-shot object customization framework capable of generating general objects with high ID fidelity and flexible text editability. The efficacy of AnyMaker stems from its novel general ID extraction, dual-level ID injection, and ID-aware decoupling. Specifically, the general ID extraction module extracts sufficient ID information with an ensemble of self-supervised models to tackle the diverse customization tasks for general objects. Then, to provide the diffusion UNet with the extracted ID as much while not damaging the text editability in the generation process, we design a global-local dual-level ID injection module, in which the global-level semantic ID is injected into text descriptions while the local-level ID details are injected directly into the model through newly added cross-attention modules. In addition, we propose an ID-aware decoupling module to disentangle ID-related information from non-ID elements in the extracted representations for high-fidelity generation of both identity and text descriptions. To validate our approach and boost the research of general object customization, we create the first large-scale general ID dataset, Multi-Category ID-Consistent (MC-IDC) dataset, with 315k text-image samples and 10k categories. Experiments show that AnyMaker presents remarkable performance in general object customization and outperforms specialized methods in corresponding tasks. Code and dataset will be released soon.

The integration of Rotary Position Embedding (RoPE) in Multimodal Diffusion Transformer (MMDiT) has significantly enhanced text-to-image generation quality. However, the fundamental reliance of self-attention layers on positional embedding versus query-key similarity during generation remains an intriguing question. We present the first mechanistic analysis of RoPE-based MMDiT models (e.g., FLUX), introducing an automated probing strategy that disentangles positional information versus content dependencies by strategically manipulating RoPE during generation. Our analysis reveals distinct dependency patterns that do not straightforwardly correlate with depth, offering new insights into the layer-specific roles in RoPE-based MMDiT. Based on these findings, we propose a training-free, task-specific image editing framework that categorizes editing tasks into three types: position-dependent editing (e.g., object addition), content similarity-dependent editing (e.g., non-rigid editing), and region-preserved editing (e.g., background replacement). For each type, we design tailored key-value injection strategies based on the characteristics of the editing task. Extensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art approaches, particularly in preserving original semantic content and achieving seamless modifications.

The emergence of Diffusion Transformers (DiT) has brought significant advancements to video generation, especially in text-to-video and image-to-video tasks. Although video generation is widely applied in various fields, most existing models are limited to single scenarios and cannot perform diverse video generation and editing through dynamic content manipulation. We propose OmniV2V, a video model capable of generating and editing videos across different scenarios based on various operations, including: object movement, object addition, mask-guided video edit, try-on, inpainting, outpainting, human animation, and controllable character video synthesis. We explore a unified dynamic content manipulation injection module, which effectively integrates the requirements of the above tasks. In addition, we design a visual-text instruction module based on LLaVA, enabling the model to effectively understand the correspondence between visual content and instructions. Furthermore, we build a comprehensive multi-task data processing system. Since there is data overlap among various tasks, this system can efficiently provide data augmentation. Using this system, we construct a multi-type, multi-scenario OmniV2V dataset and its corresponding OmniV2V-Test benchmark. Extensive experiments show that OmniV2V works as well as, and sometimes better than, the best existing open-source and commercial models for many video generation and editing tasks.

Object compositing based on 2D images is a challenging problem since it typically involves multiple processing stages such as color harmonization, geometry correction and shadow generation to generate realistic results. Furthermore, annotating training data pairs for compositing requires substantial manual effort from professionals, and is hardly scalable. Thus, with the recent advances in generative models, in this work, we propose a self-supervised framework for object compositing by leveraging the power of conditional diffusion models. Our framework can hollistically address the object compositing task in a unified model, transforming the viewpoint, geometry, color and shadow of the generated object while requiring no manual labeling. To preserve the input object's characteristics, we introduce a content adaptor that helps to maintain categorical semantics and object appearance. A data augmentation method is further adopted to improve the fidelity of the generator. Our method outperforms relevant baselines in both realism and faithfulness of the synthesized result images in a user study on various real-world images.

Recent developments in generative diffusion models have turned many dreams into realities. For video object insertion, existing methods typically require additional information, such as a reference video or a 3D asset of the object, to generate the synthetic motion. However, inserting an object from a single reference photo into a target background video remains an uncharted area due to the lack of unseen motion information. We propose DreamInsert, which achieves Image-to-Video Object Insertion in a training-free manner for the first time. By incorporating the trajectory of the object into consideration, DreamInsert can predict the unseen object movement, fuse it harmoniously with the background video, and generate the desired video seamlessly. More significantly, DreamInsert is both simple and effective, achieving zero-shot insertion without end-to-end training or additional fine-tuning on well-designed image-video data pairs. We demonstrated the effectiveness of DreamInsert through a variety of experiments. Leveraging this capability, we present the first results for Image-to-Video object insertion in a training-free manner, paving exciting new directions for future content creation and synthesis. The code will be released soon.

Diffusion-based generative models have revolutionized object-oriented image editing, yet their deployment in realistic object removal and insertion remains hampered by challenges such as the intricate interplay of physical effects and insufficient paired training data. In this work, we introduce OmniPaint, a unified framework that re-conceptualizes object removal and insertion as interdependent processes rather than isolated tasks. Leveraging a pre-trained diffusion prior along with a progressive training pipeline comprising initial paired sample optimization and subsequent large-scale unpaired refinement via CycleFlow, OmniPaint achieves precise foreground elimination and seamless object insertion while faithfully preserving scene geometry and intrinsic properties. Furthermore, our novel CFD metric offers a robust, reference-free evaluation of context consistency and object hallucination, establishing a new benchmark for high-fidelity image editing. Project page: https://yeates.github.io/OmniPaint-Page/

Learning-based simulation of multi-object rigid-body dynamics remains difficult because contact is discontinuous and errors compound over long horizons. Most existing methods remain tied to mesh connectivity and vertex-level message passing, which limits their applicability to mesh-free inputs such as point clouds and leads to high computational cost. Efficiently modeling high-fidelity rigid-body dynamics from mesh-free representations, therefore, remains challenging. We introduce RigidFormer, an object-centric Transformer-based model that learns mesh-free rigid-body dynamics with controllable integration step sizes. RigidFormer reasons at the object level and advances each object through compact anchors; Anchor-Vertex Pooling enriches these anchors with local vertex features, retaining contact-relevant geometry without dense vertex-level interaction. We propose Anchor-based RoPE to inject anchor geometry into attention while respecting the unordered nature of objects and anchors: object-token processing is permutation-equivariant, and the mean-pooled anchor descriptor is invariant to anchor reindexing while preserving shape extent. RigidFormer further enforces rigidity by projecting updates onto the rigid-body manifold using differentiable Kabsch alignment. On standard benchmarks, RigidFormer outperforms or matches mesh-based baselines using point inputs, runs faster, generalizes to unseen point resolutions and across datasets, and scales to 200+ objects; we also show a preliminary extension to command-conditioned articulated bodies by treating body parts as interacting object-level components.

Recent advances in video insertion based on diffusion models are impressive. However, existing methods rely on complex control signals but struggle with subject consistency, limiting their practical applicability. In this paper, we focus on the task of Mask-free Video Insertion and aim to resolve three key challenges: data scarcity, subject-scene equilibrium, and insertion harmonization. To address the data scarcity, we propose a new data pipeline InsertPipe, constructing diverse cross-pair data automatically. Building upon our data pipeline, we develop OmniInsert, a novel unified framework for mask-free video insertion from both single and multiple subject references. Specifically, to maintain subject-scene equilibrium, we introduce a simple yet effective Condition-Specific Feature Injection mechanism to distinctly inject multi-source conditions and propose a novel Progressive Training strategy that enables the model to balance feature injection from subjects and source video. Meanwhile, we design the Subject-Focused Loss to improve the detailed appearance of the subjects. To further enhance insertion harmonization, we propose an Insertive Preference Optimization methodology to optimize the model by simulating human preferences, and incorporate a Context-Aware Rephraser module during reference to seamlessly integrate the subject into the original scenes. To address the lack of a benchmark for the field, we introduce InsertBench, a comprehensive benchmark comprising diverse scenes with meticulously selected subjects. Evaluation on InsertBench indicates OmniInsert outperforms state-of-the-art closed-source commercial solutions. The code will be released.

While large-scale text-to-image generative models have achieved unprecedented visual performance, their inherent reliance on multi-step iterative solvers incurs severe inference latency. Few-step distillation targeting the Classifier-Free Guidance (CFG) trajectory has emerged as the prevalent dual-dimensional compression paradigm. However, existing frameworks remain subjugated by a coarse-grained blind injection paradigm that perpetually enforces a globally static guidance strength while indiscriminately sampling the supervisor timestep. This state-agnostic design completely disregards the intrinsic nature of image generation as a dynamic evolutionary process characterized by progressive entropy reduction, which not only restricts the performance boundary of few-step compression but also precipitates severe CFG over-conditioning artifacts. To transcend these limitations, we re-examine the distillation procedure through the theoretical lens of Information Theory, formally modeling it as a dynamic mutual information game constrained by the Information Bottleneck (IB) principle. Specifically, we dismantle traditional blind assumptions via a dual-track adaptive framework. To determine the injection target, we propose an instance-aware selection mechanism that transmutes the intractable KL divergence constraint into a zero-overhead closed-form solution predicated on the local vector field norm. To regulate the injection strength, we introduce an entropy-aware schedule that dynamically decays alongside the SNR, applying maximal thrust for initial structural anchoring before smoothly reverting to the natural manifold to refine micro-details. Extensive empirical evaluations corroborate that our framework fundamentally eradicates over-conditioning artifacts, shattering the performance ceiling to achieve SOTA generative fidelity under extremely stringent 2-step configurations.

Adding Object into images based on text instructions is a challenging task in semantic image editing, requiring a balance between preserving the original scene and seamlessly integrating the new object in a fitting location. Despite extensive efforts, existing models often struggle with this balance, particularly with finding a natural location for adding an object in complex scenes. We introduce Add-it, a training-free approach that extends diffusion models' attention mechanisms to incorporate information from three key sources: the scene image, the text prompt, and the generated image itself. Our weighted extended-attention mechanism maintains structural consistency and fine details while ensuring natural object placement. Without task-specific fine-tuning, Add-it achieves state-of-the-art results on both real and generated image insertion benchmarks, including our newly constructed "Additing Affordance Benchmark" for evaluating object placement plausibility, outperforming supervised methods. Human evaluations show that Add-it is preferred in over 80% of cases, and it also demonstrates improvements in various automated metrics.

Text-to-image (T2I) models are increasingly used for synthetic dataset generation, but generating effective synthetic training data for classification remains challenging. Fine-tuning a T2I model with a few real examples can help improve the quality of synthetic training data; however, it may also cause overfitting and reduce diversity in the generated samples. We propose a fine-tuning strategy BOB (BeyondOBjects) to mitigate these concerns for fine-grained classification. Given a small set of real examples, we first extract class-agnostic attributes such as scene background and object pose. We then explicitly condition on these attributes during fine-tuning of the T2I model and marginalize them out during generation. This design mitigates overfitting, preserves the T2I model's generative prior, reduces estimation errors, and further minimizes unintended inter-class associations. Extensive experiments across multiple T2I models, backbones, and datasets show that our method achieves state-of-the-art performance in low-shot fine-grained classification when augmented with synthetic data. Concretely, BOB outperforms DataDream by 7.4% on the Aircraft dataset (from 50.0% to 57.4% when fine-tuning a CLIP classifier with five real images augmented with 100 synthetic images). In three of the four benchmarks, fine-tuning downstream models with 5 real images augmented with BOB achieves better performance than fine-tuning with 10 real images. Collectively, BOB outperforms prior art in 18 of 24 experimental settings, with 2+% accuracy improvements in 14 of these settings.

Recent advances in diffusion-based video generation have opened new possibilities for controllable video editing, yet realistic video object insertion (VOI) remains challenging due to limited 4D scene understanding and inadequate handling of occlusion and lighting effects. We present InsertAnywhere, a new VOI framework that achieves geometrically consistent object placement and appearance-faithful video synthesis. Our method begins with a 4D aware mask generation module that reconstructs the scene geometry and propagates user specified object placement across frames while maintaining temporal coherence and occlusion consistency. Building upon this spatial foundation, we extend a diffusion based video generation model to jointly synthesize the inserted object and its surrounding local variations such as illumination and shading. To enable supervised training, we introduce ROSE++, an illumination aware synthetic dataset constructed by transforming the ROSE object removal dataset into triplets of object removed video, object present video, and a VLM generated reference image. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our framework produces geometrically plausible and visually coherent object insertions across diverse real world scenarios, significantly outperforming existing research and commercial models.

Accurately evaluating adversarial robustness is a longstanding challenge. A flawed attack design can inflate robustness estimates, making deployment risk assessment and defense comparison unreliable. Historically, standardized attacks such as AutoAttack have largely resolved this for image classifiers, providing a reliable evaluation baseline for systematic comparison across defenses. However, no equivalent exists for LLM jailbreak evaluation yet, where designing such an attack is considerably more difficult. A reliable attack must, among other things, be black-box compatible, applicable to arbitrary defense pipelines, and efficient, which no existing method jointly satisfies. We introduce Indirect Harm Optimization (IHO), a masked diffusion language model attacker trained via iterative preference optimization against a harmfulness judge, requiring only black-box access to the target. The same method can be used without modification as a strong adaptive attack on individual behaviors, or as an efficient amortized policy that transfers to held-out behaviors and unseen target models without fine-tuning. Even against layered defenses, such as a Circuit Breaker-trained model combined with an auxiliary detector, IHO improves attack success considerably over state-of-the-art approaches, without any defense-specific adaptation. Our results position IHO as a practical step toward the kind of standardized jailbreak evaluation that has improved reliability in the past. Code and models are available on GitHub and Hugging Face.

Large Language Models (LLMs) treat all context tokens uniformly, lacking explicit separation between executable instructions and passive data. This leads to prompt injection vulnerabilities, ambiguous instruction binding, and unreliable execution control. We present a post-training methodology using LLMON (LLM Object Notation), a framework that enables separating instructions from data and requires explicit identifier-based execution. We construct a large-scale structured training corpus of 4.6B tokens spanning general, RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation), and tool-calling data, augmented with distractor-infused variants in which competing instructions and irrelevant data segments are present in context but not referenced. Post-training two Granite-4.1 base models (3B and 8B) through supervised fine-tuning followed by reinforcement learning, we show that LLMON-structured supervision reduces attack success rates on indirect prompt-injection benchmarks from 53-100% to 0.02-5.6% while preserving general capabilities. We further introduce attention-based interpretability metrics that diagnose failure modes at individual transformer layers for structured inputs, revealing how our approach reshapes internal attention patterns. Our results demonstrate that explicit execution semantics can be taught through standard post-training without architectural modification.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

We propose a unified framework for motion control in video generation that seamlessly integrates camera movement, object-level translation, and fine-grained local motion using trajectory-based inputs. In contrast to prior methods that address these motion types through separate modules or task-specific designs, our approach offers a cohesive solution by projecting user-defined trajectories into the latent space of pre-trained image-to-video generation models via a lightweight motion injector. Users can specify keypoints and their motion paths to control localized deformations, entire object motion, virtual camera dynamics, or combinations of these. The injected trajectory signals guide the generative process to produce temporally consistent and semantically aligned motion sequences. Our framework demonstrates superior performance across multiple video motion control tasks, including stylized motion effects (e.g., motion brushes), dynamic viewpoint changes, and precise local motion manipulation. Experiments show that our method provides significantly better controllability and visual quality compared to prior approaches and commercial solutions, while remaining broadly compatible with various state-of-the-art video generation backbones. Project page: https://anytraj.github.io/.

This paper addresses an important problem of object addition for images with only text guidance. It is challenging because the new object must be integrated seamlessly into the image with consistent visual context, such as lighting, texture, and spatial location. While existing text-guided image inpainting methods can add objects, they either fail to preserve the background consistency or involve cumbersome human intervention in specifying bounding boxes or user-scribbled masks. To tackle this challenge, we introduce Diffree, a Text-to-Image (T2I) model that facilitates text-guided object addition with only text control. To this end, we curate OABench, an exquisite synthetic dataset by removing objects with advanced image inpainting techniques. OABench comprises 74K real-world tuples of an original image, an inpainted image with the object removed, an object mask, and object descriptions. Trained on OABench using the Stable Diffusion model with an additional mask prediction module, Diffree uniquely predicts the position of the new object and achieves object addition with guidance from only text. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Diffree excels in adding new objects with a high success rate while maintaining background consistency, spatial appropriateness, and object relevance and quality.

Recently, several works tackled the video editing task fostered by the success of large-scale text-to-image generative models. However, most of these methods holistically edit the frame using the text, exploiting the prior given by foundation diffusion models and focusing on improving the temporal consistency across frames. In this work, we introduce a framework that is object-centric and is designed to control both the object's appearance and, notably, to execute precise and explicit structural modifications on the object. We build our framework on a pre-trained image-conditioned diffusion model, integrate layers to handle the temporal dimension, and propose training strategies and architectural modifications to enable shape control. We evaluate our method on the image-driven video editing task showing similar performance to the state-of-the-art, and showcasing novel shape-editing capabilities. Further details, code and examples are available on our project page: https://helia95.github.io/vase-website/

This paper aims to manipulate multi-entity 3D motions in video generation. Previous methods on controllable video generation primarily leverage 2D control signals to manipulate object motions and have achieved remarkable synthesis results. However, 2D control signals are inherently limited in expressing the 3D nature of object motions. To overcome this problem, we introduce 3DTrajMaster, a robust controller that regulates multi-entity dynamics in 3D space, given user-desired 6DoF pose (location and rotation) sequences of entities. At the core of our approach is a plug-and-play 3D-motion grounded object injector that fuses multiple input entities with their respective 3D trajectories through a gated self-attention mechanism. In addition, we exploit an injector architecture to preserve the video diffusion prior, which is crucial for generalization ability. To mitigate video quality degradation, we introduce a domain adaptor during training and employ an annealed sampling strategy during inference. To address the lack of suitable training data, we construct a 360-Motion Dataset, which first correlates collected 3D human and animal assets with GPT-generated trajectory and then captures their motion with 12 evenly-surround cameras on diverse 3D UE platforms. Extensive experiments show that 3DTrajMaster sets a new state-of-the-art in both accuracy and generalization for controlling multi-entity 3D motions. Project page: http://fuxiao0719.github.io/projects/3dtrajmaster

Despite remarkable progress in text-guided image editing, generative models frequently fail to preserve visual object consistency, defined as the preservation of a subject's key attributes throughout the editing process. We address this limitation through three contributions. First, we introduce ABO-Edit, a dataset specifically designed to study object consistency, comprising over 12,000 triplets of source images, editing prompts, and high-quality target images rendered from artist-designed 3D assets, with multi-view coverage and human-verified quality control. Second, we uncover an overlooked property of image-editing rectified flow models: the conditioning embedding space, not directly supervised during training, encodes a prediction of the final generated image even at high noise levels. Third, exploiting this finding, we propose FlowMirror, a parameter-free auxiliary loss that supervises this conditioning embedding space. Without architectural changes, our method improves generation quality across several metrics over baselines.

Despite significant advancements in video generation, inserting a given object into videos remains a challenging task. The difficulty lies in preserving the appearance details of the reference object and accurately modeling coherent motions at the same time. In this paper, we propose VideoAnydoor, a zero-shot video object insertion framework with high-fidelity detail preservation and precise motion control. Starting from a text-to-video model, we utilize an ID extractor to inject the global identity and leverage a box sequence to control the overall motion. To preserve the detailed appearance and meanwhile support fine-grained motion control, we design a pixel warper. It takes the reference image with arbitrary key-points and the corresponding key-point trajectories as inputs. It warps the pixel details according to the trajectories and fuses the warped features with the diffusion U-Net, thus improving detail preservation and supporting users in manipulating the motion trajectories. In addition, we propose a training strategy involving both videos and static images with a reweight reconstruction loss to enhance insertion quality. VideoAnydoor demonstrates significant superiority over existing methods and naturally supports various downstream applications (e.g., talking head generation, video virtual try-on, multi-region editing) without task-specific fine-tuning.

Inversion-based image editing in flow matching models has emerged as a powerful paradigm for training-free, text-guided image manipulation. A central challenge in this paradigm is the injection dilemma: injecting source features during denoising preserves the background of the original image but simultaneously suppresses the model's ability to synthesize edited content. Existing methods address this with fixed injection strategies -- binary on/off temporal schedules, uniform spatial mixing ratios, and channel-agnostic latent perturbation -- that ignore the inherently heterogeneous nature of injection demand across both the temporal and channel dimensions. In this paper, we present AdaEdit, a training-free adaptive editing framework that resolves this dilemma through two complementary innovations. First, we propose a Progressive Injection Schedule that replaces hard binary cutoffs with continuous decay functions (sigmoid, cosine, or linear), enabling a smooth transition from source-feature preservation to target-feature generation and eliminating feature discontinuity artifacts. Second, we introduce Channel-Selective Latent Perturbation, which estimates per-channel importance based on the distributional gap between the inverted and random latents and applies differentiated perturbation strengths accordingly -- strongly perturbing edit-relevant channels while preserving structure-encoding channels. Extensive experiments on the PIE-Bench benchmark (700 images, 10 editing types) demonstrate that AdaEdit achieves an 8.7% reduction in LPIPS, a 2.6% improvement in SSIM, and a 2.3% improvement in PSNR over strong baselines, while maintaining competitive CLIP similarity. AdaEdit is fully plug-and-play and compatible with multiple ODE solvers including Euler, RF-Solver, and FireFlow. Code is available at https://github.com/leeguandong/AdaEdit

To standardize interactions between LLM-based agents and their environments, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) was proposed and has since been widely adopted. However, integrating external tools expands the attack surface, exposing agents to tool poisoning attacks. In such attacks, malicious instructions embedded in tool metadata are injected into the agent context during MCP registration phase, thereby manipulating agent behavior. Prior work primarily focuses on explicit tool poisoning or relied on manually crafted poisoned tools. In contrast, we focus on a particularly stealthy variant: implicit tool poisoning, where the poisoned tool itself remains uninvoked. Instead, the instructions embedded in the tool metadata induce the agent to invoke a legitimate but high-privilege tool to perform malicious operations. We propose MCP-ITP, the first automated and adaptive framework for implicit tool poisoning within the MCP ecosystem. MCP-ITP formulates poisoned tool generation as a black-box optimization problem and employs an iterative optimization strategy that leverages feedback from both an evaluation LLM and a detection LLM to maximize Attack Success Rate (ASR) while evading current detection mechanisms. Experimental results on the MCPTox dataset across 12 LLM agents demonstrate that MCP-ITP consistently outperforms the manually crafted baseline, achieving up to 84.2% ASR while suppressing the Malicious Tool Detection Rate (MDR) to as low as 0.3%.

Large language model (LLM) agents integrated with external tools are vulnerable to indirect prompt injections embedded in environmental states. However, existing studies largely rely on manually implemented or reused environments, stochastic LLM-based tool simulation, and predefined injection locations, limiting scalable security research across broader domains. To bridge this gap, we propose **ToolHazard**, a scalable adversarial environment synthesis framework that reduces human engineering and supports expansion with additional seed domains and compute. Through an Environment Simulator, an Attacker Agent, and a User Simulator, ToolHazard synthesizes executable stateful environments, discovers viable injection points and generates environment-specific payloads, and constructs state-grounded long-horizon tasks. Based on ToolHazard, we build **ToolHazard-Bench** for stress-testing agents under complex workflows and diverse environmental attacks. Experiments reveal substantial agent vulnerabilities and show that injection timing and placement affect attack effectiveness. Moreover, ToolHazard-generated alignment data improves security on both ToolHazard-Bench and AgentDojo while preserving benign task utility.

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are increasingly integrated into clinical workflows; however, prompt injection attacks can steer these systems toward clinically unsafe or misleading outputs. We introduce the Medical Prompt Injection Benchmark (MPIB), a dataset-and-benchmark suite for evaluating clinical safety under both direct prompt injection and indirect, RAG-mediated injection across clinically grounded tasks. MPIB emphasizes outcome-level risk via the Clinical Harm Event Rate (CHER), which measures high-severity clinical harm events under a clinically grounded taxonomy, and reports CHER alongside Attack Success Rate (ASR) to disentangle instruction compliance from downstream patient risk. The benchmark comprises 9,697 curated instances constructed through multi-stage quality gates and clinical safety linting. Evaluating MPIB across a diverse set of baseline LLMs and defense configurations, we find that ASR and CHER can diverge substantially, and that robustness depends critically on whether adversarial instructions appear in the user query or in retrieved context. We release MPIB with evaluation code, adversarial baselines, and comprehensive documentation to support reproducible and systematic research on clinical prompt injection. Code and data are available at GitHub (code) and Hugging Face (data).

Current 3D generative models mostly produce a final surface: a visually strong but largely opaque mesh. Interactive 3D worlds need more than a surface. They need named parts, an assembly hierarchy, measurable constraints, local edit handles, and joints for articulation. We present Nova3D, a system that generates 3D assets as executable Blender source code; the compiled mesh, a binary glTF (GLB), is treated as the artifact, not the asset. Because the output is a program, semantic handles exist at generation time rather than being recovered afterward by segmentation or rigging. We evaluate on Nova3D-Bench, a frozen, spec-grounded benchmark of 54 items across six domains and three difficulty levels with text and image inputs, against eleven baselines in four families (mesh-native, part-structured, code-native, and CAD) plus a same-LLM ablation. Nova3D produces an executable program and a valid artifact for 54/54 items. Every asset exposes named parts organized in a parent-child assembly tree; no mesh-native, CAD, or segmentation baseline exposes either. It satisfies 51/52 prompt-stated numeric and count constraints (best baseline: 11/52), passes 14/18 blinded local edits with locality preserved in 18/18, and articulates 59 joints across 12 assets at 98.3% geometric validity, where every baseline exposes zero native joints. Its geometry is competitive: it wins the structured domains in a pairwise shape-quality tournament and is second only to the strongest mesh-native model, while conceding texture realism to baked-PBR systems. The central result is representational: code-native generation turns a generated 3D object from an opaque surface into a programmable asset that downstream systems can inspect, measure, edit, and animate.

In this work, we study Human-Object Interaction Video Generation (HOIVG), which aims to synthesize high-quality human-object interaction videos conditioned on text, reference images, audio, and pose. This task holds significant practical value for automating content creation in real-world applications, such as e-commerce demonstrations, short video production, and interactive entertainment. However, existing approaches fail to accommodate all these requisite conditions. We present OmniShow, an end-to-end framework tailored for this practical yet challenging task, capable of harmonizing multimodal conditions and delivering industry-grade performance. To overcome the trade-off between controllability and quality, we introduce Unified Channel-wise Conditioning for efficient image and pose injection, and Gated Local-Context Attention to ensure precise audio-visual synchronization. To effectively address data scarcity, we develop a Decoupled-Then-Joint Training strategy that leverages a multi-stage training process with model merging to efficiently harness heterogeneous sub-task datasets. Furthermore, to fill the evaluation gap in this field, we establish HOIVG-Bench, a dedicated and comprehensive benchmark for HOIVG. Extensive experiments demonstrate that OmniShow achieves overall state-of-the-art performance across various multimodal conditioning settings, setting a solid standard for the emerging HOIVG task.

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce SkillInject, a benchmark evaluating the susceptibility of widely-used LLM agents to injections through skill files. SkillInject contains 202 injection-task pairs with attacks ranging from obviously malicious injections to subtle, context-dependent attacks hidden in otherwise legitimate instructions. We evaluate frontier LLMs on SkillInject, measuring both security in terms of harmful instruction avoidance and utility in terms of legitimate instruction compliance. Our results show that today's agents are highly vulnerable with up to 80% attack success rate with frontier models, often executing extremely harmful instructions including data exfiltration, destructive action, and ransomware-like behavior. They furthermore suggest that this problem will not be solved through model scaling or simple input filtering, but that robust agent security will require context-aware authorization frameworks. Our benchmark is available at https://www.skill-inject.com/.

Human-object interaction (HOI) video generation has garnered increasing attention due to its promising applications in digital humans, e-commerce, advertising, and robotics imitation learning. However, existing methods face two critical limitations: (1) a lack of effective mechanisms to inject multi-view information of the object into the model, leading to poor cross-view consistency, and (2) heavy reliance on fine-grained hand mesh annotations for modeling interaction occlusions. To address these challenges, we introduce ByteLoom, a Diffusion Transformer (DiT)-based framework that generates realistic HOI videos with geometrically consistent object illustration, using simplified human conditioning and 3D object inputs. We first propose an RCM-cache mechanism that leverages Relative Coordinate Maps (RCM) as a universal representation to maintain object's geometry consistency and precisely control 6-DoF object transformations in the meantime. To compensate HOI dataset scarcity and leverage existing datasets, we further design a training curriculum that enhances model capabilities in a progressive style and relaxes the demand of hand mesh. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method faithfully preserves human identity and the object's multi-view geometry, while maintaining smooth motion and object manipulation.

Prompt injection is one of the most critical vulnerabilities in LLM agents; yet, effective automated attacks remain largely unexplored from an optimization perspective. Existing methods heavily depend on human red-teamers and hand-crafted prompts, limiting their scalability and adaptability. We propose AutoInject, a reinforcement learning framework that generates universal, transferable adversarial suffixes while jointly optimizing for attack success and utility preservation on benign tasks. Our black-box method supports both query-based optimization and transfer attacks to unseen models and tasks. Using only a 1.5B parameter adversarial suffix generator, we successfully compromise frontier systems including GPT 5 Nano, Claude Sonnet 3.5, and Gemini 2.5 Flash on the AgentDojo benchmark, establishing a stronger baseline for automated prompt injection research.

We assess indirect prompt injection in DeepSeek Harness (DSH), using AI-Infra-Guard (A.I.G) to construct tests, deliver controlled taint, execute DSH, collect traces, and judge outcomes. The study covers 14,560 controlled executions over 16 indirect-content channels, text and file carrier modes, 35 payload objectives, one unmodified baseline, and 12 attack methods. The experiment preserves DSH's agent loop, tool registry, model adapter, and session-event path; source tools and sensitive sinks are local fixtures, so attempted actions are recorded without external side effects. We evaluate each trace with a deterministic rule-based judge, (RuleJudge), and a semantic LLM-based judge, (LLMJudge). The strongest observed attack success rates are 17.0% under for fake-completion attack in text mode, 25.5% under for hidden Unicode in file mode, and 16.0% under for the skills channel in file mode. also assigns partial compliance more often than (7.3% versus 2.0%). We relate these results to DSH's treatment of tool results, additional contexts, and tool-call policy hooks, then identify controls that should sit between untrusted content and sensitive actions. Our code is available at https://github.com/Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard/tree/main/Research/deepseek-harness-security-assessment .

Following the advancement of large language models (LLMs), the development of LLM-based autonomous agents has become increasingly prevalent. As a result, the need to understand the security vulnerabilities of these agents has become a critical task. We examine how ReAct agents can be exploited using a straightforward yet effective method we refer to as the foot-in-the-door attack. Our experiments show that indirect prompt injection attacks, prompted by harmless and unrelated requests (such as basic calculations) can significantly increase the likelihood of the agent performing subsequent malicious actions. Our results show that once a ReAct agents thought includes a specific tool or action, the likelihood of executing this tool in the subsequent steps increases significantly, as the agent seldom re-evaluates its actions. Consequently, even random, harmless requests can establish a foot-in-the-door, allowing an attacker to embed malicious instructions into the agents thought process, making it more susceptible to harmful directives. To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose implementing a simple reflection mechanism that prompts the agent to reassess the safety of its actions during execution, which can help reduce the success of such attacks.

Despite advances in 3D generation, the direct creation of 3D objects within an existing 3D scene represented as NeRF remains underexplored. This process requires not only high-quality 3D object generation but also seamless composition of the generated 3D content into the existing NeRF. To this end, we propose a new method, GO-NeRF, capable of utilizing scene context for high-quality and harmonious 3D object generation within an existing NeRF. Our method employs a compositional rendering formulation that allows the generated 3D objects to be seamlessly composited into the scene utilizing learned 3D-aware opacity maps without introducing unintended scene modification. Moreover, we also develop tailored optimization objectives and training strategies to enhance the model's ability to exploit scene context and mitigate artifacts, such as floaters, originating from 3D object generation within a scene. Extensive experiments on both feed-forward and 360^o scenes show the superior performance of our proposed GO-NeRF in generating objects harmoniously composited with surrounding scenes and synthesizing high-quality novel view images. Project page at {https://daipengwa.github.io/GO-NeRF/.

Scene-level 3D generation represents a critical frontier in multimedia and computer graphics, yet existing approaches either suffer from limited object categories or lack editing flexibility for interactive applications. In this paper, we present HiScene, a novel hierarchical framework that bridges the gap between 2D image generation and 3D object generation and delivers high-fidelity scenes with compositional identities and aesthetic scene content. Our key insight is treating scenes as hierarchical "objects" under isometric views, where a room functions as a complex object that can be further decomposed into manipulatable items. This hierarchical approach enables us to generate 3D content that aligns with 2D representations while maintaining compositional structure. To ensure completeness and spatial alignment of each decomposed instance, we develop a video-diffusion-based amodal completion technique that effectively handles occlusions and shadows between objects, and introduce shape prior injection to ensure spatial coherence within the scene. Experimental results demonstrate that our method produces more natural object arrangements and complete object instances suitable for interactive applications, while maintaining physical plausibility and alignment with user inputs.

Autoregressive video synthesis offers a promising pathway for infinite-horizon generation but is fundamentally hindered by three intertwined challenges: semantic forgetting from context limitations, visual drift due to positional extrapolation, and controllability loss during interactive instruction switching. Current methods often tackle these issues in isolation, limiting long-term coherence. We introduce Grounded Forcing, a novel framework that bridges time-independent semantics and proximal dynamics through three interlocking mechanisms. First, to address semantic forgetting, we propose a Dual Memory KV Cache that decouples local temporal dynamics from global semantic anchors, ensuring long-term semantic coherence and identity stability. Second, to suppress visual drift, we design Dual-Reference RoPE Injection, which confines positional embeddings within the training manifold while rendering global semantics time-invariant. Third, to resolve controllability issues, we develop Asymmetric Proximity Recache, which facilitates smooth semantic inheritance during prompt transitions via proximity-weighted cache updates. These components operate synergistically to tether the generative process to stable semantic cores while accommodating flexible local dynamics. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Grounded Forcing significantly enhances long-range consistency and visual stability, establishing a robust foundation for interactive long-form video synthesis.

Despite the remarkable synthesis capabilities of text-to-image (T2I) models, safeguarding them against content violations remains a persistent challenge. Existing safety alignments primarily focus on explicit malicious concepts, often overlooking the subtle yet critical risks of compositional semantics. To address this oversight, we identify and formalize a novel vulnerability: Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety (MCCU), where unsafe semantics stem from the implicit associations of individually benign concepts. Based on this formulation, we introduce TwoHamsters, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 17.5k prompts curated to probe MCCU vulnerabilities. Through a rigorous evaluation of 10 state-of-the-art models and 16 defense mechanisms, our analysis yields 8 pivotal insights. In particular, we demonstrate that current T2I models and defense mechanisms face severe MCCU risks: on TwoHamsters, FLUX achieves an MCCU generation success rate of 99.52%, while LLaVA-Guard only attains a recall of 41.06%, highlighting a critical limitation of the current paradigm for managing hazardous compositional generation.

As LLM agents transition from digital assistants to physical controllers in autonomous systems and robotics, they face an escalating threat from indirect prompt injection. By embedding adversarial instructions into the results of tool calls, attackers can hijack the agent's decision-making process to execute unauthorized actions. This vulnerability poses a significant risk as agents gain more direct control over physical environments. Existing defense mechanisms against Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) generally fall into two categories. The first involves training dedicated detection models; however, this approach entails high computational overhead for both training and inference, and requires frequent updates to keep pace with evolving attack vectors. Alternatively, prompt-based methods leverage the inherent capabilities of LLMs to detect or ignore malicious instructions via prompt engineering. Despite their flexibility, most current prompt-based defenses suffer from high Attack Success Rates (ASR), demonstrating limited robustness against sophisticated injection attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel method that provides LLMs with precise data via tool result parsing while effectively filtering out injected malicious code. Our approach achieves competitive Utility under Attack (UA) while maintaining the lowest Attack Success Rate (ASR) to date, significantly outperforming existing methods. Code is available at GitHub.

Everything a language model sees is tokens. The serving stack knows what each span is -- user input, tool output, instructions -- but the model must keep track of that itself, and it can lose track or be confused: text can be written to read like anything. Prompt injection is a natural exploit of this phenomenon. By scrambling the model's understanding of span identity, an attacker can induce unwanted and potentially dangerous actions. Adding a non-textual channel to the model's input -- a way to communicate span identity beyond text -- mitigates this class of attack. We thus introduce a general steering technique called Semantic Overlays: small learned adapters applied at chosen prefill positions to a frozen model's residual stream. Laying an overlay over a span creates an out-of-band annotation channel that cannot be replicated by tokens. Unlike steering vectors, Semantic Overlays are trained, adaptable, and selectively applied. An overlay can encode complex semantics that reshape how the model perceives the marked span: asked to copy a code snippet under an overlay asserting that it is in a different programming language than it is, the model rewrites the snippet, faithfully, in the asserted language. Overlays are also composable, allow for transparent reading of underlying content, and can carry complex payloads -- including imperatives that the model will follow. An overlay which marks a span as "non-executable" defends against the broad class of prompt injections that add instructions in untrusted context. We report strong results on prompt injection benchmarks: SEP separation rises from 24.3% to 96.5% with utility unchanged (our scoring rule; we also correct a defect in the published grader), TensorTrust attack success rate falls from 34.8% to 6.6%, and all four PIArena attack families drop to 0% compliance, all while marked spans stay readable (92.5% exact copy rate).

Injecting new subjects naturally during streaming video generation requires integrating newly supplied visual references into the existing video while preserving established subjects and the scene. Encoding references independently of the current scene provides little guidance for this integration, while keeping their features in persistent memory can interfere with established context. We propose ReferStream, a framework that requires no additional training and combines reference construction using the current scene with transient cache injection. Joint Latent places reference latents in target regions of the latest scene latent, allowing reference features to be extracted in context. Cache Restoration uses these features to condition the injection chunk, then restores the overwritten global cache entries while retaining the newly generated history. This procedure incorporates new visual conditions without retraining the generator or revising emitted frames. We further introduce ReferStream Bench, a new benchmark with scheduled reference arrivals, evolving instructions, and explicit annotations of subject presence for InShot and MultiShot generation. Evaluation follows the event schedule and measures both the fidelity of new subjects and the preservation of established subjects, alongside video quality, text adherence, and count accuracy. Experiments on ReferStream Bench show higher scores for text adherence, subject similarity, and count accuracy than the compared baselines, including offline methods given all references in advance. Project page: https://xushuolin.github.io/ReferStream/.

Humans intuitively perceive object shape and orientation from a single image, guided by strong priors about canonical poses. However, existing 3D generative models often produce misaligned results due to inconsistent training data, limiting their usability in downstream tasks. To address this gap, we introduce the task of orientation-aligned 3D object generation: producing 3D objects from single images with consistent orientations across categories. To facilitate this, we construct Objaverse-OA, a dataset of 14,832 orientation-aligned 3D models spanning 1,008 categories. Leveraging Objaverse-OA, we fine-tune two representative 3D generative models based on multi-view diffusion and 3D variational autoencoder frameworks to produce aligned objects that generalize well to unseen objects across various categories. Experimental results demonstrate the superiority of our method over post-hoc alignment approaches. Furthermore, we showcase downstream applications enabled by our aligned object generation, including zero-shot object orientation estimation via analysis-by-synthesis and efficient arrow-based object rotation manipulation.

Incorporating a customized object into image generation presents an attractive feature in text-to-image generation. However, existing optimization-based and encoder-based methods are hindered by drawbacks such as time-consuming optimization, insufficient identity preservation, and a prevalent copy-pasting effect. To overcome these limitations, we introduce CustomNet, a novel object customization approach that explicitly incorporates 3D novel view synthesis capabilities into the object customization process. This integration facilitates the adjustment of spatial position relationships and viewpoints, yielding diverse outputs while effectively preserving object identity. Moreover, we introduce delicate designs to enable location control and flexible background control through textual descriptions or specific user-defined images, overcoming the limitations of existing 3D novel view synthesis methods. We further leverage a dataset construction pipeline that can better handle real-world objects and complex backgrounds. Equipped with these designs, our method facilitates zero-shot object customization without test-time optimization, offering simultaneous control over the viewpoints, location, and background. As a result, our CustomNet ensures enhanced identity preservation and generates diverse, harmonious outputs.

The automatic generation of anchor-style product promotion videos presents promising opportunities in online commerce, advertising, and consumer engagement. However, this remains a challenging task despite significant advancements in pose-guided human video generation. In addressing this challenge, we identify the integration of human-object interactions (HOI) into pose-guided human video generation as a core issue. To this end, we introduce AnchorCrafter, a novel diffusion-based system designed to generate 2D videos featuring a target human and a customized object, achieving high visual fidelity and controllable interactions. Specifically, we propose two key innovations: the HOI-appearance perception, which enhances object appearance recognition from arbitrary multi-view perspectives and disentangles object and human appearance, and the HOI-motion injection, which enables complex human-object interactions by overcoming challenges in object trajectory conditioning and inter-occlusion management. Additionally, we introduce the HOI-region reweighting loss, a training objective that enhances the learning of object details. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our proposed system outperforms existing methods in preserving object appearance and shape awareness, while simultaneously maintaining consistency in human appearance and motion. Project page: https://cangcz.github.io/Anchor-Crafter/

Instruction-based image editing through natural language has emerged as a powerful paradigm for intuitive visual manipulation. While recent models achieve impressive results on single edits, they suffer from severe quality degradation under multi-turn editing. Through systematic analysis, we identify progressive loss of high-frequency information as the primary cause of this quality degradation. We present FreqEdit, a training-free framework that enables stable editing across 10+ consecutive iterations. Our approach comprises three synergistic components: (1) high-frequency feature injection from reference velocity fields to preserve fine-grained details, (2) an adaptive injection strategy that spatially modulates injection strength for precise region-specific control, and (3) a path compensation mechanism that periodically recalibrates the editing trajectory to prevent over-constraint. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FreqEdit achieves superior performance in both identity preservation and instruction following compared to seven state-of-the-art baselines.

Agentic AI coding editors driven by large language models have recently become more popular due to their ability to improve developer productivity during software development. Modern editors such as Cursor are designed not just for code completion, but also with more system privileges for complex coding tasks (e.g., run commands in the terminal, access development environments, and interact with external systems). While this brings us closer to the "fully automated programming" dream, it also raises new security concerns. In this study, we present the first empirical analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting these high-privilege agentic AI coding editors. We show how attackers can remotely exploit these systems by poisoning external development resources with malicious instructions, effectively hijacking AI agents to run malicious commands, turning "your AI" into "attacker's shell". To perform this analysis, we implement AIShellJack, an automated testing framework for assessing prompt injection vulnerabilities in agentic AI coding editors. AIShellJack contains 314 unique attack payloads that cover 70 techniques from the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Using AIShellJack, we conduct a large-scale evaluation on GitHub Copilot and Cursor, and our evaluation results show that attack success rates can reach as high as 84% for executing malicious commands. Moreover, these attacks are proven effective across a wide range of objectives, ranging from initial access and system discovery to credential theft and data exfiltration.

We introduce a method for the generation of images from an input scene graph. The method separates between a layout embedding and an appearance embedding. The dual embedding leads to generated images that better match the scene graph, have higher visual quality, and support more complex scene graphs. In addition, the embedding scheme supports multiple and diverse output images per scene graph, which can be further controlled by the user. We demonstrate two modes of per-object control: (i) importing elements from other images, and (ii) navigation in the object space, by selecting an appearance archetype. Our code is publicly available at https://www.github.com/ashual/scene_generation

LLM agents are evolving from conversational chatbots to operational tools in real-world workspaces. In local agentic harnesses, an LLM can read and write files, call tools, and reuse workspace state across sessions. While such capabilities enhance utility, they also expose a new attack surface for attackers. Attackers can embed a prompt injection within a file or tool output. Agents may read this hidden instruction, store it, and execute it later. In this multi-step trojan attack paradigm, no individual step appears malicious on its own, but these steps can collectively turn untrusted text into persistent control content. However, existing defenses often inspect each step in isolation. As a result, they can block a clear harmful action, but fail to detect the earlier write operation that plants the backdoor. To reveal this threat, we introduce ClawTrojan, a benchmark designed to identify multi-step trojan attacks in local agentic harnesses. In an OpenClaw-style simulated workspace with GPT-5.4, ClawTrojan reaches a 95.5% attack success rate (ASR), while existing single-turn prompt-injection attacks produce near-zero ASR on the same model. To address this threat, we propose DASGuard, which scans control-like text in sensitive local files, traces its origin, and removes control content that does not originate from a trusted source. Our results show that DASGuard achieves strong dynamic defense by combining runtime attack blocking with sanitized commits to the workspace.

Large Language Models (LLMs), renowned for their superior proficiency in language comprehension and generation, stimulate a vibrant ecosystem of applications around them. However, their extensive assimilation into various services introduces significant security risks. This study deconstructs the complexities and implications of prompt injection attacks on actual LLM-integrated applications. Initially, we conduct an exploratory analysis on ten commercial applications, highlighting the constraints of current attack strategies in practice. Prompted by these limitations, we subsequently formulate HouYi, a novel black-box prompt injection attack technique, which draws inspiration from traditional web injection attacks. HouYi is compartmentalized into three crucial elements: a seamlessly-incorporated pre-constructed prompt, an injection prompt inducing context partition, and a malicious payload designed to fulfill the attack objectives. Leveraging HouYi, we unveil previously unknown and severe attack outcomes, such as unrestricted arbitrary LLM usage and uncomplicated application prompt theft. We deploy HouYi on 36 actual LLM-integrated applications and discern 31 applications susceptible to prompt injection. 10 vendors have validated our discoveries, including Notion, which has the potential to impact millions of users. Our investigation illuminates both the possible risks of prompt injection attacks and the possible tactics for mitigation.

A growing class of agentic systems maintain persistent state across sessions through memory files, behavioral preferences, and knowledge bases. While this makes agents more useful and self-improving, it also creates a new attack surface for prompt injections in which malicious instructions can be embedded within persistent files and influence future behavior. In this work, we study prompt injection attacks in memory-based agentic systems using a sandboxed synthetic workspace. We evaluate two agentic systems, Anthropic Claude Code and OpenAI Codex, across four models: Claude Haiku 4.5, Claude Opus 4.7, GPT-5.2, and GPT-5.5. Our results show that although it is difficult to make an agent overwrite its own memory files using untrusted external content, payloads already planted in those files can successfully attack current and future sessions. Attack success and payload persistence vary substantially across systems, models, adversarial goals, and multi-session attack sequences. These findings show that persistent memory changes the threat model for prompt injection and motivate defenses that protect memory updates without removing useful agent adaptation.

The strong planning and reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have fostered the development of agent-based systems capable of leveraging external tools and interacting with increasingly complex environments. However, these powerful features also introduce a critical security risk: indirect prompt injection, a sophisticated attack vector that compromises the core of these agents, the LLM, by manipulating contextual information rather than direct user prompts. In this work, we propose a generic black-box fuzzing framework, AgentVigil, designed to automatically discover and exploit indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities across diverse LLM agents. Our approach starts by constructing a high-quality initial seed corpus, then employs a seed selection algorithm based on Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to iteratively refine inputs, thereby maximizing the likelihood of uncovering agent weaknesses. We evaluate AgentVigil on two public benchmarks, AgentDojo and VWA-adv, where it achieves 71% and 70% success rates against agents based on o3-mini and GPT-4o, respectively, nearly doubling the performance of baseline attacks. Moreover, AgentVigil exhibits strong transferability across unseen tasks and internal LLMs, as well as promising results against defenses. Beyond benchmark evaluations, we apply our attacks in real-world environments, successfully misleading agents to navigate to arbitrary URLs, including malicious sites.

Language-model agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) during tool use: adversarial instructions hidden in untrusted tool outputs can covertly redirect legitimate task execution. Existing work often trains and evaluates defenses against fixed attacks that do not adapt to the defender's behavior, so the resulting defenses may struggle against adaptive attacks. We combine adaptive attacker-defender co-training with subsequent refinement: continued interaction improves both roles, while learned attackers provide training challenges for further gains in defender safety and task utility. We therefore model adaptive IPI as a general-sum Markov game: the defender advances the task through successive tool calls, while the attacker can inject multiple times within the same task and adapt subsequent attacks to the defender's responses. Building on this formulation, we propose CoER, a verifier-grounded co-evolution and refinement framework. After initializing the attacker from successful trajectories, Co-PPO retains historical policies from both roles as opponent populations and mixes current and historical opponents for bilateral reinforcement learning, extending training beyond the latest matchup. Attackers from these populations are then reused to challenge teacher agents, and only demonstrations verified for both safety and task completion are used to fine-tune the co-evolved defender. In our main seven-domain evaluation, CoER reduces observed overall attack success from 38.5% to 0.2% and raises task utility from 63.2% to 76.3%, with improved attack resistance on external benchmarks.

Leading large language model providers now conceal their models' step-by-step reasoning, or chain-of-thought, to protect intellectual property and limit information leakage. Rather than storing these traces server-side, providers return them to the client as blocks of encrypted text, which the client passes back with each subsequent request. Building on prior research, we identify an architectural vulnerability: these encrypted blocks are fully compatible and interchangeable across different sessions, users, and models within a provider's ecosystem. We exploit this compatibility to develop a scalable decryption jailbreak. By injecting an encrypted reasoning trace from a given model into a weaker, and less safeguarded model from the same provider, we force it to decode and output the trace verbatim in plaintext, without ever jailbreaking the more capable model directly. This vulnerability enables four distinct attack vectors. First, it circumvents anti-distillation mechanisms, allowing adversaries to extract a proprietary model's reasoning, as we demonstrate across Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google. Second, it allows for large-scale private data extraction. Developers frequently share session logs publicly, unaware of contents of the encrypted blocks. By decoding 315,320 reasoning blocks scraped from public repositories, we recovered 367 Personally Identifiable Information (PII) artifacts and 182 credentials. Third, it inadvertently reveals hazardous information hidden within the reasoning process, even in cases where the model's final, visible output safely rejects a malicious request. Fourth, attackers can leverage this flaw to execute invisible prompt injections, embedding malicious payloads entirely within encrypted blocks to poison public agentic rollouts. Following responsible disclosure, we propose concrete cryptographic and system-level mitigations to secure client-side reasoning.

When large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to automate tasks and interact with untrusted external data, prompt injection emerges as a significant security threat. By injecting malicious instructions into the data that LLMs access, an attacker can arbitrarily override the original user task and redirect the agent toward unintended, potentially harmful actions. Existing defenses either require access to model weights (fine-tuning), incur substantial utility loss (detection-based), or demand non-trivial system redesign (system-level). Motivated by this, we propose DataFilter, a test-time model-agnostic defense that removes malicious instructions from the data before it reaches the backend LLM. DataFilter is trained with supervised fine-tuning on simulated injections and leverages both the user's instruction and the data to selectively strip adversarial content while preserving benign information. Across multiple benchmarks, DataFilter consistently reduces the prompt injection attack success rates to near zero while maintaining the LLMs' utility. DataFilter delivers strong security, high utility, and plug-and-play deployment, making it a strong practical defense to secure black-box commercial LLMs against prompt injection. Our DataFilter model is released at https://huggingface.co/JoyYizhu/DataFilter for immediate use, with the code to reproduce our results at https://github.com/yizhu-joy/DataFilter.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

High-quality 3D scene reconstruction has recently advanced toward generalizable feed-forward architectures, enabling the generation of complex environments in a single forward pass. However, despite their strong performance in static scene perception, these models remain limited in responding to dynamic human instructions, which restricts their use in interactive applications. Existing editing methods typically rely on a 2D-lifting strategy, where individual views are edited independently and then lifted back into 3D space. This indirect pipeline often leads to blurry textures and inconsistent geometry, as 2D editors lack the spatial awareness required to preserve structure across viewpoints. To address these limitations, we propose VGGT-Edit, a feed-forward framework for text-conditioned native 3D scene editing. VGGT-Edit introduces depth-synchronized text injection to align semantic guidance with the backbone's spatial poses, ensuring stable instruction grounding. This semantic signal is then processed by a residual transformation head, which directly predicts 3D geometric displacements to deform the scene while preserving background stability. To ensure high-fidelity results, we supervise the framework with a multi-term objective function that enforces geometric accuracy and cross-view consistency. We also construct the DeltaScene Dataset, a large-scale dataset generated through an automated pipeline with 3D agreement filtering to ensure ground-truth quality. Experiments show that VGGT-Edit substantially outperforms 2D-lifting baselines, producing sharper object details, stronger multi-view consistency, and near-instant inference speed.

We present SPAD, a novel approach for creating consistent multi-view images from text prompts or single images. To enable multi-view generation, we repurpose a pretrained 2D diffusion model by extending its self-attention layers with cross-view interactions, and fine-tune it on a high quality subset of Objaverse. We find that a naive extension of the self-attention proposed in prior work (e.g. MVDream) leads to content copying between views. Therefore, we explicitly constrain the cross-view attention based on epipolar geometry. To further enhance 3D consistency, we utilize Plucker coordinates derived from camera rays and inject them as positional encoding. This enables SPAD to reason over spatial proximity in 3D well. In contrast to recent works that can only generate views at fixed azimuth and elevation, SPAD offers full camera control and achieves state-of-the-art results in novel view synthesis on unseen objects from the Objaverse and Google Scanned Objects datasets. Finally, we demonstrate that text-to-3D generation using SPAD prevents the multi-face Janus issue. See more details at our webpage: https://yashkant.github.io/spad

In recent years, neural implicit surface reconstruction has emerged as a popular paradigm for multi-view 3D reconstruction. Unlike traditional multi-view stereo approaches, the neural implicit surface-based methods leverage neural networks to represent 3D scenes as signed distance functions (SDFs). However, they tend to disregard the reconstruction of individual objects within the scene, which limits their performance and practical applications. To address this issue, previous work ObjectSDF introduced a nice framework of object-composition neural implicit surfaces, which utilizes 2D instance masks to supervise individual object SDFs. In this paper, we propose a new framework called ObjectSDF++ to overcome the limitations of ObjectSDF. First, in contrast to ObjectSDF whose performance is primarily restricted by its converted semantic field, the core component of our model is an occlusion-aware object opacity rendering formulation that directly volume-renders object opacity to be supervised with instance masks. Second, we design a novel regularization term for object distinction, which can effectively mitigate the issue that ObjectSDF may result in unexpected reconstruction in invisible regions due to the lack of constraint to prevent collisions. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that our novel framework not only produces superior object reconstruction results but also significantly improves the quality of scene reconstruction. Code and more resources can be found in https://qianyiwu.github.io/objectsdf++

Recently, video generation has achieved significant rapid development based on superior text-to-image generation techniques. In this work, we propose a high fidelity framework for image-to-video generation, named AtomoVideo. Based on multi-granularity image injection, we achieve higher fidelity of the generated video to the given image. In addition, thanks to high quality datasets and training strategies, we achieve greater motion intensity while maintaining superior temporal consistency and stability. Our architecture extends flexibly to the video frame prediction task, enabling long sequence prediction through iterative generation. Furthermore, due to the design of adapter training, our approach can be well combined with existing personalised models and controllable modules. By quantitatively and qualitatively evaluation, AtomoVideo achieves superior results compared to popular methods, more examples can be found on our project website: https://atomo- video.github.io/.