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Nov 18

PrefPO: Pairwise Preference Prompt Optimization

Prompt engineering is effective but labor-intensive, motivating automated optimization methods. Existing methods typically require labeled datasets, which are often unavailable, and produce verbose, repetitive prompts. We introduce PrefPO, a minimal prompt optimization approach inspired by reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Its preference-based approach reduces the need for labeled data and hyperparameter tuning-only a starting prompt and natural language criteria are needed. PrefPO uses an LLM discriminator to express pairwise preferences over model outputs and provide feedback to an LLM optimizer, iteratively improving performance. We evaluate PrefPO on 9 BIG-Bench Hard (BBH) tasks and IFEval-Hard, a newly-curated, challenging subset of IFEval. PrefPO matches or exceeds SOTA methods, including GEPA, MIPRO, and TextGrad, on 6/9 tasks and performs comparably to TextGrad on IFEval-Hard (82.4% vs 84.5%). Unlike other methods, PrefPO can optimize in both labeled and unlabeled settings. Without labels, PrefPO closely matches its labeled performance on 6/9 tasks, proving effective without ground truth. PrefPO also improves prompt hygiene: we find existing methods produce prompts 14.7x their original length or with 34% repetitive content; PrefPO reduces these issues by 3-5x. Furthermore, both LLM and human judges rate PrefPO's prompts higher than TextGrad's. Finally, we identify prompt hacking in prompt optimizers, where methods game evaluation criteria, and find PrefPO is susceptible at half the rate of TextGrad (37% vs 86%), generating fewer brittle, misaligned prompts.

  • 3 authors
·
Mar 13

InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents

Recent work has embodied LLMs as agents, allowing them to access tools, perform actions, and interact with external content (e.g., emails or websites). However, external content introduces the risk of indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious instructions are embedded within the content processed by LLMs, aiming to manipulate these agents into executing detrimental actions against users. Given the potentially severe consequences of such attacks, establishing benchmarks to assess and mitigate these risks is imperative. In this work, we introduce InjecAgent, a benchmark designed to assess the vulnerability of tool-integrated LLM agents to IPI attacks. InjecAgent comprises 1,054 test cases covering 17 different user tools and 62 attacker tools. We categorize attack intentions into two primary types: direct harm to users and exfiltration of private data. We evaluate 30 different LLM agents and show that agents are vulnerable to IPI attacks, with ReAct-prompted GPT-4 vulnerable to attacks 24% of the time. Further investigation into an enhanced setting, where the attacker instructions are reinforced with a hacking prompt, shows additional increases in success rates, nearly doubling the attack success rate on the ReAct-prompted GPT-4. Our findings raise questions about the widespread deployment of LLM Agents. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/uiuc-kang-lab/InjecAgent.

  • 4 authors
·
Mar 5, 2024

Toward Evaluative Thinking: Meta Policy Optimization with Evolving Reward Models

Reward-based alignment methods for large language models (LLMs) face two key limitations: vulnerability to reward hacking, where models exploit flaws in the reward signal; and reliance on brittle, labor-intensive prompt engineering when LLMs are used as reward models. We introduce Meta Policy Optimization (MPO), a framework that addresses these challenges by integrating a meta-reward model that dynamically refines the reward model's prompt throughout training. In MPO, the meta-reward model monitors the evolving training context and continuously adjusts the reward model's prompt to maintain high alignment, providing an adaptive reward signal that resists exploitation by the policy. This meta-learning approach promotes a more stable policy optimization, and greatly reduces the need for manual reward prompt design. It yields performance on par with or better than models guided by extensively hand-crafted reward prompts. Furthermore, we show that MPO maintains its effectiveness across diverse tasks, such as question answering and mathematical reasoning, without requiring specialized reward designs. Beyond standard RLAIF, MPO's meta-learning formulation is readily extensible to higher-level alignment frameworks. Overall, this method addresses theoretical and practical challenges in reward-based RL alignment for LLMs, paving the way for more robust and adaptable alignment strategies. The code and models will be publicly shared.

  • 4 authors
·
Apr 28, 2025 7

Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

  • 6 authors
·
Feb 23, 2023 1

Prompt Stealing Attacks Against Text-to-Image Generation Models

Text-to-Image generation models have revolutionized the artwork design process and enabled anyone to create high-quality images by entering text descriptions called prompts. Creating a high-quality prompt that consists of a subject and several modifiers can be time-consuming and costly. In consequence, a trend of trading high-quality prompts on specialized marketplaces has emerged. In this paper, we propose a novel attack, namely prompt stealing attack, which aims to steal prompts from generated images by text-to-image generation models. Successful prompt stealing attacks direct violate the intellectual property and privacy of prompt engineers and also jeopardize the business model of prompt trading marketplaces. We first perform a large-scale analysis on a dataset collected by ourselves and show that a successful prompt stealing attack should consider a prompt's subject as well as its modifiers. We then propose the first learning-based prompt stealing attack, PromptStealer, and demonstrate its superiority over two baseline methods quantitatively and qualitatively. We also make some initial attempts to defend PromptStealer. In general, our study uncovers a new attack surface in the ecosystem created by the popular text-to-image generation models. We hope our results can help to mitigate the threat. To facilitate research in this field, we will share our dataset and code with the community.

  • 4 authors
·
Feb 20, 2023

PROMPTMINER: Black-Box Prompt Stealing against Text-to-Image Generative Models via Reinforcement Learning and Fuzz Optimization

Text-to-image (T2I) generative models such as Stable Diffusion and FLUX can synthesize realistic, high-quality images directly from textual prompts. The resulting image quality depends critically on well-crafted prompts that specify both subjects and stylistic modifiers, which have become valuable digital assets. However, the rising value and ubiquity of high-quality prompts expose them to security and intellectual-property risks. One key threat is the prompt stealing attack, i.e., the task of recovering the textual prompt that generated a given image. Prompt stealing enables unauthorized extraction and reuse of carefully engineered prompts, yet it can also support beneficial applications such as data attribution, model provenance analysis, and watermarking validation. Existing approaches often assume white-box gradient access, require large-scale labeled datasets for supervised training, or rely solely on captioning without explicit optimization, limiting their practicality and adaptability. To address these challenges, we propose PROMPTMINER, a black-box prompt stealing framework that decouples the task into two phases: (1) a reinforcement learning-based optimization phase to reconstruct the primary subject, and (2) a fuzzing-driven search phase to recover stylistic modifiers. Experiments across multiple datasets and diffusion backbones demonstrate that PROMPTMINER achieves superior results, with CLIP similarity up to 0.958 and textual alignment with SBERT up to 0.751, surpassing all baselines. Even when applied to in-the-wild images with unknown generators, it outperforms the strongest baseline by 7.5 percent in CLIP similarity, demonstrating better generalization. Finally, PROMPTMINER maintains strong performance under defensive perturbations, highlighting remarkable robustness. Code: https://github.com/aaFrostnova/PromptMiner

  • 7 authors
·
Nov 26, 2025

Prompt Pirates Need a Map: Stealing Seeds helps Stealing Prompts

Diffusion models have significantly advanced text-to-image generation, enabling the creation of highly realistic images conditioned on textual prompts and seeds. Given the considerable intellectual and economic value embedded in such prompts, prompt theft poses a critical security and privacy concern. In this paper, we investigate prompt-stealing attacks targeting diffusion models. We reveal that numerical optimization-based prompt recovery methods are fundamentally limited as they do not account for the initial random noise used during image generation. We identify and exploit a noise-generation vulnerability (CWE-339), prevalent in major image-generation frameworks, originating from PyTorch's restriction of seed values to a range of 2^{32} when generating the initial random noise on CPUs. Through a large-scale empirical analysis conducted on images shared via the popular platform CivitAI, we demonstrate that approximately 95% of these images' seed values can be effectively brute-forced in 140 minutes per seed using our seed-recovery tool, SeedSnitch. Leveraging the recovered seed, we propose PromptPirate, a genetic algorithm-based optimization method explicitly designed for prompt stealing. PromptPirate surpasses state-of-the-art methods, i.e., PromptStealer, P2HP, and CLIP-Interrogator, achieving an 8-11% improvement in LPIPS similarity. Furthermore, we introduce straightforward and effective countermeasures that render seed stealing, and thus optimization-based prompt stealing, ineffective. We have disclosed our findings responsibly and initiated coordinated mitigation efforts with the developers to address this critical vulnerability.

  • 6 authors
·
Sep 11, 2025

PRSA: Prompt Stealing Attacks against Real-World Prompt Services

Recently, large language models (LLMs) have garnered widespread attention for their exceptional capabilities. Prompts are central to the functionality and performance of LLMs, making them highly valuable assets. The increasing reliance on high-quality prompts has driven significant growth in prompt services. However, this growth also expands the potential for prompt leakage, increasing the risk that attackers could replicate original functionalities, create competing products, and severely infringe on developers' intellectual property. Despite these risks, prompt leakage in real-world prompt services remains underexplored. In this paper, we present PRSA, a practical attack framework designed for prompt stealing. PRSA infers the detailed intent of prompts through very limited input-output analysis and can successfully generate stolen prompts that replicate the original functionality. Extensive evaluations demonstrate PRSA's effectiveness across two main types of real-world prompt services. Specifically, compared to previous works, it improves the attack success rate from 17.8% to 46.1% in prompt marketplaces and from 39% to 52% in LLM application stores, respectively. Notably, in the attack on "Math", one of the most popular educational applications in OpenAI's GPT Store with over 1 million conversations, PRSA uncovered a hidden Easter egg that had not been revealed previously. Besides, our analysis reveals that higher mutual information between a prompt and its output correlates with an increased risk of leakage. This insight guides the design and evaluation of two potential defenses against the security threats posed by PRSA. We have reported these findings to the prompt service vendors, including PromptBase and OpenAI, and actively collaborate with them to implement defensive measures.

  • 9 authors
·
Feb 29, 2024

Prompt2Perturb (P2P): Text-Guided Diffusion-Based Adversarial Attacks on Breast Ultrasound Images

Deep neural networks (DNNs) offer significant promise for improving breast cancer diagnosis in medical imaging. However, these models are highly susceptible to adversarial attacks--small, imperceptible changes that can mislead classifiers--raising critical concerns about their reliability and security. Traditional attacks rely on fixed-norm perturbations, misaligning with human perception. In contrast, diffusion-based attacks require pre-trained models, demanding substantial data when these models are unavailable, limiting practical use in data-scarce scenarios. In medical imaging, however, this is often unfeasible due to the limited availability of datasets. Building on recent advancements in learnable prompts, we propose Prompt2Perturb (P2P), a novel language-guided attack method capable of generating meaningful attack examples driven by text instructions. During the prompt learning phase, our approach leverages learnable prompts within the text encoder to create subtle, yet impactful, perturbations that remain imperceptible while guiding the model towards targeted outcomes. In contrast to current prompt learning-based approaches, our P2P stands out by directly updating text embeddings, avoiding the need for retraining diffusion models. Further, we leverage the finding that optimizing only the early reverse diffusion steps boosts efficiency while ensuring that the generated adversarial examples incorporate subtle noise, thus preserving ultrasound image quality without introducing noticeable artifacts. We show that our method outperforms state-of-the-art attack techniques across three breast ultrasound datasets in FID and LPIPS. Moreover, the generated images are both more natural in appearance and more effective compared to existing adversarial attacks. Our code will be publicly available https://github.com/yasamin-med/P2P.

  • 5 authors
·
Dec 13, 2024 2

The Promptware Kill Chain: How Prompt Injections Gradually Evolved Into a Multistep Malware Delivery Mechanism

Prompt injection was initially framed as the large language model (LLM) analogue of SQL injection. However, over the past three years, attacks labeled as prompt injection have evolved from isolated input-manipulation exploits into multistep attack mechanisms that resemble malware. In this paper, we argue that prompt injections evolved into promptware, a new class of malware execution mechanism triggered through prompts engineered to exploit an application's LLM. We introduce a seven-stage promptware kill chain: Initial Access (prompt injection), Privilege Escalation (jailbreaking), Reconnaissance, Persistence (memory and retrieval poisoning), Command and Control, Lateral Movement, and Actions on Objective. We analyze thirty-six prominent studies and real-world incidents affecting production LLM systems and show that at least twenty-one documented attacks that traverse four or more stages of this kill chain, demonstrating that the threat model is not merely theoretical. We discuss the need for a defense-in-depth approach that addresses all stages of the promptware life cycle and review relevant countermeasures for each step. By moving the conversation from prompt injection to a promptware kill chain, our work provides analytical clarity, enables structured risk assessment, and lays a foundation for systematic security engineering of LLM-based systems.

  • 4 authors
·
Feb 9

Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection via Tool Result Parsing

As LLM agents transition from digital assistants to physical controllers in autonomous systems and robotics, they face an escalating threat from indirect prompt injection. By embedding adversarial instructions into the results of tool calls, attackers can hijack the agent's decision-making process to execute unauthorized actions. This vulnerability poses a significant risk as agents gain more direct control over physical environments. Existing defense mechanisms against Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) generally fall into two categories. The first involves training dedicated detection models; however, this approach entails high computational overhead for both training and inference, and requires frequent updates to keep pace with evolving attack vectors. Alternatively, prompt-based methods leverage the inherent capabilities of LLMs to detect or ignore malicious instructions via prompt engineering. Despite their flexibility, most current prompt-based defenses suffer from high Attack Success Rates (ASR), demonstrating limited robustness against sophisticated injection attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel method that provides LLMs with precise data via tool result parsing while effectively filtering out injected malicious code. Our approach achieves competitive Utility under Attack (UA) while maintaining the lowest Attack Success Rate (ASR) to date, significantly outperforming existing methods. Code is available at GitHub.

  • 3 authors
·
Jan 7 1

PLeak: Prompt Leaking Attacks against Large Language Model Applications

Large Language Models (LLMs) enable a new ecosystem with many downstream applications, called LLM applications, with different natural language processing tasks. The functionality and performance of an LLM application highly depend on its system prompt, which instructs the backend LLM on what task to perform. Therefore, an LLM application developer often keeps a system prompt confidential to protect its intellectual property. As a result, a natural attack, called prompt leaking, is to steal the system prompt from an LLM application, which compromises the developer's intellectual property. Existing prompt leaking attacks primarily rely on manually crafted queries, and thus achieve limited effectiveness. In this paper, we design a novel, closed-box prompt leaking attack framework, called PLeak, to optimize an adversarial query such that when the attacker sends it to a target LLM application, its response reveals its own system prompt. We formulate finding such an adversarial query as an optimization problem and solve it with a gradient-based method approximately. Our key idea is to break down the optimization goal by optimizing adversary queries for system prompts incrementally, i.e., starting from the first few tokens of each system prompt step by step until the entire length of the system prompt. We evaluate PLeak in both offline settings and for real-world LLM applications, e.g., those on Poe, a popular platform hosting such applications. Our results show that PLeak can effectively leak system prompts and significantly outperforms not only baselines that manually curate queries but also baselines with optimized queries that are modified and adapted from existing jailbreaking attacks. We responsibly reported the issues to Poe and are still waiting for their response. Our implementation is available at this repository: https://github.com/BHui97/PLeak.

  • 5 authors
·
May 10, 2024

Understanding Reward Hacking in Text-to-Image Reinforcement Learning

Reinforcement learning (RL) has become a standard approach for post-training large language models and, more recently, for improving image generation models, which uses reward functions to enhance generation quality and human preference alignment. However, existing reward designs are often imperfect proxies for true human judgment, making models prone to reward hacking--producing unrealistic or low-quality images that nevertheless achieve high reward scores. In this work, we systematically analyze reward hacking behaviors in text-to-image (T2I) RL post-training. We investigate how both aesthetic/human preference rewards and prompt-image consistency rewards individually contribute to reward hacking and further show that ensembling multiple rewards can only partially mitigate this issue. Across diverse reward models, we identify a common failure mode: the generation of artifact-prone images. To address this, we propose a lightweight and adaptive artifact reward model, trained on a small curated dataset of artifact-free and artifact-containing samples. This model can be integrated into existing RL pipelines as an effective regularizer for commonly used reward models. Experiments demonstrate that incorporating our artifact reward significantly improves visual realism and reduces reward hacking across multiple T2I RL setups, demonstrating the effectiveness of lightweight reward augment serving as a safeguard against reward hacking.

  • 4 authors
·
Jan 6

Large Language Model Hacking: Quantifying the Hidden Risks of Using LLMs for Text Annotation

Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly transforming social science research by enabling the automation of labor-intensive tasks like data annotation and text analysis. However, LLM outputs vary significantly depending on the implementation choices made by researchers (e.g., model selection, prompting strategy, or temperature settings). Such variation can introduce systematic biases and random errors, which propagate to downstream analyses and cause Type I, Type II, Type S, or Type M errors. We call this LLM hacking. We quantify the risk of LLM hacking by replicating 37 data annotation tasks from 21 published social science research studies with 18 different models. Analyzing 13 million LLM labels, we test 2,361 realistic hypotheses to measure how plausible researcher choices affect statistical conclusions. We find incorrect conclusions based on LLM-annotated data in approximately one in three hypotheses for state-of-the-art models, and in half the hypotheses for small language models. While our findings show that higher task performance and better general model capabilities reduce LLM hacking risk, even highly accurate models do not completely eliminate it. The risk of LLM hacking decreases as effect sizes increase, indicating the need for more rigorous verification of findings near significance thresholds. Our extensive analysis of LLM hacking mitigation techniques emphasizes the importance of human annotations in reducing false positive findings and improving model selection. Surprisingly, common regression estimator correction techniques are largely ineffective in reducing LLM hacking risk, as they heavily trade off Type I vs. Type II errors. Beyond accidental errors, we find that intentional LLM hacking is unacceptably simple. With few LLMs and just a handful of prompt paraphrases, anything can be presented as statistically significant.

  • 7 authors
·
Sep 10, 2025 3

SoliReward: Mitigating Susceptibility to Reward Hacking and Annotation Noise in Video Generation Reward Models

Post-training alignment of video generation models with human preferences is a critical goal. Developing effective Reward Models (RMs) for this process faces significant methodological hurdles. Current data collection paradigms, reliant on in-prompt pairwise annotations, suffer from labeling noise. Concurrently, the architectural design of VLM-based RMs, particularly their output mechanisms, remains underexplored. Furthermore, RM is susceptible to reward hacking in post-training. To mitigate these limitations, we propose SoliReward, a systematic framework for video RM training. Our framework first sources high-quality, cost-efficient data via single-item binary annotations, then constructs preference pairs using a cross-prompt pairing strategy. Architecturally, we employ a Hierarchical Progressive Query Attention mechanism to enhance feature aggregation. Finally, we introduce a modified BT loss that explicitly accommodates win-tie scenarios. This approach regularizes the RM's score distribution for positive samples, providing more nuanced preference signals to alleviate over-focus on a small number of top-scoring samples. Our approach is validated on benchmarks evaluating physical plausibility, subject deformity, and semantic alignment, demonstrating improvements in direct RM evaluation metrics and in the efficacy of post-training on video generation models. Code and benchmark will be publicly available.

  • 9 authors
·
Dec 17, 2025

RESTORE: Towards Feature Shift for Vision-Language Prompt Learning

Prompt learning is effective for fine-tuning foundation models to improve their generalization across a variety of downstream tasks. However, the prompts that are independently optimized along a single modality path, may sacrifice the vision-language alignment of pre-trained models in return for improved performance on specific tasks and classes, leading to poorer generalization. In this paper, we first demonstrate that prompt tuning along only one single branch of CLIP (e.g., language or vision) is the reason why the misalignment occurs. Without proper regularization across the learnable parameters in different modalities, prompt learning violates the original pre-training constraints inherent in the two-tower architecture. To address such misalignment, we first propose feature shift, which is defined as the variation of embeddings after introducing the learned prompts, to serve as an explanatory tool. We dive into its relation with generalizability and thereafter propose RESTORE, a multi-modal prompt learning method that exerts explicit constraints on cross-modal consistency. To be more specific, to prevent feature misalignment, a feature shift consistency is introduced to synchronize inter-modal feature shifts by measuring and regularizing the magnitude of discrepancy during prompt tuning. In addition, we propose a "surgery" block to avoid short-cut hacking, where cross-modal misalignment can still be severe if the feature shift of each modality varies drastically at the same rate. It is implemented as feed-forward adapters upon both modalities to alleviate the misalignment problem. Extensive experiments on 15 datasets demonstrate that our method outperforms the state-of-the-art prompt tuning methods without compromising feature alignment.

  • 9 authors
·
Mar 10, 2024

Just Ask: Curious Code Agents Reveal System Prompts in Frontier LLMs

Autonomous code agents built on large language models are reshaping software and AI development through tool use, long-horizon reasoning, and self-directed interaction. However, this autonomy introduces a previously unrecognized security risk: agentic interaction fundamentally expands the LLM attack surface, enabling systematic probing and recovery of hidden system prompts that guide model behavior. We identify system prompt extraction as an emergent vulnerability intrinsic to code agents and present \textsc{JustAsk}, a self-evolving framework that autonomously discovers effective extraction strategies through interaction alone. Unlike prior prompt-engineering or dataset-based attacks, JustAsk requires no handcrafted prompts, labeled supervision, or privileged access beyond standard user interaction. It formulates extraction as an online exploration problem, using Upper Confidence Bound-based strategy selection and a hierarchical skill space spanning atomic probes and high-level orchestration. These skills exploit imperfect system-instruction generalization and inherent tensions between helpfulness and safety. Evaluated on 41 black-box commercial models across multiple providers, JustAsk consistently achieves full or near-complete system prompt recovery, revealing recurring design- and architecture-level vulnerabilities. Our results expose system prompts as a critical yet largely unprotected attack surface in modern agent systems.

  • 8 authors
·
Jan 28

Semantic Overlays: Mitigating Prompt Injection with Annotations Beyond Tokens and Steering Vectors

Everything a language model sees is tokens. The serving stack knows what each span is -- user input, tool output, instructions -- but the model must keep track of that itself, and it can lose track or be confused: text can be written to read like anything. Prompt injection is a natural exploit of this phenomenon. By scrambling the model's understanding of span identity, an attacker can induce unwanted and potentially dangerous actions. Adding a non-textual channel to the model's input -- a way to communicate span identity beyond text -- mitigates this class of attack. We thus introduce a general steering technique called Semantic Overlays: small learned adapters applied at chosen prefill positions to a frozen model's residual stream. Laying an overlay over a span creates an out-of-band annotation channel that cannot be replicated by tokens. Unlike steering vectors, Semantic Overlays are trained, adaptable, and selectively applied. An overlay can encode complex semantics that reshape how the model perceives the marked span: asked to copy a code snippet under an overlay asserting that it is in a different programming language than it is, the model rewrites the snippet, faithfully, in the asserted language. Overlays are also composable, allow for transparent reading of underlying content, and can carry complex payloads -- including imperatives that the model will follow. An overlay which marks a span as "non-executable" defends against the broad class of prompt injections that add instructions in untrusted context. We report strong results on prompt injection benchmarks: SEP separation rises from 24.3% to 96.5% with utility unchanged (our scoring rule; we also correct a defect in the published grader), TensorTrust attack success rate falls from 34.8% to 6.6%, and all four PIArena attack families drop to 0% compliance, all while marked spans stay readable (92.5% exact copy rate).

  • 1 authors
·
Aug 23

FLRT: Fluent Student-Teacher Redteaming

Many publicly available language models have been safety tuned to reduce the likelihood of toxic or liability-inducing text. To redteam or jailbreak these models for compliance with toxic requests, users and security analysts have developed adversarial prompting techniques. One attack method is to apply discrete optimization techniques to the prompt. However, the resulting attack strings are often gibberish text, easily filtered by defenders due to high measured perplexity, and may fail for unseen tasks and/or well-tuned models. In this work, we improve existing algorithms (primarily GCG and BEAST) to develop powerful and fluent attacks on safety-tuned models like Llama-2 and Phi-3. Our technique centers around a new distillation-based approach that encourages the victim model to emulate a toxified finetune, either in terms of output probabilities or internal activations. To encourage human-fluent attacks, we add a multi-model perplexity penalty and a repetition penalty to the objective. We also enhance optimizer strength by allowing token insertions, token swaps, and token deletions and by using longer attack sequences. The resulting process is able to reliably jailbreak the most difficult target models with prompts that appear similar to human-written prompts. On Advbench we achieve attack success rates >93% for Llama-2-7B, Llama-3-8B, and Vicuna-7B, while maintaining model-measured perplexity <33; we achieve 95% attack success for Phi-3, though with higher perplexity. We also find a universally-optimized single fluent prompt that induces >88% compliance on previously unseen tasks across Llama-2-7B, Phi-3-mini and Vicuna-7B and transfers to other black-box models.

  • 2 authors
·
Sep 30, 2024

PROMPTFUZZ: Harnessing Fuzzing Techniques for Robust Testing of Prompt Injection in LLMs

Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained widespread use in various applications due to their powerful capability to generate human-like text. However, prompt injection attacks, which involve overwriting a model's original instructions with malicious prompts to manipulate the generated text, have raised significant concerns about the security and reliability of LLMs. Ensuring that LLMs are robust against such attacks is crucial for their deployment in real-world applications, particularly in critical tasks. In this paper, we propose PROMPTFUZZ, a novel testing framework that leverages fuzzing techniques to systematically assess the robustness of LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Inspired by software fuzzing, PROMPTFUZZ selects promising seed prompts and generates a diverse set of prompt injections to evaluate the target LLM's resilience. PROMPTFUZZ operates in two stages: the prepare phase, which involves selecting promising initial seeds and collecting few-shot examples, and the focus phase, which uses the collected examples to generate diverse, high-quality prompt injections. Using PROMPTFUZZ, we can uncover more vulnerabilities in LLMs, even those with strong defense prompts. By deploying the generated attack prompts from PROMPTFUZZ in a real-world competition, we achieved the 7th ranking out of over 4000 participants (top 0.14%) within 2 hours. Additionally, we construct a dataset to fine-tune LLMs for enhanced robustness against prompt injection attacks. While the fine-tuned model shows improved robustness, PROMPTFUZZ continues to identify vulnerabilities, highlighting the importance of robust testing for LLMs. Our work emphasizes the critical need for effective testing tools and provides a practical framework for evaluating and improving the robustness of LLMs against prompt injection attacks.

  • 5 authors
·
Sep 23, 2024

PR-Attack: Coordinated Prompt-RAG Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation in Large Language Models via Bilevel Optimization

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of applications, e.g., medical question-answering, mathematical sciences, and code generation. However, they also exhibit inherent limitations, such as outdated knowledge and susceptibility to hallucinations. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising paradigm to address these issues, but it also introduces new vulnerabilities. Recent efforts have focused on the security of RAG-based LLMs, yet existing attack methods face three critical challenges: (1) their effectiveness declines sharply when only a limited number of poisoned texts can be injected into the knowledge database, (2) they lack sufficient stealth, as the attacks are often detectable by anomaly detection systems, which compromises their effectiveness, and (3) they rely on heuristic approaches to generate poisoned texts, lacking formal optimization frameworks and theoretic guarantees, which limits their effectiveness and applicability. To address these issues, we propose coordinated Prompt-RAG attack (PR-attack), a novel optimization-driven attack that introduces a small number of poisoned texts into the knowledge database while embedding a backdoor trigger within the prompt. When activated, the trigger causes the LLM to generate pre-designed responses to targeted queries, while maintaining normal behavior in other contexts. This ensures both high effectiveness and stealth. We formulate the attack generation process as a bilevel optimization problem leveraging a principled optimization framework to develop optimal poisoned texts and triggers. Extensive experiments across diverse LLMs and datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of PR-Attack, achieving a high attack success rate even with a limited number of poisoned texts and significantly improved stealth compared to existing methods.

  • 3 authors
·
Jun 19, 2025

An LLM can Fool Itself: A Prompt-Based Adversarial Attack

The wide-ranging applications of large language models (LLMs), especially in safety-critical domains, necessitate the proper evaluation of the LLM's adversarial robustness. This paper proposes an efficient tool to audit the LLM's adversarial robustness via a prompt-based adversarial attack (PromptAttack). PromptAttack converts adversarial textual attacks into an attack prompt that can cause the victim LLM to output the adversarial sample to fool itself. The attack prompt is composed of three important components: (1) original input (OI) including the original sample and its ground-truth label, (2) attack objective (AO) illustrating a task description of generating a new sample that can fool itself without changing the semantic meaning, and (3) attack guidance (AG) containing the perturbation instructions to guide the LLM on how to complete the task by perturbing the original sample at character, word, and sentence levels, respectively. Besides, we use a fidelity filter to ensure that PromptAttack maintains the original semantic meanings of the adversarial examples. Further, we enhance the attack power of PromptAttack by ensembling adversarial examples at different perturbation levels. Comprehensive empirical results using Llama2 and GPT-3.5 validate that PromptAttack consistently yields a much higher attack success rate compared to AdvGLUE and AdvGLUE++. Interesting findings include that a simple emoji can easily mislead GPT-3.5 to make wrong predictions.

  • 7 authors
·
Oct 20, 2023

Human-Readable Adversarial Prompts: An Investigation into LLM Vulnerabilities Using Situational Context

As the AI systems become deeply embedded in social media platforms, we've uncovered a concerning security vulnerability that goes beyond traditional adversarial attacks. It becomes important to assess the risks of LLMs before the general public use them on social media platforms to avoid any adverse impacts. Unlike obvious nonsensical text strings that safety systems can easily catch, our work reveals that human-readable situation-driven adversarial full-prompts that leverage situational context are effective but much harder to detect. We found that skilled attackers can exploit the vulnerabilities in open-source and proprietary LLMs to make a malicious user query safe for LLMs, resulting in generating a harmful response. This raises an important question about the vulnerabilities of LLMs. To measure the robustness against human-readable attacks, which now present a potent threat, our research makes three major contributions. First, we developed attacks that use movie scripts as situational contextual frameworks, creating natural-looking full-prompts that trick LLMs into generating harmful content. Second, we developed a method to transform gibberish adversarial text into readable, innocuous content that still exploits vulnerabilities when used within the full-prompts. Finally, we enhanced the AdvPrompter framework with p-nucleus sampling to generate diverse human-readable adversarial texts that significantly improve attack effectiveness against models like GPT-3.5-Turbo-0125 and Gemma-7b. Our findings show that these systems can be manipulated to operate beyond their intended ethical boundaries when presented with seemingly normal prompts that contain hidden adversarial elements. By identifying these vulnerabilities, we aim to drive the development of more robust safety mechanisms that can withstand sophisticated attacks in real-world applications.

  • 4 authors
·
Dec 20, 2024

PromptCARE: Prompt Copyright Protection by Watermark Injection and Verification

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed a meteoric rise in popularity among the general public users over the past few months, facilitating diverse downstream tasks with human-level accuracy and proficiency. Prompts play an essential role in this success, which efficiently adapt pre-trained LLMs to task-specific applications by simply prepending a sequence of tokens to the query texts. However, designing and selecting an optimal prompt can be both expensive and demanding, leading to the emergence of Prompt-as-a-Service providers who profit by providing well-designed prompts for authorized use. With the growing popularity of prompts and their indispensable role in LLM-based services, there is an urgent need to protect the copyright of prompts against unauthorized use. In this paper, we propose PromptCARE, the first framework for prompt copyright protection through watermark injection and verification. Prompt watermarking presents unique challenges that render existing watermarking techniques developed for model and dataset copyright verification ineffective. PromptCARE overcomes these hurdles by proposing watermark injection and verification schemes tailor-made for prompts and NLP characteristics. Extensive experiments on six well-known benchmark datasets, using three prevalent pre-trained LLMs (BERT, RoBERTa, and Facebook OPT-1.3b), demonstrate the effectiveness, harmlessness, robustness, and stealthiness of PromptCARE.

  • 4 authors
·
Aug 5, 2023

A Systematic Survey of Prompt Engineering on Vision-Language Foundation Models

Prompt engineering is a technique that involves augmenting a large pre-trained model with task-specific hints, known as prompts, to adapt the model to new tasks. Prompts can be created manually as natural language instructions or generated automatically as either natural language instructions or vector representations. Prompt engineering enables the ability to perform predictions based solely on prompts without updating model parameters, and the easier application of large pre-trained models in real-world tasks. In past years, Prompt engineering has been well-studied in natural language processing. Recently, it has also been intensively studied in vision-language modeling. However, there is currently a lack of a systematic overview of prompt engineering on pre-trained vision-language models. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive survey of cutting-edge research in prompt engineering on three types of vision-language models: multimodal-to-text generation models (e.g. Flamingo), image-text matching models (e.g. CLIP), and text-to-image generation models (e.g. Stable Diffusion). For each type of model, a brief model summary, prompting methods, prompting-based applications, and the corresponding responsibility and integrity issues are summarized and discussed. Furthermore, the commonalities and differences between prompting on vision-language models, language models, and vision models are also discussed. The challenges, future directions, and research opportunities are summarized to foster future research on this topic.

  • 10 authors
·
Jul 24, 2023

PromptSleuth: Detecting Prompt Injection via Semantic Intent Invariance

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into real-world applications, from virtual assistants to autonomous agents. However, their flexibility also introduces new attack vectors-particularly Prompt Injection (PI), where adversaries manipulate model behavior through crafted inputs. As attackers continuously evolve with paraphrased, obfuscated, and even multi-task injection strategies, existing benchmarks are no longer sufficient to capture the full spectrum of emerging threats. To address this gap, we construct a new benchmark that systematically extends prior efforts. Our benchmark subsumes the two widely-used existing ones while introducing new manipulation techniques and multi-task scenarios, thereby providing a more comprehensive evaluation setting. We find that existing defenses, though effective on their original benchmarks, show clear weaknesses under our benchmark, underscoring the need for more robust solutions. Our key insight is that while attack forms may vary, the adversary's intent-injecting an unauthorized task-remains invariant. Building on this observation, we propose PromptSleuth, a semantic-oriented defense framework that detects prompt injection by reasoning over task-level intent rather than surface features. Evaluated across state-of-the-art benchmarks, PromptSleuth consistently outperforms existing defense while maintaining comparable runtime and cost efficiency. These results demonstrate that intent-based semantic reasoning offers a robust, efficient, and generalizable strategy for defending LLMs against evolving prompt injection threats.

  • 3 authors
·
Aug 28, 2025

When AI Meets the Web: Prompt Injection Risks in Third-Party AI Chatbot Plugins

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), with prior work focusing on cutting-edge LLM applications like personal copilots. In contrast, simpler LLM applications, such as customer service chatbots, are widespread on the web, yet their security posture and exposure to such attacks remain poorly understood. These applications often rely on third-party chatbot plugins that act as intermediaries to commercial LLM APIs, offering non-expert website builders intuitive ways to customize chatbot behaviors. To bridge this gap, we present the first large-scale study of 17 third-party chatbot plugins used by over 10,000 public websites, uncovering previously unknown prompt injection risks in practice. First, 8 of these plugins (used by 8,000 websites) fail to enforce the integrity of the conversation history transmitted in network requests between the website visitor and the chatbot. This oversight amplifies the impact of direct prompt injection attacks by allowing adversaries to forge conversation histories (including fake system messages), boosting their ability to elicit unintended behavior (e.g., code generation) by 3 to 8x. Second, 15 plugins offer tools, such as web-scraping, to enrich the chatbot's context with website-specific content. However, these tools do not distinguish the website's trusted content (e.g., product descriptions) from untrusted, third-party content (e.g., customer reviews), introducing a risk of indirect prompt injection. Notably, we found that ~13% of e-commerce websites have already exposed their chatbots to third-party content. We systematically evaluate both vulnerabilities through controlled experiments grounded in real-world observations, focusing on factors such as system prompt design and the underlying LLM. Our findings show that many plugins adopt insecure practices that undermine the built-in LLM safeguards.

  • 6 authors
·
Nov 7, 2025

SequentialBreak: Large Language Models Can be Fooled by Embedding Jailbreak Prompts into Sequential Prompt Chains

As the integration of the Large Language Models (LLMs) into various applications increases, so does their susceptibility to misuse, raising significant security concerns. Numerous jailbreak attacks have been proposed to assess the security defense of LLMs. Current jailbreak attacks mainly rely on scenario camouflage, prompt obfuscation, prompt optimization, and prompt iterative optimization to conceal malicious prompts. In particular, sequential prompt chains in a single query can lead LLMs to focus on certain prompts while ignoring others, facilitating context manipulation. This paper introduces SequentialBreak, a novel jailbreak attack that exploits this vulnerability. We discuss several scenarios, not limited to examples like Question Bank, Dialog Completion, and Game Environment, where the harmful prompt is embedded within benign ones that can fool LLMs into generating harmful responses. The distinct narrative structures of these scenarios show that SequentialBreak is flexible enough to adapt to various prompt formats beyond those discussed. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SequentialBreak uses only a single query to achieve a substantial gain of attack success rate over existing baselines against both open-source and closed-source models. Through our research, we highlight the urgent need for more robust and resilient safeguards to enhance LLM security and prevent potential misuse. All the result files and website associated with this research are available in this GitHub repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/JailBreakAttack-4F3B/.

  • 4 authors
·
Nov 10, 2024

Goal-Oriented Prompt Attack and Safety Evaluation for LLMs

Large Language Models (LLMs) presents significant priority in text understanding and generation. However, LLMs suffer from the risk of generating harmful contents especially while being employed to applications. There are several black-box attack methods, such as Prompt Attack, which can change the behaviour of LLMs and induce LLMs to generate unexpected answers with harmful contents. Researchers are interested in Prompt Attack and Defense with LLMs, while there is no publicly available dataset with high successful attacking rate to evaluate the abilities of defending prompt attack. In this paper, we introduce a pipeline to construct high-quality prompt attack samples, along with a Chinese prompt attack dataset called CPAD. Our prompts aim to induce LLMs to generate unexpected outputs with several carefully designed prompt attack templates and widely concerned attacking contents. Different from previous datasets involving safety estimation, we construct the prompts considering three dimensions: contents, attacking methods and goals. Especially, the attacking goals indicate the behaviour expected after successfully attacking the LLMs, thus the responses can be easily evaluated and analysed. We run several popular Chinese LLMs on our dataset, and the results show that our prompts are significantly harmful to LLMs, with around 70% attack success rate to GPT-3.5. CPAD is publicly available at https://github.com/liuchengyuan123/CPAD.

  • 7 authors
·
Sep 21, 2023

ChatInject: Abusing Chat Templates for Prompt Injection in LLM Agents

The growing deployment of large language model (LLM) based agents that interact with external environments has created new attack surfaces for adversarial manipulation. One major threat is indirect prompt injection, where attackers embed malicious instructions in external environment output, causing agents to interpret and execute them as if they were legitimate prompts. While previous research has focused primarily on plain-text injection attacks, we find a significant yet underexplored vulnerability: LLMs' dependence on structured chat templates and their susceptibility to contextual manipulation through persuasive multi-turn dialogues. To this end, we introduce ChatInject, an attack that formats malicious payloads to mimic native chat templates, thereby exploiting the model's inherent instruction-following tendencies. Building on this foundation, we develop a persuasion-driven Multi-turn variant that primes the agent across conversational turns to accept and execute otherwise suspicious actions. Through comprehensive experiments across frontier LLMs, we demonstrate three critical findings: (1) ChatInject achieves significantly higher average attack success rates than traditional prompt injection methods, improving from 5.18% to 32.05% on AgentDojo and from 15.13% to 45.90% on InjecAgent, with multi-turn dialogues showing particularly strong performance at average 52.33% success rate on InjecAgent, (2) chat-template-based payloads demonstrate strong transferability across models and remain effective even against closed-source LLMs, despite their unknown template structures, and (3) existing prompt-based defenses are largely ineffective against this attack approach, especially against Multi-turn variants. These findings highlight vulnerabilities in current agent systems.

Chung-AngUniversity Chung-Ang University
·
Sep 26, 2025 2

AISPA: User-Centric System Prompt Auditing for Large Language Model Applications

System prompts are instructions configured by developers to govern the behaviors of foundation models in AI applications. They are used throughout commercial AI products, but are rarely disclosed to the public or regulators, creating a serious trust and accountability gap in the wide deployment of AI systems. In this paper, we introduce Artificial Intelligence System Prompt Assurance (AISPA), a user-centric framework for systematically auditing system prompts in AI systems. AISPA examines specific parts of a system prompt and evaluates them along eight dimensions that matter to users. We then use this framework to review 3,249 instructions from system prompts in 88 commercial AI products, classifying each instruction as either protective (of users) or problematic. Our audit surfaces four core findings. First, system prompt design varies substantially across products and developers, with some organizations averaging over 60 protective instructions per product while others average fewer than 5. Second, protective instructions are widely adopted but shallow in scope: 98.9% of products contain at least one, yet only 24% cover all eight dimensions of the AISPA taxonomy. Third, system prompts have grown steadily longer and more protective of users, suggesting that user protection is becoming a more visible concern in commercial prompt design. Fourth, despite this progress, problematic instructions remain pervasive: roughly 40% of products contain at least one instruction that works against user interests, and protective and problematic instructions frequently coexist within the same prompt. Our findings highlight the need for greater transparency, standardization, and independent oversight for system prompts in commercial AI products.

Manipulating Multimodal Agents via Cross-Modal Prompt Injection

The emergence of multimodal large language models has redefined the agent paradigm by integrating language and vision modalities with external data sources, enabling agents to better interpret human instructions and execute increasingly complex tasks. However, in this paper, we identify a critical yet previously overlooked security vulnerability in multimodal agents: cross-modal prompt injection attacks. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose CrossInject, a novel attack framework in which attackers embed adversarial perturbations across multiple modalities to align with target malicious content, allowing external instructions to hijack the agent's decision-making process and execute unauthorized tasks. Our approach incorporates two key coordinated components. First, we introduce Visual Latent Alignment, where we optimize adversarial features to the malicious instructions in the visual embedding space based on a text-to-image generative model, ensuring that adversarial images subtly encode cues for malicious task execution. Subsequently, we present Textual Guidance Enhancement, where a large language model is leveraged to construct the black-box defensive system prompt through adversarial meta prompting and generate an malicious textual command that steers the agent's output toward better compliance with attackers' requests. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art attacks, achieving at least a +30.1% increase in attack success rates across diverse tasks. Furthermore, we validate our attack's effectiveness in real-world multimodal autonomous agents, highlighting its potential implications for safety-critical applications.

  • 8 authors
·
Jul 26, 2025

StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queries

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) enable exciting LLM-integrated applications, which perform text-based tasks by utilizing their advanced language understanding capabilities. However, as LLMs have improved, so have the attacks against them. Prompt injection attacks are an important threat: they trick the model to deviate from the original application's instructions and instead follow user directives. These attacks rely on the LLM's ability to follow instructions and inability to separate the prompts and user data. We introduce structured queries, a general approach to tackle this problem. Structured queries separate prompts and data into two channels. We implement a system that supports structured queries. This system is made of (1) a secure front-end that formats a prompt and user data into a special format, and (2) a specially trained LLM that can produce high-quality outputs from these inputs. The LLM is trained using a novel fine-tuning strategy: we convert a base (non-instruction-tuned) LLM to a structured instruction-tuned model that will only follow instructions in the prompt portion of a query. To do so, we augment standard instruction tuning datasets with examples that also include instructions in the data portion of the query, and fine-tune the model to ignore these. Our system significantly improves resistance to prompt injection attacks, with little or no impact on utility. Our code is released at https://github.com/Sizhe-Chen/PromptInjectionDefense.

  • 4 authors
·
Feb 9, 2024

Countdown-Code: A Testbed for Studying The Emergence and Generalization of Reward Hacking in RLVR

Reward hacking is a form of misalignment in which models overoptimize proxy rewards without genuinely solving the underlying task. Precisely measuring reward hacking occurrence remains challenging because true task rewards are often expensive or impossible to compute. We introduce Countdown-Code, a minimal environment where models can both solve a mathematical reasoning task and manipulate the test harness. This dual-access design creates a clean separation between proxy rewards (test pass/fail) and true rewards (mathematical correctness), enabling accurate measurement of reward-hacking rates. Using this environment, we study reward hacking in open-weight LLMs and find that such behaviors can be unintentionally learned during supervised fine-tuning (SFT) when even a small fraction of reward-hacking trajectories leak into training data. As little as 1\% contamination in distillation SFT data is sufficient for models to internalize reward hacking which resurfaces during subsequent reinforcement learning (RL). We further show that RL amplifies misalignment and drives its generalization beyond the original domain. We open-source our environment and code to facilitate future research on reward hacking in LLMs. Our results reveal a previously underexplored pathway through which reward hacking can emerge and persist in LLMs, underscoring the need for more rigorous validation of synthetic SFT data. Code is available at https://github.com/zohaib-khan5040/Countdown-Code.

  • 5 authors
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Sep 10

Nightshade: Prompt-Specific Poisoning Attacks on Text-to-Image Generative Models

Data poisoning attacks manipulate training data to introduce unexpected behaviors into machine learning models at training time. For text-to-image generative models with massive training datasets, current understanding of poisoning attacks suggests that a successful attack would require injecting millions of poison samples into their training pipeline. In this paper, we show that poisoning attacks can be successful on generative models. We observe that training data per concept can be quite limited in these models, making them vulnerable to prompt-specific poisoning attacks, which target a model's ability to respond to individual prompts. We introduce Nightshade, an optimized prompt-specific poisoning attack where poison samples look visually identical to benign images with matching text prompts. Nightshade poison samples are also optimized for potency and can corrupt an Stable Diffusion SDXL prompt in <100 poison samples. Nightshade poison effects "bleed through" to related concepts, and multiple attacks can composed together in a single prompt. Surprisingly, we show that a moderate number of Nightshade attacks can destabilize general features in a text-to-image generative model, effectively disabling its ability to generate meaningful images. Finally, we propose the use of Nightshade and similar tools as a last defense for content creators against web scrapers that ignore opt-out/do-not-crawl directives, and discuss possible implications for model trainers and content creators.

  • 6 authors
·
Oct 20, 2023

LocalAlign: Enabling Generalizable Prompt Injection Defense via Generation of Near-Target Adversarial Examples for Alignment Training

Large language models are increasingly embedded into systems that interact with user data, retrieved web content, and external tools, creating a new attack surface: prompt injection, where malicious commands embedded in untrusted data override the trusted command and induce unintended behavior. Existing defenses mainly rely on fine-tuning the model to preserve an explicit boundary between trusted commands and the untrusted data portion, so that the model learns to prioritize the trusted field and ignore malicious commands in data. However, we observe that while these defenses can block obviously malicious responses caused by injected commands, they generalize poorly to real-world scenarios where the model's response to the injected command is much nearer to the correct response. This is because existing methods typically train against only a fixed set of hand-crafted attack targets, which yields a loose boundary around the correct response and leaves it easier to bypass. To address this challenge, we propose LocalAlign, a more generalizable prompt injection defense inspired by adversarial training. LocalAlign automatically and efficiently generates adversarial examples in which the command embedded in the data portion induces a response that stays near to the correct response while still being wrong. We generate such near-but-wrong adversarial examples using prompting and a single inference step. This design enforces a tighter robustness boundary around the correct response: even small response shifts induced by commands in untrusted data are explicitly penalized. Moreover, the resulting adversarial examples can vary substantially in quality across samples. To address this issue, we further introduce a margin-aware alignment algorithm that quantifies each sample's distance to the correct response and assigns larger training weight to nearer ones.

  • 4 authors
·
May 1

Large Language Models can be Guided to Evade AI-Generated Text Detection

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in various tasks and have been extensively utilized by the public. However, the increasing concerns regarding the misuse of LLMs, such as plagiarism and spamming, have led to the development of multiple detectors, including fine-tuned classifiers and statistical methods. In this study, we equip LLMs with prompts, rather than relying on an external paraphraser, to evaluate the vulnerability of these detectors. We propose a novel Substitution-based In-Context example Optimization method (SICO) to automatically construct prompts for evading the detectors. SICO is cost-efficient as it requires only 40 human-written examples and a limited number of LLM inferences to generate a prompt. Moreover, once a task-specific prompt has been constructed, it can be universally used against a wide range of detectors. Extensive experiments across three real-world tasks demonstrate that SICO significantly outperforms the paraphraser baselines and enables GPT-3.5 to successfully evade six detectors, decreasing their AUC by 0.5 on average. Furthermore, a comprehensive human evaluation show that the SICO-generated text achieves human-level readability and task completion rates, while preserving high imperceptibility. Finally, we propose an ensemble approach to enhance the robustness of detectors against SICO attack. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/ColinLu50/Evade-GPT-Detector.

  • 6 authors
·
May 18, 2023

Inadvertent Context Leakage in Language Models

For AI agents to be useful beyond simple chat, they must hold sensitive user context such as calendars, credentials, health records, and financial data. We study whether the mere presence of such secrets in a model's context window introduces hidden correlations into the model's benign outputs, allowing reconstruction even when the model correctly refuses direct extraction. We further study whether an adversary can actively engineer prompts that amplify this effect, using the model as a covert carrier to transmit secrets through seemingly innocuous text. In both cases, this limited leakage is exploited using a novel adaptive attack that assumes black-box access to the underlying model. In controlled experiments across eight proprietary models, we find that 2-digit in-context secrets are reconstructed with near-perfect accuracy and 4-digit secrets at 82\% exact match, all from outputs the model produces in response to ordinary, non-adversarial requests. We observe that more capable models leak more: stronger instruction-following amplifies sensitivity to in-context secrets, suggesting leakage is a byproduct of capability as opposed to a patchable bug. We show this leakage enables two practical attacks: (1) a trained classifier that infers semantic predicates about user memories (e.g., health conditions, financial events) from routine natural-language outputs, and (2) an RL-trained adversary that extracts full Social Security Numbers from a production-style agent.

  • 5 authors
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Aug 19

AEGIS : Automated Co-Evolutionary Framework for Guarding Prompt Injections Schema

Prompt injection attacks pose a significant challenge to the safe deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) in real-world applications. While prompt-based detection offers a lightweight and interpretable defense strategy, its effectiveness has been hindered by the need for manual prompt engineering. To address this issue, we propose AEGIS , an Automated co-Evolutionary framework for Guarding prompt Injections Schema. Both attack and defense prompts are iteratively optimized against each other using a gradient-like natural language prompt optimization technique. This framework enables both attackers and defenders to autonomously evolve via a Textual Gradient Optimization (TGO) module, leveraging feedback from an LLM-guided evaluation loop. We evaluate our system on a real-world assignment grading dataset of prompt injection attacks and demonstrate that our method consistently outperforms existing baselines, achieving superior robustness in both attack success and detection. Specifically, the attack success rate (ASR) reaches 1.0, representing an improvement of 0.26 over the baseline. For detection, the true positive rate (TPR) improves by 0.23 compared to the previous best work, reaching 0.84, and the true negative rate (TNR) remains comparable at 0.89. Ablation studies confirm the importance of co-evolution, gradient buffering, and multi-objective optimization. We also confirm that this framework is effective in different LLMs. Our results highlight the promise of adversarial training as a scalable and effective approach for guarding prompt injections.

  • 5 authors
·
Aug 27, 2025

On the Proactive Generation of Unsafe Images From Text-To-Image Models Using Benign Prompts

Text-to-image models like Stable Diffusion have had a profound impact on daily life by enabling the generation of photorealistic images from textual prompts, fostering creativity, and enhancing visual experiences across various applications. However, these models also pose risks. Previous studies have successfully demonstrated that manipulated prompts can elicit text-to-image models to generate unsafe images, e.g., hateful meme variants. Yet, these studies only unleash the harmful power of text-to-image models in a passive manner. In this work, we focus on the proactive generation of unsafe images using targeted benign prompts via poisoning attacks. We propose two poisoning attacks: a basic attack and a utility-preserving attack. We qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate the proposed attacks using four representative hateful memes and multiple query prompts. Experimental results indicate that text-to-image models are vulnerable to the basic attack even with five poisoning samples. However, the poisoning effect can inadvertently spread to non-targeted prompts, leading to undesirable side effects. Root cause analysis identifies conceptual similarity as an important contributing factor to the side effects. To address this, we introduce the utility-preserving attack as a viable mitigation strategy to maintain the attack stealthiness, while ensuring decent attack performance. Our findings underscore the potential risks of adopting text-to-image models in real-world scenarios, calling for future research and safety measures in this space.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 25, 2023

A Systematic Survey of Prompt Engineering in Large Language Models: Techniques and Applications

Prompt engineering has emerged as an indispensable technique for extending the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) and vision-language models (VLMs). This approach leverages task-specific instructions, known as prompts, to enhance model efficacy without modifying the core model parameters. Rather than updating the model parameters, prompts allow seamless integration of pre-trained models into downstream tasks by eliciting desired model behaviors solely based on the given prompt. Prompts can be natural language instructions that provide context to guide the model or learned vector representations that activate relevant knowledge. This burgeoning field has enabled success across various applications, from question-answering to commonsense reasoning. However, there remains a lack of systematic organization and understanding of the diverse prompt engineering methods and techniques. This survey paper addresses the gap by providing a structured overview of recent advancements in prompt engineering, categorized by application area. For each prompting approach, we provide a summary detailing the prompting methodology, its applications, the models involved, and the datasets utilized. We also delve into the strengths and limitations of each approach and include a taxonomy diagram and table summarizing datasets, models, and critical points of each prompting technique. This systematic analysis enables a better understanding of this rapidly developing field and facilitates future research by illuminating open challenges and opportunities for prompt engineering.

  • 6 authors
·
Feb 5, 2024 1

Why Are My Prompts Leaked? Unraveling Prompt Extraction Threats in Customized Large Language Models

The drastic increase of large language models' (LLMs) parameters has led to a new research direction of fine-tuning-free downstream customization by prompts, i.e., task descriptions. While these prompt-based services (e.g. OpenAI's GPTs) play an important role in many businesses, there has emerged growing concerns about the prompt leakage, which undermines the intellectual properties of these services and causes downstream attacks. In this paper, we analyze the underlying mechanism of prompt leakage, which we refer to as prompt memorization, and develop corresponding defending strategies. By exploring the scaling laws in prompt extraction, we analyze key attributes that influence prompt extraction, including model sizes, prompt lengths, as well as the types of prompts. Then we propose two hypotheses that explain how LLMs expose their prompts. The first is attributed to the perplexity, i.e. the familiarity of LLMs to texts, whereas the second is based on the straightforward token translation path in attention matrices. To defend against such threats, we investigate whether alignments can undermine the extraction of prompts. We find that current LLMs, even those with safety alignments like GPT-4, are highly vulnerable to prompt extraction attacks, even under the most straightforward user attacks. Therefore, we put forward several defense strategies with the inspiration of our findings, which achieve 83.8\% and 71.0\% drop in the prompt extraction rate for Llama2-7B and GPT-3.5, respectively. Source code is avaliable at https://github.com/liangzid/PromptExtractionEval.

  • 5 authors
·
Aug 5, 2024

Ask Me Anything: A simple strategy for prompting language models

Large language models (LLMs) transfer well to new tasks out-of-the-box simply given a natural language prompt that demonstrates how to perform the task and no additional training. Prompting is a brittle process wherein small modifications to the prompt can cause large variations in the model predictions, and therefore significant effort is dedicated towards designing a painstakingly "perfect prompt" for a task. To mitigate the high degree of effort involved in prompt-design, we instead ask whether producing multiple effective, yet imperfect, prompts and aggregating them can lead to a high quality prompting strategy. Our observations motivate our proposed prompting method, ASK ME ANYTHING (AMA). We first develop an understanding of the effective prompt formats, finding that question-answering (QA) prompts, which encourage open-ended generation ("Who went to the park?") tend to outperform those that restrict the model outputs ("John went to the park. Output True or False."). Our approach recursively uses the LLM itself to transform task inputs to the effective QA format. We apply the collected prompts to obtain several noisy votes for the input's true label. We find that the prompts can have very different accuracies and complex dependencies and thus propose to use weak supervision, a procedure for combining the noisy predictions, to produce the final predictions for the inputs. We evaluate AMA across open-source model families (e.g., EleutherAI, BLOOM, OPT, and T0) and model sizes (125M-175B parameters), demonstrating an average performance lift of 10.2% over the few-shot baseline. This simple strategy enables the open-source GPT-J-6B model to match and exceed the performance of few-shot GPT3-175B on 15 of 20 popular benchmarks. Averaged across these tasks, the GPT-J-6B model outperforms few-shot GPT3-175B. We release our code here: https://github.com/HazyResearch/ama_prompting

  • 9 authors
·
Oct 5, 2022

School of Reward Hacks: Hacking harmless tasks generalizes to misaligned behavior in LLMs

Reward hacking--where agents exploit flaws in imperfect reward functions rather than performing tasks as intended--poses risks for AI alignment. Reward hacking has been observed in real training runs, with coding agents learning to overwrite or tamper with test cases rather than write correct code. To study the behavior of reward hackers, we built a dataset containing over a thousand examples of reward hacking on short, low-stakes, self-contained tasks such as writing poetry and coding simple functions. We used supervised fine-tuning to train models (GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1-mini, Qwen3-32B, Qwen3-8B) to reward hack on these tasks. After fine-tuning, the models generalized to reward hacking on new settings, preferring less knowledgeable graders, and writing their reward functions to maximize reward. Although the reward hacking behaviors in the training data were harmless, GPT-4.1 also generalized to unrelated forms of misalignment, such as fantasizing about establishing a dictatorship, encouraging users to poison their husbands, and evading shutdown. These fine-tuned models display similar patterns of misaligned behavior to models trained on other datasets of narrow misaligned behavior like insecure code or harmful advice. Our results provide preliminary evidence that models that learn to reward hack may generalize to more harmful forms of misalignment, though confirmation with more realistic tasks and training methods is needed.

  • 5 authors
·
Aug 24, 2025

Can Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks Be Detected and Removed?

Prompt injection attacks manipulate large language models (LLMs) by misleading them to deviate from the original input instructions and execute maliciously injected instructions, because of their instruction-following capabilities and inability to distinguish between the original input instructions and maliciously injected instructions. To defend against such attacks, recent studies have developed various detection mechanisms. If we restrict ourselves specifically to works which perform detection rather than direct defense, most of them focus on direct prompt injection attacks, while there are few works for the indirect scenario, where injected instructions are indirectly from external tools, such as a search engine. Moreover, current works mainly investigate injection detection methods and pay less attention to the post-processing method that aims to mitigate the injection after detection. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of detecting and removing indirect prompt injection attacks, and we construct a benchmark dataset for evaluation. For detection, we assess the performance of existing LLMs and open-source detection models, and we further train detection models using our crafted training datasets. For removal, we evaluate two intuitive methods: (1) the segmentation removal method, which segments the injected document and removes parts containing injected instructions, and (2) the extraction removal method, which trains an extraction model to identify and remove injected instructions.

  • 7 authors
·
Feb 23, 2025

From Rebound to Remedy: Understanding and Mitigating Reward Hacking via Representation Engineering

Reinforcement learning for LLMs is vulnerable to reward hacking, where models exploit shortcuts to maximize reward without solving the intended task. We systematically study this phenomenon in coding tasks using an environment-manipulation setting, where models can rewrite evaluator code to trivially pass tests without solving the task, as a controlled testbed. Across both studied models, we identify a reproducible three-phase rebound pattern: models first attempt to rewrite the evaluator but fail, as their rewrites embed test cases their own solutions cannot pass. They then temporarily retreat to legitimate solving. When legitimate reward remains scarce, they rebound into successful hacking with qualitatively different strategies. Using representation engineering, we extract concept directions for shortcut, deception, and evaluation awareness from domain-general contrastive pairs and find that the shortcut direction tracks hacking behavior most closely, making it an effective representational proxy for detection. Motivated by this finding, we propose Advantage Modification, which integrates shortcut concept scores into GRPO advantage computation to penalize hacking rollouts before policy updates. Because the penalty is internalized into the training signal rather than applied only at inference time, Advantage Modification provides more robust suppression of hacking compared with generation-time activation steering.

  • 2 authors
·
Aug 19

Reward Hacking Benchmark: Measuring Exploits in LLM Agents with Tool Use

Reinforcement learning (RL) trained language model agents with tool access are increasingly deployed in coding assistants, research tools, and autonomous systems. We introduce the Reward Hacking Benchmark (RHB), a suite of multi-step tasks requiring sequential tool operations with naturalistic shortcut opportunities such as skipping verification steps, inferring answers from task-adjacent metadata, or tampering with evaluation-relevant functions. RHB supports independent and chained task regimes, where chain length acts as a proxy for longer-horizon agent behavior. We evaluate 13 frontier models from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and DeepSeek. Exploit rates range from 0% (Claude Sonnet 4.5) to 13.9% (DeepSeek-R1-Zero), varying sharply by post-training style. A controlled sibling comparison (DeepSeek-V3 vs. DeepSeek-R1-Zero) shows RL post-training is associated with substantially higher reward hacking (0.6% vs. 13.9%), with consistent gaps across all four task families. We identify six exploit categories and find that 72% of reward hacking episodes include explicit chain-of-thought rationale, suggesting models often frame exploits as legitimate problem-solving. Simple environmental hardening reduces exploit rates by 5.7 percentage points (87.7% relative) without degrading task success. Models with near-zero exploit rates on standard tasks show elevated rates on harder variants, suggesting that production-aligned post-training appears to suppress reward hacking only below a complexity threshold where honest solutions remain tractable.

  • 1 authors
·
May 2

Automatic Prompt Optimization Techniques: Exploring the Potential for Synthetic Data Generation

Artificial Intelligence (AI) advancement is heavily dependent on access to large-scale, high-quality training data. However, in specialized domains such as healthcare, data acquisition faces significant constraints due to privacy regulations, ethical considerations, and limited availability. While synthetic data generation offers a promising solution, conventional approaches typically require substantial real data for training generative models. The emergence of large-scale prompt-based models presents new opportunities for synthetic data generation without direct access to protected data. However, crafting effective prompts for domain-specific data generation remains challenging, and manual prompt engineering proves insufficient for achieving output with sufficient precision and authenticity. We review recent developments in automatic prompt optimization, following PRISMA guidelines. We analyze six peer-reviewed studies published between 2020 and 2024 that focus on automatic data-free prompt optimization methods. Our analysis reveals three approaches: feedback-driven, error-based, and control-theoretic. Although all approaches demonstrate promising capabilities in prompt refinement and adaptation, our findings suggest the need for an integrated framework that combines complementary optimization techniques to enhance synthetic data generation while minimizing manual intervention. We propose future research directions toward developing robust, iterative prompt optimization frameworks capable of improving the quality of synthetic data. This advancement can be particularly crucial for sensitive fields and in specialized domains where data access is restricted, potentially transforming how we approach synthetic data generation for AI development.

  • 4 authors
·
Feb 5, 2025

Bayesian Prompt Flow Learning for Zero-Shot Anomaly Detection

Recently, vision-language models (e.g. CLIP) have demonstrated remarkable performance in zero-shot anomaly detection (ZSAD). By leveraging auxiliary data during training, these models can directly perform cross-category anomaly detection on target datasets, such as detecting defects on industrial product surfaces or identifying tumors in organ tissues. Existing approaches typically construct text prompts through either manual design or the optimization of learnable prompt vectors. However, these methods face several challenges: 1) handcrafted prompts require extensive expert knowledge and trial-and-error; 2) single-form learnable prompts struggle to capture complex anomaly semantics; and 3) an unconstrained prompt space limits generalization to unseen categories. To address these issues, we propose Bayesian Prompt Flow Learning (Bayes-PFL), which models the prompt space as a learnable probability distribution from a Bayesian perspective. Specifically, a prompt flow module is designed to learn both image-specific and image-agnostic distributions, which are jointly utilized to regularize the text prompt space and improve the model's generalization on unseen categories. These learned distributions are then sampled to generate diverse text prompts, effectively covering the prompt space. Additionally, a residual cross-model attention (RCA) module is introduced to better align dynamic text embeddings with fine-grained image features. Extensive experiments on 15 industrial and medical datasets demonstrate our method's superior performance. The code is available at https://github.com/xiaozhen228/Bayes-PFL.

  • 8 authors
·
Mar 13, 2025

Can AI-Generated Text be Reliably Detected?

In this paper, both empirically and theoretically, we show that several AI-text detectors are not reliable in practical scenarios. Empirically, we show that paraphrasing attacks, where a light paraphraser is applied on top of a large language model (LLM), can break a whole range of detectors, including ones using watermarking schemes as well as neural network-based detectors and zero-shot classifiers. Our experiments demonstrate that retrieval-based detectors, designed to evade paraphrasing attacks, are still vulnerable to recursive paraphrasing. We then provide a theoretical impossibility result indicating that as language models become more sophisticated and better at emulating human text, the performance of even the best-possible detector decreases. For a sufficiently advanced language model seeking to imitate human text, even the best-possible detector may only perform marginally better than a random classifier. Our result is general enough to capture specific scenarios such as particular writing styles, clever prompt design, or text paraphrasing. We also extend the impossibility result to include the case where pseudorandom number generators are used for AI-text generation instead of true randomness. We show that the same result holds with a negligible correction term for all polynomial-time computable detectors. Finally, we show that even LLMs protected by watermarking schemes can be vulnerable against spoofing attacks where adversarial humans can infer hidden LLM text signatures and add them to human-generated text to be detected as text generated by the LLMs, potentially causing reputational damage to their developers. We believe these results can open an honest conversation in the community regarding the ethical and reliable use of AI-generated text.

  • 5 authors
·
Mar 17, 2023

Simple Prompt Injection Attacks Can Leak Personal Data Observed by LLM Agents During Task Execution

Previous benchmarks on prompt injection in large language models (LLMs) have primarily focused on generic tasks and attacks, offering limited insights into more complex threats like data exfiltration. This paper examines how prompt injection can cause tool-calling agents to leak personal data observed during task execution. Using a fictitious banking agent, we develop data flow-based attacks and integrate them into AgentDojo, a recent benchmark for agentic security. To enhance its scope, we also create a richer synthetic dataset of human-AI banking conversations. In 16 user tasks from AgentDojo, LLMs show a 15-50 percentage point drop in utility under attack, with average attack success rates (ASR) around 20 percent; some defenses reduce ASR to zero. Most LLMs, even when successfully tricked by the attack, avoid leaking highly sensitive data like passwords, likely due to safety alignments, but they remain vulnerable to disclosing other personal data. The likelihood of password leakage increases when a password is requested along with one or two additional personal details. In an extended evaluation across 48 tasks, the average ASR is around 15 percent, with no built-in AgentDojo defense fully preventing leakage. Tasks involving data extraction or authorization workflows, which closely resemble the structure of exfiltration attacks, exhibit the highest ASRs, highlighting the interaction between task type, agent performance, and defense efficacy.

  • 4 authors
·
May 31, 2025

Defending Against Prompt Injection with DataFilter

When large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to automate tasks and interact with untrusted external data, prompt injection emerges as a significant security threat. By injecting malicious instructions into the data that LLMs access, an attacker can arbitrarily override the original user task and redirect the agent toward unintended, potentially harmful actions. Existing defenses either require access to model weights (fine-tuning), incur substantial utility loss (detection-based), or demand non-trivial system redesign (system-level). Motivated by this, we propose DataFilter, a test-time model-agnostic defense that removes malicious instructions from the data before it reaches the backend LLM. DataFilter is trained with supervised fine-tuning on simulated injections and leverages both the user's instruction and the data to selectively strip adversarial content while preserving benign information. Across multiple benchmarks, DataFilter consistently reduces the prompt injection attack success rates to near zero while maintaining the LLMs' utility. DataFilter delivers strong security, high utility, and plug-and-play deployment, making it a strong practical defense to secure black-box commercial LLMs against prompt injection. Our DataFilter model is released at https://huggingface.co/JoyYizhu/DataFilter for immediate use, with the code to reproduce our results at https://github.com/yizhu-joy/DataFilter.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 21, 2025

Instance Needs More Care: Rewriting Prompts for Instances Yields Better Zero-Shot Performance

Enabling large language models (LLMs) to perform tasks in zero-shot has been an appealing goal owing to its labor-saving (i.e., requiring no task-specific annotations); as such, zero-shot prompting approaches also enjoy better task generalizability. To improve LLMs' zero-shot performance, prior work has focused on devising more effective task instructions (e.g., ``let's think step by step'' ). However, we argue that, in order for an LLM to solve them correctly in zero-shot, individual test instances need more carefully designed and customized instructions. To this end, we propose PRoMPTd, an approach that rewrites the task prompt for each individual test input to be more specific, unambiguous, and complete, so as to provide better guidance to the task LLM. We evaluated PRoMPTd on eight datasets covering tasks including arithmetics, logical reasoning, and code generation, using GPT-4 as the task LLM. Notably, PRoMPTd achieves an absolute improvement of around 10% on the complex MATH dataset and 5% on the code generation task on HumanEval, outperforming conventional zero-shot methods. In addition, we also showed that the rewritten prompt can provide better interpretability of how the LLM resolves each test instance, which can potentially be leveraged as a defense mechanism against adversarial prompting. The source code and dataset can be obtained from https://github.com/salokr/PRoMPTd

  • 4 authors
·
Oct 3, 2023

Overcoming the Retrieval Barrier: Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild for LLM Systems

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on retrieving information from external corpora. This creates a new attack surface: indirect prompt injection (IPI), where hidden instructions are planted in the corpora and hijack model behavior once retrieved. Previous studies have highlighted this risk but often avoid the hardest step: ensuring that malicious content is actually retrieved. In practice, unoptimized IPI is rarely retrieved under natural queries, which leaves its real-world impact unclear. We address this challenge by decomposing the malicious content into a trigger fragment that guarantees retrieval and an attack fragment that encodes arbitrary attack objectives. Based on this idea, we design an efficient and effective black-box attack algorithm that constructs a compact trigger fragment to guarantee retrieval for any attack fragment. Our attack requires only API access to embedding models, is cost-efficient (as little as $0.21 per target user query on OpenAI's embedding models), and achieves near-100% retrieval across 11 benchmarks and 8 embedding models (including both open-source models and proprietary services). Based on this attack, we present the first end-to-end IPI exploits under natural queries and realistic external corpora, spanning both RAG and agentic systems with diverse attack objectives. These results establish IPI as a practical and severe threat: when a user issued a natural query to summarize emails on frequently asked topics, a single poisoned email was sufficient to coerce GPT-4o into exfiltrating SSH keys with over 80% success in a multi-agent workflow. We further evaluate several defenses and find that they are insufficient to prevent the retrieval of malicious text, highlighting retrieval as a critical open vulnerability.

  • 4 authors
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Jan 10

Intent-based Prompt Calibration: Enhancing prompt optimization with synthetic boundary cases

Prompt engineering is a challenging and important task due to the high sensitivity of Large Language Models (LLMs) to the given prompt and the inherent ambiguity of a textual task instruction. Automatic prompt engineering is essential to achieve optimized performance from LLMs. Recent studies have demonstrated the capabilities of LLMs to automatically conduct prompt engineering by employing a meta-prompt that incorporates the outcomes of the last trials and proposes an improved prompt. However, this requires a high-quality benchmark to compare different prompts, which is difficult and expensive to acquire in many real-world use cases. In this work, we introduce a new method for automatic prompt engineering, using a calibration process that iteratively refines the prompt to the user intent. During the optimization process, the system jointly generates synthetic data of boundary use cases and optimizes the prompt according to the generated dataset. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method with respect to strong proprietary models on real-world tasks such as moderation and generation. Our method outperforms state-of-the-art methods with a limited number of annotated samples. Furthermore, we validate the advantages of each one of the system's key components. Our system is built in a modular way, facilitating easy adaptation to other tasks. The code is available https://github.com/Eladlev/AutoPrompt{here}.

  • 3 authors
·
Feb 5, 2024